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This dissertation proposes a radically new understanding of North Korean politics under 
Kim Jong Il and carefully tests this theoretical proposition. Current models describe North Korea 
as some form of a highly centralized state: totalitarian, personalistic, or corporatist. By contrast, I 
argue that these monolithic ideal types fail to capture the institutional pluralism that helps 
distinguish the younger Kim’s rein from his father’s. While Kim Il Sung’s rule can be described 
as totalitarian, Kim Jong Il governs through a more decentralized post-totalitarian, institutionally 
plural state. 
 
Kim Jong Il’s government is highly centralized, but it is less centralized than his father’s.  
North Korean politics comprises the interaction of the military, party, and cabinet with 
“oversight” by the security apparatus.  These institutions enjoy limited autonomy in an effort to 
most productively leverage their expertise while retaining generalist political control over them.  
Kim and his inner circle of advisers have final authority, but institutional inputs set the decision-
making stage and shape most policies’ implementation.    
 
These semi-autonomous groups have opportunity and cause to interact in the policy 
formation and execution process, creating room to discuss pluralist politics in North Korea.  Kim 
Jong Il’s focus on political survival and emergency management over ideology as a guiding force 
makes today’s North Korean government more rational than in the past but it does not suggest 
that ideology is irrelevant.  Bureaucratic winners and losers are defined on an issue basis.  In 
short, institutional politics – in conjunction with Kim Jong Il’s critical role – help explain 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“North Korea is a country that has a very vertically oriented governing structure to be 
sure… but at the same time it is place for politics. And so I think it is fair to say that there 
are people in North Korea who really are not with the program here, really rather 
continue to be producing this plutonium for whatever reason.”   
 
-- Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Chris Hill 
March 25, 20081 
  
Chairman of the National Defense Commission and General Secretary of the Korean 
Worker’s Party Kim Jong Il hosted South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in Pyongyang for an 
historic summit in June 2000.  One of the long-standing issues under discussion was the 
presences of American troops on the Korean peninsula.  The DPRK ostensibly existed to protect 
Koreans and their special, moral, socialist way of life from the violent, greedy, and uncivilized 
imperialists and puppet counterparts south of the DMZ.   
DPRK Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun told South Korean President Kim Dae Jung that 
the U.S. military must remove all its troops from the peninsula.  Kim Jong Il reportedly 
interrupted, “What problem would there be if the U.S. military remained?”  Seeming surprised, 
Kim Yong-sun began presenting the party line.  The United States military threatened North 
Korea and impaired national reunification.  The long-held North Korean position was simple: the 
U.S. must withdraw.   
The North Korean Party Secretary did not get his whole line out.  Kim Jong Il again 
interrupted, “Secretary Yong-sun, stop that.  Even though I try to do something, people under me 
oppose it like this. Perhaps the military, too, must have the same view of the U.S. military as 
Secretary Yong-sun. The U.S. military should not attack us. But, in President Kim's explanation, 
there are some aspects I concur with. (The U.S. military) need not withdraw now. It will be good 
for the U.S. military to remain to maintain peace even after reunification.”     
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung asked, “But in press articles, does not North 
Korea always demand the U.S. military withdrawal?” Kim Jong-il replied, “It is for domestic 
consumption. As there is the aspect that our military also maintains (discipline) through tension, 
I hope you will not be so concerned.”2   
                                                           
1 Christopher Hill, Remarks at the Washington Forum for the Atlantic Council of United States.  Quoted in “US 
Warns North Korean Politics Could Scuttle Nuclear Deal,” Agence France Presse, March 25, 2008.   
2 “Kim Jong-il interrupts own official to say U.S. forces may stay after reunification,” Choson Ilbo August 9, 2000, 






Kim Jong Il was either making history or playing tactical games.  This incident could 
easily have been staged.  However, he also may have been expressing genuine conflict within his 
regime.  Groups within North Korea may reveal preferences, and Kim may have to balance and 
placate these groups.  My theory of North Korean politics laid out in the following chapter holds 
out the possibility that events like this one are not staged.  North Korea’s highest-level defector 
Hwang Jang Yop has described Kim as one who often publicly castigates senior officials on a 
whim.3  Political psychologists note he is prone to impulsive remarks and policy stands.4  It is 
possible that this display actually reflected different bureaucratic positions within the state that 
Kim seeks to control.   
It is not uncommon for North Korea specialists, especially in government circles, to 
assert that Kim is the only important node in North Korean politics.  However, Kim cannot rule 
by fiat; individuals and institutions below him matter.  At the very least, they inform and execute 
the most strategic-level decisions and make more operational decisions based on their 
understanding of Kim’s wishes.  An important goal for any analyst of North Korean politics is to 
understand how this internal politics works.  Whether recognized or not, assumptions about the 
North Korean political system shape one’s view of how it reacts to its external environment.  A 
poor understanding of North Korean politics will inevitably lead one to call the products of that 
political system (policy choices) “surprising” or “perplexing.”  
This book’s core argument is that the existing models of North Korean politics do a poor 
job of explaining the regime’s political process.  North Korean actions are continually labeled 
surprising precisely because of this inadequate view of its political operations.  This study seeks 
to explain – and even predict – North Korea’s policy choices based on a revised understanding of 
its basic functions.   
In this specific incident, Kim Jong Il may have decided to shift course given this changed 
external environment, but what explains the stop-and-go nature of a strategic change in course?  
Why suffer the costs of loosened administrative control over the economy to foster economic 
efficiency if the state is simply going to reverse these gains the following year?  How can the 
state pursue contradictory policies simultaneously and why do some senior leaders cautiously 
voice opposition to decided policy if all policy choices originate from the “nerve center” (Kim)?  
The various monolithic ideal types described in greater detail in the following chapter are 
inadequate to the task of describing and predicting North Korean political choices.  Incorporating 
North Korea’s institutional politics into a model of the regime’s functions goes a long way to 
aiding our understanding of Pyongyang’s policy choices and beyond.     
Additionally, the summit statement reminds analysts that establishing the meaning and 
authenticity of statements remains challenging.  Are North Korean statements merely tactical 
efforts to deceive the outside world or do they also serve as a conduit for internal 
communication?  Pyongyang’s focus on information security leads it to try to deceive hostile 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Yomiuri August 10, 2000, p. 1, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).  Don Kirk, “A North Korean Shift on 
Opposing U.S. Troops?” International Herald Tribune, August 10, 2000, p. 1.  
3 Hwang Jang Yop, Nanun Yoksaui Chillirul Poatta [I Saw the Truth of History] (Seoul: Hanul, 1999).   
4 Jerrold Post, “Kim Jong Il of North Korea: In the Shadow of His Father,” in Leaders and Their Followers in a 






states even more than most countries.  However, concerns about internal threats to Kim’s power 
lead the state to stovepipe information, or compartment access to data in such a way as to restrict 
cross-institutional collaboration and communication.  Demand for cross-institutional 
communication prompts leaders to debate strategic policy choices in the North Korean press, 
where central leadership can keep a close eye on these communications.  Systematically 
analyzing this data in context can help the outside observer see the interaction between various 
interests inside North Korea.   
Views of the Regime 
 The popular view that only one man matters in North Korea quickly breaks down upon 
investigation.  One may hypothesize that policy reversals are a function of a dictator ultimately 
unsure of his own decisions and second guessing himself.  Of course, this does not square well 
with the popular or scholarly image of the dictator.  Instead, Kim may be playing tactical games 
to merely sustain a regime lacking any existential purpose.  This too has difficulty explaining a 
host of specific policy programs pursued and general goals like reunification and anti-
imperialism that remain.  Indeed, one may even label this cartoonish view of the North Korean 
state as a straw man; much more sophisticated views of the North Korean state exist that still 
present the state as some type of monolith.   
 One can read a number of excellent accounts of U.S.-North Korean negotiations.  These 
explain in great detail the bureaucratic conflict within the U.S. government during these 
negotiations but rarely refer to any sub-state actor in North Korea.5  While these thoughtful 
authors recognize some internal dynamic must operate in North Korea as well, they readily admit 
that this process is unknown.  Unknown does not imply unknowable and provides one 
motivation for this project.     
 Partisans in the debate over whether to engage the North dispute whether the state has or 
can uphold any of its international commitments.  Both sides can select data to bolster their 
argument, but it often does not serve a fruitful analytical purpose.  It does not help explain why 
North Korea upholds its international commitments sometimes and breaks them at other times.  
Further, it does not explain why the opaque state pursues a risky economic policy of 
marketization, for example, simply to later change course.   
This study argues that divergent policy choices reflect, in part, different views and 
interests within the state.  Kim must react to domestic as well as international stimuli.  One must 
first recognize that internal politics matters and then specifically how North Korean internal 
politics functions to produce different policy outputs.  Such as project has utility for both 
comparative theorists and policy analysts concerned with how the state functions.  The project 
focuses on the how question, since, if it demonstrates a consistent pattern of North Korean 
politics, inherently refutes the argument that sub-Kim domestic politics do not matter.   
                                                           
5 Leon Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1998).  Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman, and Robert Gallucci, Going Critical: the First North Korean Nuclear 
Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).  Charles Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story 
of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: 






Diverse Institutional Views 
The empirical chapters detail the policy positions that different institutions within North 
Korea express in the official media.  They expose these diverse policy preferences to an internal 
audience carefully, recognizing that foreign observers and the top leadership may read their 
articles.  This exercise exposes a number of specific and general debates including budget fights 
over the relative merits of allocating funding to agriculture and consumer goods versus the 
military and heavy industry.  It shows high-level cabinet members attending ceremonies 
committing rail and road connections across the DMZ and hosting South Korean trade 
delegations at the same time that party and military officials speak of insulating the state from 
foreign pressures and engaging in deadly interactions with the South Korean military.   
Institutions regularly and openly identify revealed policy preferences as belonging to 
their institution and even question policy directions sanctioned by Kim.  For example, in 1998 a 
senior military official said, “The Korean People's Army expected nothing from the agreement 
[Agreed Framework] and had no interest in dialogue and negotiation through diplomatic 
channels.  Now, the United States, throwing away the mask of ‘appeasement’ and ‘engagement’ 
… prove that the KPA's judgment and stand were completely correct.”6  It is only human to want 
to express to one’s colleagues when one’s policy preferences should be implemented or to claim 
victory by being “right.”  More importantly, it is common to rational modes of policy creation to 
utilize the information resources available in different parts of the system.  Communication 
between working-level and senior-level officials below Kim and his inner circle is necessary for 
rational rule.   
This more divided political system has allowed greater discussions on several important 
issues.  The cabinet, party, and military have expressed distinct views on the strategic direction 
of the North Korean economy.  Increased marketization has experienced a back-and-forth 
trajectory over the timeframe under analysis, largely reflecting the success and failures of the 
state’s three institutions to allow or crack down on societal-driven economic changes.  Though 
party and military officials favor greater socialist orthodoxy in the North’s economy, market 
economics plays a greater role under Kim Jong Il’s system than under Kim Il Sung’s regime.  
North Korea’s economy still maintains significant elements of a command economy and the state 
has not made any irreversible decisions to comprehensively reform the economy, but the 
command economy has shrunk in the last decade.  The cabinet has been at the forefront of 
advocating a greater role for markets, decentralized enterprise management, and other 
mechanisms to increase the efficiency of the North Korean economy.   
Kim Jong Il’s North Korea has likewise demonstrated its system functions according to a 
different model in the critical areas of anti-imperialism and reunification policy.  The concrete 
manifestations of these two areas are Pyongyang’s foreign policy towards the United States and 
its policy towards South Korea.  The party’s main source of input into policy decisions is 
ideological guidance.  As such, it consistently presents the case against accommodating the 
American “imperialists” in diplomatic fora.  It seizes on unfavorable news, presents historical 
                                                           
6 “Army's Anger over U.S. Nuclear Moves has ‘Reached its Limit’,” KCNA, December 12, 1998, BBC Summary of 






narratives, or makes pure ideological claims that undermine the Foreign Ministry’s efforts to 
engage Washington.   
The military takes a similar, but distinct, stand against negotiating with the Americans.  
Washington seeks to limit North Korea’s coercive potential, particularly in the missile and 
nuclear areas.  The Korean Peoples Army (KPA) objects to limitations that a foreign power seeks 
to place on its ability to defend the state.  This insertion of the military institution into politics 
takes a limited but pragmatic strategic vision.  The military does not object to negotiations 
because they violate Juche principles but because they hinder the institution’s ability to provide 
for the state’s military-based security.   
The cabinet’s Foreign Ministry is the only institution that consistently presents the 
benefits of engaging the Americans.  As the lead organization in each of the different sets of 
talks during this period, the Foreign Ministry has presented the value of negotiating by 
highlighting the concessions the other side provided.  It presents North Korea’s positions fiercely 
and has not shied away from ultimatums.  When relations soured, the cabinet often simply went 
silent as the party and military presented why such engagement was never productive or 
worthwhile.  This cabinet institution’s strategic interests conflict with the military and party’s 
interests and platforms; it presents a strikingly different future for the North Korean state with 
American security guarantees and economic revitalization.  
These three institutions likewise demonstrated three internally consistent agendas on 
reunification issues.  Though all three groups support eventual reunification, they advocate 
different inter-Korean policies to achieve this end.  The party presents a 1950s-style reunification 
path.  The party’s position is so nostalgic that some analysts question whether it still genuinely 
maintains this desire to reunify the state through force.  South Korea is now a successful 
democracy with a military likely capable of defeating the North even without American 
assistance in a prolonged Korean conflict.  When Kim Il Sung’s forces crossed the 38th parallel 
in 1950, the North enjoyed military superiority over the South and Seoul’s anti-democratic 
tendencies at the time did not give it a popular legitimacy advance over the North.  Pyongyang 
also enjoyed support from a much wider group of leftists among the South Korean populace that 
opposed the South’s rightist government.  Seoul’s superpower ally continued to demobilize its 
military forces after World War II, especially in Asia and even moreso in Korea.  Kim Il Sung 
enjoyed Soviet political support which brought reluctant Chinese support well in advance of 
Beijing’s actually committing three million “volunteers” to the Korean War.  Pyongyang had a 
much better chance of forcing reunification on the North’s terms in 1950 than today.   
The party maintains that, eventually, conditions will be ripe for a 1950s-style 
reunification drive again.  The “Great Patriotic War” is immortalized in North Korean lore 
despite its recognized role in leveling the whole of North Korea and much of the South.  The 
United States is not demobilizing, but it may – someday – withdraw from Asia or at least decide 
not to get involved in a long and bloody second Korean war, especially if it ran the risk of 
nuclear escalation.  The Soviet Union is gone, but Pyongyang could conceivably enjoy Russian 
or Chinese political support in international organizations like the UN Security Council to 
preserve peninsular stability and limit the American presence on the Asian mainland.  China’s 






and it is highly questionable whether Beijing will defend Pyongyang as its legacy treaty 
commitments indicate in case of a collapse scenario or even foreign invasion.  South Korea still 
has a leftist social element but it has been much weakened since democratization and not likely 
to significantly and violently rise up against its democratic government in face of a North Korean 
advance.   
Nevertheless, the party takes the long view and prefers to prepare for a day in the future 
when the North may reunify the Korean nation under one flag.  When weighed against its 
alternative and incorporating the individual self-interest of elites, the party’s position is more 
understandable.  North Korea is not a state with favorable options.  Reforming and opening up 
brings its own risks, especially to regime elites.  If the state reforms in the way of Eastern 
Europe, revolutionary aims would be lost, decades of sacrifice and family efforts would be for 
naught, and the physical security of regime elites may be put in jeopardy.  Even if the North is 
integrated into South Korean society under the most favorable of conditions for these elites, they 
would lose much of their privilege.  In short, it is not irrational for this group of elites to prefer to 
extend the current system as long as possible rather than take the short-term risks of collapsing 
the regime and threatening both their social position and lives.  In practice, this means the party 
rejects increased economic contacts with the South and stresses military strength.   
The military’s inter-Korean position is similar in practice to the party’s.  The military 
uses fewer explicit justifications for its actions, but it too takes exception to the cabinet’s inter-
Korean economic projects that allow greater cross-border rail and road traffic.  It presents 
military security as an absolute goal; other issues should not interfere with the KPA’s ability to 
provide for the state’s security.  It continually notes in the North Korean media that it stands 
ready to reunify the state by force.  The motivation of its soldiers and tactical advances makes 
victory assured, they argue.  Whether military leaders genuinely believe they can force the South 
into a protracted war and avoid American intervention is ultimately not observable.  Koreans 
have a long history of fiercely defending their independence against all odds, and those who 
gambled and won in North Korea two generations ago put themselves and their families in 
positions of power for long periods of time in a system that otherwise makes climbing the social 
ladder very difficult.  More importantly, military leaders must prepare to carry out orders to go to 
war, so it is natural that these leaders try to position resources to most effectively carry out those 
potential orders.  The fortress state means prioritized resource allocation to the military, a sealed 
northern and southern border, and developing all weapons systems available, including nuclear 
weapons and their means of delivery.   
The cabinet’s inter-Korean policy is the most distinct.  It does not reject reunification but 
does not mention it much either.  Inter-Korean policy for the cabinet is wrapped up in a different 
view of the future of the state.  The cabinet has a more difficult time articulating a strategic 
vision for a unified peninsula under the North’s control as a byproduct of its advocacy.  Instead, 
its goals are aimed at more immediate economic goals and a long-term vision of a more 
sustainable economy.  Foreign investment, special economic zones, and humanitarian aid 
provide economic and social benefits.  The special economic zones especially provide foreign 
investment with fewer immediate risks since they are fairly well-insulated from the wider 
society.  The cabinet’s efforts to attract more foreign investment, development assistance, and 






South ties.  The cabinet manages this relationship with an emphasis on the economic benefits it 
provides, but its policy does not logically end with reunification.  As such, the cabinet opens 
itself to criticism from party and military quarters that such policies abandon a core, emotionally-
and rationally-held goal of Koreans.   
These debates reflect how North Korea’s institutions embody the competing goals the 
regime must manage.  There is a role for ideology but also pragmatism.  The party is an 
important institution, but only one of three peer institutions that compete for influence.  In short, 
the nature and functions of North Korean politics is different than in the past.  North Korea has 
undergone an evolution, not a revolution.  It changed from its distinct past, and this starting point 
has a profound impact on its present.  North Korea did not reshape its politics from scratch but 
how the regime fundamentally functions remains a key question for any student of North Korea 
that this study addresses.      
These policy differences are puzzling if one subscribes to a monolithic view of the North 
Korean government.  Why does Kim permit this dissent?  Is the dissent genuine?  If not, what is 
its purpose?  Why would the regime attempt to demonstrate its absolute control to internal and 
external audiences present subtle evidence of disunity?  More fundamentally, how can one make 
sense of this seemingly strange political system that both surprises and defies conventional 
expectations?  It is my contention that North Korea’s bureaucracies work at cross-currents; 
recognizing that the river flows in different directions simultaneously is an important first step in 
crafting an effective navigation strategy.   
Towards a New Model  
Understanding how the state functions, crafts policy, and conducts politics is the critical 
first node in explaining and even predicting policy choices.  Continually surprising and 
perplexing outcomes suggest that existing models of North Korean politics may be outdated or 
wrong.  Despite this demand for understanding, few have attempted in recent years to 
comprehensively model the North Korea political system.  This project looks to fill this void.  
There is demand for scholarship on the North Korean state both among comparativists 
and foreign policy practitioners, but the supply of methodologically rigorous scholarship is low. 
A review of the two major comparative politics journals and the three general political science 
journals yields only one article on the state since its founding. 7  Likewise, some area specialists 
recognize that the state is poorly understood in both policy and academic circles.  This 
recognized problem has not been resolved.  The little area studies literature broadly related to 
this topic does not speak to the comparative literature and usually has little to no explicit 
theoretical discussion.  Area specialists have largely avoided studying the state’s domestic 
politics altogether or applied the same limited data points on the North’s internal functions.  This 
scholarly chasm has further hampered our collective understanding.  This project attempts to 
                                                           






bridge this gap by building on the strong comparative politics theoretical tradition, the rich area 
studies empirical work and my own contribution to each of these areas.   
One reason for this dearth of scholarship is the required refrain that North Korea is a 
data-poor country.  While this is true, it is often overstated and perhaps discourages new 
researchers before they even begin.  The lack of empirical research on North Korea is a great 
opportunity to make significant statements and expose substantial “new” data that has been 
largely overlooked.  There are more untapped scholarly resources available on this state than 
most others as the empirical chapters demonstrate.  Furthermore, North Korea’s controlled media 
is a useful window into the state’s function precisely because it is controlled.  Dismissing this 
information as thoughtless propaganda loses an opportunity to look inside this controlled 
regime’s operations.  The state can be studied systematically and new data and patterns 
discerned.   
North Korea suffered a confluence of crises in the 1990s.  The state’s founder and 
national hero died in 1994, and his son took power.  China and Russia established diplomatic 
relations with South Korea, and the United States came precariously close to war with North 
Korea during the first nuclear crisis in 1993/94.  Pyongyang lost its Soviet benefactor in 1991, 
notably losing energy and food aid.  The state suffered extreme economic hardship and decades 
of poor agricultural policy choices combined with North Korea’s periodic intense flooding to 
plunge the state into famine in the late 1990s.8  Multiple analysts argued the regime’s days were 
numbered, suggesting the state would not survive the decade.9  While the state did not collapse, 
these forces did alter it.  North Korea’s political evolution rapidly accelerated, dislodging some 
elements and retaining others.  The assumption that that North Korea’s government functions in 
much the same way as it did under Kim Il Sung is highly questionable.   
The centralized narratives generally hold that both Kims relied on a small set of inner 
circle advisers to craft national policy.  Some of these individuals command large bureaucracies 
but most do not. They are powerful due to their relationship with Kim, not the bureaucracies they 
command.  Power flows from the top. Kim uses carrots (e.g., gifts) and sticks (e.g., purges and 
threats) to control this group.  Kim may direct policy through a favored institution such as the 
military or the party, but policy innovation comes from the center.  The major bureaucracies are 
composed of functionaries.  In Stalin’s terms, these are “transmission belts” to implement small-
group decisions.  Functionaries are to blame for failing to properly implement necessarily sage 
policy when policy fails.  Both power and authority are centralized.      
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This centralized narrative comes in various forms with varying degrees of state 
dynamism built into the explanation.  The state is Stalinist,10 post-Stalinist,11 personalist, 
neosocialist corporatist,12 or an eroding totalitarian13 or eroding socialist14 state.  Kim rules as an 
absolute monarch through the military,15 party,16 or an inner circle of advisers and kin.17  Some 
of these models suggest that there is some movement away from Kim Il Sung’s more thorough 
power and authority, but Kim Jong Il does not radically depart from his father’s mode of rule.  
While I expand upon the meaning and arguments of these characterizations in the following 
chapter, I ultimately find them lacking.  I argue that these monolithic ideal types fail to capture 
the pluralism that helps distinguish the younger Kim’s rule from his father’s.  My central thesis 
is that while Kim Il Sung’s rule can be described as totalitarian, Kim Jong Il rules through a 
more decentralized post-totalitarian, institutionally plural state that I call “post-totalitarian 
institutionalism.”   
Pluralism is often associated with democracy, so I should be clear to note that this is not 
an argument that North Korea is democratizing.  Quite the contrary, the argument notes that the 
state has stabilized as a type of autocratic government.  However, it is an argument that not all 
autocratic regimes are alike and teasing out North Korea’s specific variety has utility.     
 In this type of state, interests are more diffuse and institutional preferences are debated 
cautiously but publicly.18  Debates are not personal; they are institutional.  Important policy 
differences are not defined by individuals closely tied to Kim but large bureaucracies with 
consistent interests and the capacity to produce detailed knowledge.19  National policy outcomes 
are determined more by the interaction of three “second echelon” institutions:  the cabinet, 
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military, and party.20  Policy innovation comes from below.  Kim and his inner circle serve as the 
final decision-maker of options presented by these institutions.  Authority is centralized, but 
power is diffuse.   
 If this hypothesis is correct, then this mode of rule produces very different expectations 
than the previously applied modes of rule.  North Korea is not a simple organizational unit with 
one man making core decisions.  The state processes foreign actions through a rigid and 
predictable political apparatus and returns reactive policy choices based on the external and 
internal considerations.  Treating North Korea as a black box overlooks the critical internal 
political calculations that often modify policy choices.  Predicting North Korea’s responses to 
foreign actions is not always intuitive, but this theory should improve our predictions about those 
policy choices.   
The Stakes  
North Korea is a country of great interest to foreign policy practitioners and scholars 
alike.  It is the world’s poorest state with a nuclear weapon and has demonstrated its willingness 
and capability to transfer its nuclear know-how and equipment to the Middle East.  It has the 
largest military conscription rate in the world, develops and exports ballistic missiles, and 
continually threatens its neighbors.  The country has seen humanitarian catastrophes and a 
fundamental denial of human rights.  It is the only communist state to weather a hereditary 
succession and one of the few remaining one-party communist states to survive the end of the 
Cold War.  In the past, the state has been linked to counterfeiting foreign currency, drug running, 
and terrorist incidents.   
North Korea shares a land or sea border with the second, third, and thirteenth largest 
economies in the world.  It is the 95th largest economy in the world – right behind Cameroon.  In 
2007 only three national economies in the world suffered a worse growth rate than North 
Korea.21  It commands roughly half of China’s development assistance and requires food and 
energy aid from its neighbors, its main stated adversary – the United States, and the international 
community to fill shortages.  It has experimented with limited form of market reforms simply to 
backtrack later on these moves.  North Korea rightfully commands interest, yet it is poorly 
understood.   
The common element to these issues is the North Korean regime.  Understanding the 
North’s internal processes helps gauge its reaction to policy choices made in Washington, Seoul, 
Beijing, Tokyo, and other interested capitals.  This study is, at its outset, agnostic on the 
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normative question of selecting between policy options towards North Korea, ranging from 
accommodation to pressure strategies.  However, it does seek to inform analysts interested in 
predicting North Korean reactions to these policies based on an informed understanding of the 
state’s decision-making structure.   
Furthermore, understanding how North Korea’s political system functions gives critical 
insight into a wider group of authoritarian regimes.  North Korea is arguably the most centralized 
authoritarian state in existence today.  The following chapter exposes how it has been described 
as fitting the mold of the totalitarian, personalist, and corporatist models.  While theories and 
typologies of authoritarian states are comparative in nature, understanding this critical case’s 
domestic politics has useful applications for the wider study of authoritarian regimes.  If the state 
that comes closest to the proposed ideal types departs significantly from the theories’ 
expectations, this may suggest important revisions to these typologies.   
While many of the former Soviet satellite states in Europe transitioned towards 
democracy, many regimes in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia arguably share 
some common characteristics of a post-totalitarian state.  An updated and revised view of North 
Korean politics has direct relevance on explaining a wider group of states that do not seem to be 
moving towards democracy.  In this way, this project seeks to be relevant to another group of 
readers interested in how this general group of states’ political systems craft policy, sustain 
themselves in face of challenges, evolve, and react to foreign actions of regional and global 
actors.   
Finally, the universe of communist states that weathered the Soviet collapse is few in 
number.  North Korea accounts for a substantial portion of these states that failed to transition to 
democracy and is the least reformed of the remaining communist governments.  The study traces 
the process by which North Korea evolved politically and prevented its own collapse in face of 
economic crisis, famine, international pressure, and its first and only leadership transition.  
Explanation requires theory, and well-crafted theory may be exportable to other countries.  
Authoritarian resilience is the other side of the coin of the well-researched question of 
democratic transitions and has bearing on this research program.  The evolution and resiliency of 
North Korea’s government informs both the question of how post-totalitarian regimes operate 
and the dynamic process of post-communist (non-)transitions.   
Road Map   
Chapter two reviews the competing theories of North Korean politics, including the 
totalitarian, post-totalitarian, personalist, and corporatist models.  I lay out my theoretical model, 
explaining why the state evolved from its totalitarian origins and how the system consequently 
functions today.  I conclude the theoretical section with a research design.  I describe my data 






Chapter three documents the historical evolution of North Korean politics under Kim Il 
Sung, while chapter four discusses the modified institutional structure of Kim Jong Il’s rule.  The 
younger Kim did not accept wholesale his father’s mode of rule, but he also did not recreate the 
state from scratch.  Chapter three describes the founding national-level institutions, ideology, and 
mode of rule.  It shows how these gradually evolved under Kim Il Sung’s watchful eye, 
including formal constitutional revisions and a general decline of the Juche ideology.  The 
second part of the chapter acknowledges several shocks to the system in the mid-1990s that 
accelerated the state’s transformation.  The collapse of its Soviet benefactor, nuclear crises, death 
of the state’s founder and national hero, and famine jeopardized the existence of the state.  The 
younger Kim had to adapt to deal with the existing realities.  The state’s “emergency 
management” and response to social pressures from the famine altered North Korea’s politics.  
Chapter four focuses on the resulting political order, providing relevant background on all 
constitutional institutions in North Korea not included in the general historical narrative.   
 Chapters five through seven constitute the empirical tests of this model.  These chapters 
contextualize North Korean policy debates observed in the press and leaked by foreign 
interlocutors in a contemporary history.  The model is dynamic.  This section explains how the 
state processes specific examples of foreign actions and produces policy responses.  It goes 
inside the red box to construct this narrative rather than making blind assumptions about internal 
dynamics.  It documents what the key North Korean institutional leaders said in commentaries, 
articles, and major speeches and show how these positions are consistent across the leader of the 
institution.  It evaluates how these leaders communicate preferences to other institutional leaders 
and in some cases even resist high-level policy choices.  Strategic positions by institution are 
remarkably consistent, responding in the same general frame to specific challenges.  However, 
national policy varies.  This chapter evaluates how these debates frame the discussion internally 
and explain otherwise perplexing national policy choices.   
 The final chapter concludes with three important tasks.  First, it discusses whether this 
model better fits the data than the competing models reviewed in chapter two.  This naturally 
raises the question why this characterization matters.  I discuss the downstream consequences of 
the model, which predicts some otherwise counterintuitive conclusions.  Second, I evaluate the 
effect of this model on our general understanding of authoritarian regimes.  Does this revised 
understanding of North Korea’s politics leave lessons for other states in the post-totalitarian 
world?  Finally, the chapter analyzes the general lessons for foreign policy practitioners.  Policy 
choices will remain normative, political decisions but understanding North Korea’s political 






Chapter 2: Post-totalitarian Institutionalism 
This chapter provides a conceptual basis in which to evaluate North Korean domestic 
politics and puts forth my theoretical contention of the system’s functions.  I argue that North 
Korea under Kim Il Sung approximated the totalitarian ideal type, but North Korea today is 
better understood as a centralized polity in which second-echelon institutions play an important 
role.  Kim Jong Il’s government is highly centralized, but it is less centralized than his father’s.  
North Korean politics comprises the interaction of the military, party, and cabinet with 
“oversight” by the security apparatus (see chapter 4 for a review of these institutional actors).  
These institutions enjoy limited autonomy in an effort to most productively leverage their 
expertise while retaining generalist political control over them.  Kim and his inner circle of 
advisers have final authority, but institutional inputs set the decision-making stage and shape 
most policies’ implementation.    
These semi-autonomous groups have opportunity and cause to interact in the policy 
formation and execution process, creating room to discuss pluralist politics in North Korea.  Kim 
Jong Il’s focus on political survival and emergency management over ideology as a guiding force 
makes today’s North Korean government more rational than in the past but it does not suggest 
that ideology is irrelevant.  Bureaucratic winners and losers are defined on an issue basis.  In 
short, institutional politics – in conjunction with Kim Jong Il’s critical role – help explain 
political outcomes.  In order to build on past advances, I first turn to evaluating existing theories 
of non-democratic rule that have been applied to this state.   
Existing Models of North Korean Politics 
This section synthesizes the main typologies used to describe North Korean politics and 
shows where they have failed to account for contemporary elements of the North Korean system.  
Much of the area studies literature describes North Korea as some type of a monolithic state.  
Kim has “almost total power,”1 the system is marked by a “hybrid of modern Stalinism and 
traditional Korean authoritarianism” which “lack[s] of interest group participation.”2  It is “post-
Stalinist,”3 “an eroding totalitarian regime […where] an absolute dictator still rules,”4 and the 
“application of a ‘bureaucratic model’ to North Korea is premature.”5  Other area specialists 
have recognized the conflicting roles for the cabinet, military, and party in limited 
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circumstances6 and noted the increasingly visible roles of the military and state “though under 
the guidance and directions of the party,”7 but no study has attempted to apply this to North 
Korean politics generally or build a model of institutional interaction.   
The area studies literature is strong on empirics and relatively weak on theory.  The 
comparative literature in this case is the reverse.  Both miss an opportunity.  This study attempts 
to help bridge this gap.  I argue that certain elements of the ideal types apply to North Korea.  
Explicitly incorporating the comparative literature builds on previous theoretical advances and 
allows a more sophisticated model as a fruit of knowledge accumulation.  No case fits these ideal 
types perfectly, but the North Korean case is sufficiently different that it merits a different 
typology.   
Partisans in the comparative debates have accused one another of erecting straw man 
arguments around the usage of terms like totalitarianism, monism, pluralism, interest groups, and 
corporatism.  This has delayed theoretical progress in previous debates of a similar nature and 
stands as a stark warning to proceed cautiously.  However, if one is to understand North Korea as 
another state that fits into a comparative framework, it must be defined in comparative terms.  
The danger of conceptual stretching and emotional connections to certain terms comes into 
conflict with the desire to integrate the presumed uniqueness of this state into a comparative 
framework.  Every state is unique at some level of abstraction, and North Korea’s now 
unfashionable label as a “rogue state” demonstrated a continued view that this state is 
particularly different.  Still, this does not suggest that it cannot or should not be studied 
comparatively.  One explicit theoretical purpose of this study is to bring this presumed outlier 
into the comparative tradition to explain it and help develop a better understanding of some 
category of non-democratic states more generally.   
Given the importance of studying this state comparatively, the remainder of this section 
shows the inadequacy of current comparative ideal types in explaining North Korea’s policy 
inputs.  Policy choices (outputs) that continually surprise and puzzle observers further motivates 
this theoretical reevaluation.  To be productive, a comparative study should be able to assess the 
validity of applying these previous models to this case, provide a better alternative to current 
theories, and conclude by noting the possibility of other states falling within this theoretical 
outline.  This study broadly addresses each of those tasks.   
 Totalitarian states isolate individuals and replace previous private social networks with 
state organization.  Totalitarian leaders are revolutionaries, intensely committed to destroying the 
old order and building a utopian political order based on an all-encompassing ideology.  
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Monopolizing information sources and propagandizing provides purpose to the atomized masses 
for the radical changes.  The state does not tolerate pluralism or opposition and regularly purges 
officials to pursue its revolutionary aims.  The party and secret police utilize terror, or arbitrary 
coercion to instill fear and anxiety in the population.8  Anti-regime organizing is not a matter of 
calculated risk as under authoritarian regimes; people are deterred from extra-state organization 
that has the potential to be viewed as anti-regime.9    
Totalitarianism regimes are short lived.  Since the state’s goals are utopian, they are never 
reached in practice.  The revolutionary euphoria that helped singular leaders or parties come to 
power subsides; the elite that benefit from this dictatorial rule face a cognitive dilemma.  They 
know the system does not promote its stated ideals, yet they have an incentive to maintain their 
privileged place in society and avoid punishment if the regime were to change.10  Consequently, 
the state loses much of its utopian motivation, bureaucratizes and makes routine the normal state 
functions.   
 Ideology may remain as a propaganda tool for the masses and shrinking group of true 
believers, but it is particularly hollow for many that employ it.  Ideology becomes primarily a 
tool and a constraint on state actions, but it ceases to be a motivating force for the increasingly 
disenchanted and educated elite.  Those in power are no longer a band of revolutionaries working 
against the system; they are the system, and they try to protect its interests.  From this new found 
conservative position, limited plurality emerges from the natural tendency to bureaucratize.   
This pattern can be found in multiple historical examples.  Almost a century ago, Max 
Weber recognized this general movement from revolution to bureaucratization.11  The pattern is 
also not alien to Korean culture or its core benefactors.  The young neo-Confucian scholars that 
perpetrated the Literari Purges in the early Chosun Dynasty on strong ideological grounds 
ultimately lost their revolutionary euphoria and bureaucratized their rule and protected their 
privileged place in society.12  In the Soviet Union, this rise of limited pluralism followed the 
death of Stalin.13  Likewise, North Korea has evolved from approximating the totalitarian ideal 
type under Kim Il Sung to a more plural polity under Kim Jong Il.  However, this is not simply 
the story of a state growing more rational or a pragmatic state replacing an ideological one.  The 
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developments in North Korea require greater refinement to capture the state’s functions in a way 
that helps the observer understand, explain, and even predict its policy choices.   
Post-totalitarianism is best understood as an umbrella term that recognizes the unique 
attributes of states that emerge from the breakdown of revolutionary totalitarianism.  The 
evolved states emerges gradually and retains main attributes of the prior totalitarian regime 
rather than a radically departing from the totalitarian model with a wholesale acceptance of a 
new form of rule.  The emphasis on evolution rather than revolution makes understanding the 
state’s political history even more important for explaining the way the state currently operates.   
Of course, recognizing that states evolve from a similar starting point in no way suggests 
that they evolve in the same way or are on the same trajectory.  They can move in very different 
directions.  In an early attempt to categorize regimes emerging from Soviet domination in the 
1990s, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan presented their views on the emergence of a certain class of 
these post-totalitarian states.  They argued in part that the decay of ideology in the Soviet bloc 
created space for democratic opposition – particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.  
Technocratic employment became a real alternative to party careers as citizens withdrew into 
private life and the state increasingly tolerated private activity.  When ideologues dominate 
politics, administrative competence declines.  Absent policy inputs from outside the state, 
politics stagnates if specialists from below do not push new concrete ideas up to the entrenched 
generalists.  In a participatory bureaucracy, ideas flow up and down.  Experts provide original 
ideas, which are moderated by bargaining.  Without a permanent purge, specialists can develop 
expertise and send new ideas up to the leadership.  Likewise, an expert bureaucracy can modify – 
wittingly or not – orders of superiors according to developed professional standards.14   
The loss of ideological purpose, combined with these developments, creates room for 
rational policy.  Absent a revolutionary ideological lens through which to prescribe policy 
choices, the state looks to rational data.  Technocrats and a diversity of ideologies – new and old 
alike – help define the universe of policy choices.  This evolution of the polity comes in stages.  
In the early phase, the leadership is divided, coercion is used less, and contact with the outside 
world is less restricted.  Terror is no longer arbitrary; rather the state learns to deal with dissent 
outside of the state structure for the first time.  The fusion of state and society slowly begins to 
separate, disheartening some while providing opportunity to others.  Crackdowns on dissent 
freeze the post-totalitarian system into a purposeless, unmoving state with an increasingly 
relevant civil society opposition that makes it susceptible to collapse.15  
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This band of states evolved in a similar direction, because they had similar starting points 
after World War II, common pressures, and looked to one another as political development 
models.  There would still be diversity among even those states that came to join European 
institutions like the EU and NATO, but one could draw effective generalizations about the 
transition process and their political outcomes.  However, states further east like Belarus and the 
Central Asian republics looked substantially different.  China, Cuba, and several states in the 
Middle East and other parts of Asia likewise evolved from a totalitarian or semi-totalitarian 
existence but not on the same generalized path as the European post-totalitarian states.  North 
Korea too evolved from this common starting point.  It was subject to important social forces 
described later in this chapter and evolved into something different.   
Put differently, if one accepts the argument that Kim Il Sung approached the totalitarian 
ideal type and his son’s state looks substantially different, then North Korea meets the most 
general definition of the post-totalitarian model.  This does not suggest that it follows the specific 
trajectory that Linz and Stepan outline for the states of Central and Eastern Europe.  North Korea 
certainly looks very different than the European post-totalitarian states which lacked a leader as 
strong as Kim and where the nature of state-society relations is fundamentally different.16  
Indeed, there is reason to believe they are on distinctly different trajectories.  Consequently, I 
develop a new post-totalitarian model that incorporates elements from each of the 
characterizations sketched in this section as well as new theoretical components relevant to the 
North Korea state.  Before doing so, however, it is useful to review the remaining ideal type 
characterizations that inform the new model.   
Personalistic rulers use coercion and fear like totalitarian regimes but govern not by 
tradition or ideology but by personal, arbitrary rules.  Tradition and ideology constrain 
totalitarian leaders, while personalistic rulers do not have this constraint.  They employ power for 
private ends, using national resources to extract private wealth and private wealth to maintain 
power.  This is increasingly difficult when mass organizations are prevalent as in many industrial 
states.  Personalistic states are simple and unstable, since cutting off the head of the monster kills 
the beast.17 
 North Korea resembles this model in several ways, and this model comes closest to the 
popular description of North Korea as a state governed by “one man rule.” But this model does 
not explain the remaining ideological constraints and power-wielding elite that continue to 
trumpet totalitarian rule.  Personalism explains policy reversals and contradictions only as a 
function of the leader’s changing motives or psychology.  It has a difficult time explaining 
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regular policy contradictions and cross-purposes in North Korea described in the following 
chapters.  The model also predicts an unstable state, yet North Korea has weathered the collapse 
of its Soviet benefactor, severe economic decline, nuclear crises, a hereditary power transition, 
and a famine.   
 State efforts to propagandize and promote ideology remain puzzling under this 
characterization of personalist rule.  Efforts to modify the ideal type to include an all-
encompassing ideology or a mass party remove much of the model’s explanatory power and 
produces expectations more in line with other ideal types.  Further, Kim and his colleagues have 
enriched themselves at the expense of their populace, but private gains do not explain broad 
national goals like reunification, macro-economic improvements, and broad anti-imperialism.  
Elite privilege is common to non-democracies and a single man tops even totalitarian states, but 
the personalistic ideal type leaves puzzles that other analytical tools help bridge.  I incorporate 
the relevant attributes of this ideal type into my model of North Korean politics but it is 
insufficient to simply place the North Korean state under this ideal type characterization.       
Corporatism is an elastic concept.18  North Korea’s specific variety, “neosocialist 
corporatism” in the historian Bruce Cumings’ characterization, departs somewhat from what 
most political scientists mean by the term.  Cumings sees the North Korean body politic as a 
non-competitive, united entity in which disharmony is harmful.  Kim and his familial-based 
inner circle regularize policy relations between different interests in this top-down, hierarchal 
model.  Mixing metaphors, the state is a family with the father directing affairs out of his 
paternal wisdom – an element shared by the personalist model.  The personality cult emphasizes 
that through wisdom, Kim promotes virtue, love, and benevolence, and expects loyalty in return.  
Policy radiates from the nerve center (Kim).  Innovation does not come from below.19   
 Cumings sees little change between the two Kims’ reins and finds the organic metaphor 
applies to both regimes.20  He tests his theoretical expectations by reference to the same core 
evidence found in this study: the North Korean media and public statements as well as 
perspectives from some political insiders.  North Korean propaganda states that policy (and all 
wisdom) radiates from Kim.  North Korea’s press continually repeats that both Kims are 
benevolent father figures “sagaciously” guiding their flock.  Cumings takes this oft-repeated 
propaganda line as evidence of how the state actually functions.  Policy begins with Kim and 
those below Kim implement policy.   
I argue he overstates this case and miscategorizes Kim’s normative demands for absolute 
loyalty as an empirical reality.  It leaves open the question why one should believe the official 
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characterization of the state.  This model has some very useful elements that help develop a 
theory of how Kim and his core inner circle group of about two dozen advisers make final 
decisions.  However, the model does not give enough attention to formative elements of policy.  
Neosocialist corporatism is more useful in the study of high politics such as nuclear diplomacy 
where policy inputs and execution can be more easily centralized than in the case of broader 
social and economic questions, but systemic studies must take into account the types of 
information Kim and the inner circle receive to form and execute decisions.  Further, the model 
does not discuss the downstream consequences of the particular version of corporatism, leaving a 
further opening for theoretical improvements.   
 More directly, the corporatist characterization alone has a difficult time explaining North 
Korean actions.  This model cannot explain open policy disagreement in the media and evidence 
of institutional elements working at cross-purposes.  It does not explain bureaucratic resistance to 
central decisions or in-fighting.  The more conflict rather than regularized bureaucratic 
interaction shapes policy decisions and implementation, the more one must conclude that 
pluralism is at work.  In short, the evidence presented in this study suggest my model should be 
used instead of the corporatism model, at least during this specified timeframe, as it more 
completely captures the state’s policy process of both high and low politics and moves beyond 
an analysis of Kim and his relations with his core advisers.     
The most productive difference between neosocialist corporatism and my formulation of 
North Korean politics is the role of institutional bargaining as a form of policy moderation.  The 
institutional pluralist state makes the most extreme policy choices more difficult.  Institutional 
opponents argue against their competitors’ extreme policy choices, encouraging bargained policy 
compromises that sit closer to the center of the political spectrum.  These choices are moderate 
not by a global standard but by a domestic standard.  They more fully capture the interests 
advocated by differing segments of the state’s policy experts.  All North Korean institutions 
share a strong anti-imperialist sentiment that most Americans would consider extreme, but the 
cabinet’s relatively moderate advocacy of negotiations tame the party’s advocacy for a second 
Korean War in response to the perceived American threat, for example.  While ultimate authority 
remains in the hands of one man, power is more diffuse.  Pluralist models dispute that all power 
is defined at the top and radiates downward.   
Institutional pluralism grew out of challenges to the totalitarian framework, emphasizing 
how groups of individuals cluster together to pursue specific or general policy goals.  These 
groups are not sanctioned or explicitly created by the state and have multiple, conflicting, and 
overlapping ideas and preferences.  These groups engage policy only on issues in which they 
have an interest which may or may not encompass the entire corpus of policy decisions.  
Institutional pluralism does not engage the totalitarian model so much as it presents an argument 






continued applicability of two core components of the totalitarian ideal type:  that the state 
“atomizes” the individual from an otherwise natural social reality and that the state is monolithic.   
Gordon Skilling and Jerry Hough were at the forefront of this post-Stalinist model of 
Soviet politics, disputing the argument that the post-Stalinist Soviet Union “atomized,” or 
psychologically isolated, the individual completely.  Instead, groups develop within elite circles 
with counterparts among the masses that try to influence certain segments of policy.  Any polity 
that takes on greater roles and powers produces greater incentives for interested social groups to 
try to influence that state’s policy decisions.  The Soviet state was an extreme example of this 
type of “big government,” encouraging individuals with shared attitudes and interests to cluster 
together to influence policy in any way they could.  Access to the halls of power in the Kremlin 
or local governments in the Soviet Union looked different than lobbyists working in a democratic 
state, but the basic incentive structure remained similar.  As post-Stalinist Soviet repression 
eased, interested individuals had greater opportunity to organize to exert influence on the state.   
More importantly, advocates of the institutional pluralist model did not doubt that the top 
leadership could intervene arbitrarily in lower-level policymaking.  Rather these authors sought 
to progress beyond this level of understanding.  In most cases, limits on senior leadership’s time 
and capacities required delegation.  Since the top leadership had been much more extensively 
studied, these scholars decided to devote most of their attention to describing the second-order 
groups that transgressed state and society.  Groups with common preferences coalesced around 
governmental decisions at the local, regional, and national/imperial levels.  Groups bridged the 
elite/masses divide and influenced decisions outside the top leadership’s purview.  The system 
was less monolithic and less centralized than the totalitarian ideal type suggested.   
Appropriately, the totalitarian model could point to Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy as elucidating the core tenets of the applied 
totalitarian model, while the institutional pluralism model was a relatively diffuse set of theories 
that evolved with the Soviet state.  Institutional pluralism does not have a conveniently laid out 
core canon that synthesizes and directs the larger model.  At best, Gordon Skilling and Franklin 
Griffin’s edited volume, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, takes this distinction, although the 
edited volume contained multiple different views on the functioning of the Soviet state.  Even the 
co-editors disagreed over the nature of the state’s diffused power and wrote separate concluding 
chapters.   
Yet it is still valuable to attempt to distill the main components with lasting relevance to 
this project.  The two most prominent concepts in this research area – “interest groups” and 
“pluralism” – are plagued with multiple meanings that have prompted a great deal of confusion 
and criticism.  Clarifying them is a critical first step.  Debate around these two terms focus on 
two core questions:  What is the nature of these “groups”?  And how do they affect policy 






Skilling borrowed from David Truman and Arthur Bentley’s democratic definition of 
“interest groups” to elucidate his theoretical definition of a group.  Interest groups are “any group 
that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the 
society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied 
by shared attitudes.”21  But proponents recognized that their version of interest groups looks little 
like the democratic variety and have functionally defined it very differently.  Interest groups 
cannot block a dictator’s initiative by reference to public opinion, the courts, or supporting 
alternative candidates in popular elections as Bentley and Truman describe.  Interest groups in a 
democratic context are societal-based actors pressuring – or presenting interests to – government 
officials (the state).  In the communist context, state and society are much more tightly fused and 
an external society is not acting upon a separate state.  Democratic interest groups utilize and try 
to shape public opinion, parties, and elections to influence lawmakers, while communist leaders 
seek legitimacy (authority) and power from different sources and cannot seek influence in this 
same democratic manner.  Truman and Bentley show how formal lines of legal control are only 
part of the story, but their story is fundamentally a democratic one.   
Instead, Skilling and Hough try to build on this democratic concept and describe interest 
groups more generally as “informal clusterings that articulate distinctive interests.”22  The theory 
applies to more than state institutions that are permanent, structurally separate from the 
leadership, and provide services the regime values23 with a stable and consistent pattern of 
interaction.24  Skilling claims evaluating these bureaucratic groups alone is an incomplete 
reading of the relevant political forces, concluding that professional and occupational categories 
outside the state have a discernible influence on policy direction.  He includes groups such as 
“professionals” and other vaguely defined “clusterings.”  
Critically, the empirical chapters in Skilling and Griffith’s edited volume largely focus on 
the more easily identifiable state institutions such as the party, military, and judiciary.  In North 
Korea, indigenous societal-based actors are as close to non-existent as one could imagine, but 
three main institutions interact at the top of the system: the cabinet, military, and party.  I find 
these types of groups that somehow transgress the elite/masses divide in an unobservable manner 
inappropriate to describe the North Korean political system but the concept of interested, 
institutional groups as second-echelon actors in conflict with one another has real bearing on my 
model.  The value is more apparent in the more difficult area of theorizing how such groups 
interact with each other and a state’s supreme authority (e.g., Kim Jong Il).   
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Under the institutional pluralist model, multiple groups interact to help shape policy 
direction.  Institutional pluralist advocates never argue that the state is a passive broker of these 
groups’ interests nor do groups necessarily have a systematic influence on policy decisions:  
“Interest groups are but one of the many elements involved in policy making; they are not 
necessarily decisive, and may sometimes be marginal in their impact…hampered and sometimes 
blocked by other factors, in particular the power of political leaders and authoritative organs of 
government and the party.”25  Rather, the point is that power is more diffuse than totalitarianism 
suggests and there is another element at play in regular policymaking decisions – especially 
those decisions that do not reach the highest echelons of the state.  Skilling shows how interest 
groups are compatible with authoritarianism.   
These groups with diverse interests attempt to exert influence in certain areas.  All 
clusterings do not have an interest in all issues, nor does a single individual belong to only one 
group.  These shifting and overlapping group identities make the theory more plausible but 
complicates testing systematically.  Much of the research program relied upon case studies of 
parochial issues in Soviet politics where the researcher had limited access to selected 
interviewees or read selected portions of the considerable official press to analyze how they may 
interact.  Skilling argued that this research revealed only the “tip of the iceberg” of state-
suppressed preferences – a plausible but ultimately unverifiable claim.  With proper organization 
and opportunity, he argued, such dissident preferences could explode on the scene like the 
Solidarity movement in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia.26   
Critics charged this was not a theory at all.  The totalitarian ideal type still stood strong, 
although even the Soviet case did not meet the ideal type fully.  Critics of institutional pluralism 
noted the power diffusion idea was obvious and not particularly useful:  “Power is diffuse even 
in concentration camps… The major question… is how power is diffused.” 27  Alexander Groth 
showed how traces of pluralism could be seen even in Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s 
Germany,28 while William Odom repeatedly noted that “it is indeed a misconception to believe 
that all power in the U.S.S.R. was ever wholly in the dictator’s hands.  Sophisticated users of the 
totalitarian model never really treated the matter so unambiguously.  The key question has 
always been how power is dispersed, not whether it is dispersed.”29  These later advocates of the 
totalitarianism model argued that the institutional pluralism thesis erected a straw man of the 
totalitarian model to knock it down, distracted attention from the core of the system, and focused 
on the trivial at the expense of explaining how the state functioned fundamentally.  They claimed 
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institutional pluralism was not a new model at all and represented, at best, a misguided attempt to 
correct totalitarianism.   
The debate therefore became one of degree.  How diffuse is power in the system, what is 
the nature of different power holders, and how do these power holders influence policy?  These 
are very similar tasks that the institutional pluralism thesis started out with, revealing that 
partisans in this debate actually held substantial common ground.   
While I borrow from the theoretical debates over institutional pluralism in forming my 
views of North Korean politics, the hodgepodge nature of this theory makes disputing or 
supporting its wholesale applicability to North Korea less fruitful.  Instead, I take a more positive 
approach with regard to this research program and show where I incorporate its thought into my 
own theory in the following section. 
The Emergence of Post-totalitarian Institutionalism 
 Totalitarian regimes are extreme.  They must maintain a mantle of revolution to motivate 
the high collective energy required to keep the state on a constant state of readiness against 
foreign imperialists and internal enemies.  Such intensity is difficult to maintain.  It is justified by 
arguing that times are special.  The uniqueness of a threat or opportunity encourages individuals 
to accept extreme hardship with the promise of a better future.  Over time, the call to work 
especially hard loses its special significance.  Special times become normal, and promises of 
utopia are not realized.  Intensity naturally fades, and the state must take great pains to motivate 
an increasingly skeptical and exhausted populace.  Time is totalitarianism’s natural enemy, 
especially as economic returns flatten or turn negative.   
 Nevertheless, this type of state has several tools at its disposal to encourage the masses 
and elites to follow the party line and discourage unwanted behavior.  North Korea under Kim Il 
Sung approximated the totalitarian ideal type on all five of these core areas.  (1) A single, all-
encompassing ideology predominated, (2) the Korean Worker’s Party controlled the government 
and military bureaucracies, (3) the state used arbitrary terror to atomize individuals and maintain 
obedience, and the state (4) monopolized the media and (5) planned a command economy.   
On every one of these counts, North Korea moved away from its totalitarian past, yet the 
question remains: why?  Contrary to popular belief, the totalitarian state promises its citizens and 
elites something in return for their buying into the system.  Totalitarian states are not built on the 
relatively weak platform of simple repression.  Pyongyang promises its citizens a powerful (in 
ideology and international security) and prosperous country, and it was rapidly losing its ability 
to produce on each of these pledges due to forces that the regime could not manage.   
The North Korean state, despite its continued emphasis on self-reliance, had been notably 






maintain this intensive mobilization.  A state must draw on additional resources to shape and 
constrain a citizenry and group of elites that grows increasingly skeptical of revolutionary ideals 
and requires different sources of motivation.  These groups must be reminded and convinced of 
the continued threat to their way of life by outside forces and that this way of life is worth 
protecting.  Otherwise, the state must utilize scarce resources to materially entice support or 
effectively compel groups to act in the desire way.   
At the very least, the state must provide the basic material needs of the population (food, 
water, shelter) to maintain legitimacy.  In North Korea’s case, shelter would include energy for 
heating that prevent citizens from freezing in the country’s extreme winters.  Without these 
essentials, the masses and elites alike can conclude that the revolution is simply unsustainable 
given the bounds of human frailty.  It is exceptionally difficult to convince a starving citizen that 
he or she is not hungry.  Consequently, in this case the state must remind the population of the 
horrors of the Korean War and note that the current difficulties are better than the alternative – 
the risk of a war-torn peninsula and immoral, exploitative polity.   
 Domestic and international forces that threaten the regime’s ability to provide these 
requisite needs undermine its ability to sustain itself.  Some forces are rather straightforward 
while others may be initially counterintuitive.  For example, greater international insecurity 
bolsters the state’s role as protector.  Viewed in a linear frame, greater international insecurity 
represents failure in the regime’s stated mission to protect its citizens and system.  However, this 
amorphous sense of insecurity that may arise from new actions or outright fabrications compels 
the population and bureaucracy to support easily identifiable means to address this insecurity, 
most notably by prioritizing military needs.  This reinforces the spiral effect of the security 
dilemma, producing more insecurity that must be countered.  Efforts that may actually 
undermine the state’s security like missile and nuclear developments can be presented to a mass 
or elite audience as actually increasing security due to the amorphous nature of the concept.  
Both success and failure in providing security can be framed to pursue the same policy end.   
Bread and butter issues are quite different.  Threats that can be concretely experienced 
like hunger force a more results-oriented approach.  Citizens know if they have enough food to 
eat.  Basic economic questions cannot be theoretically interpreted without reference to actual 
reality with the same ease as some questions of high politics.  On some issue areas, the state does 
not need to move away from its old ideologically-guided thinking while other areas more clearly 
demand results.  If issues were not linked or did not interact, the state would not face a dilemma.  
It could pursue a results-oriented economic policy to provide for the basic needs of its population 
and maintain a highly militarized polity, providing for the defense of the country.  Indeed, the 
structural realities of the DPRK’s first 25 years allowed Kim Il Sung to accomplish enough of 
both of these goals – economic and ideological advancement – to maintain a popular regime.  
Kim Jong Il faces a more difficult situation, however, and faces tough trade-offs between 






While both Kims had to address the gradual erosion of the state’s power to maintain their 
rule, challenges under the younger Kim became acute.  Neither Kim wanted to loosen control, 
but the younger Kim had to respond to three shocks in the 1990s outside his immediate control.  
Kim Jong Il did not seek out an increasingly ideologically-disenchanted populace, the death of 
the country’s founder and national hero (his father), the collapse of its main benefactor, or the 
famine.  North Korea had to cope or collapse.  Certain political and economic changes risked 
bringing down the whole system, while doing nothing over time risked the same.  With 
everything to lose, Kim proceeded cautiously to partially rationalize the state’s governance 
structure to exert greater efficiency while not giving up his most important claim to legitimacy – 
his hereditary claim to his father’s revolutionary history.  Kim’s efforts to stave off collapse 
produced a political order that looks and acts in substantially different ways than the totalitarian 
model predicts.   
In short, my argument is that Kim maintained much of the old system and changed only 
what he thought he must in order to address the changing internal and external situation and avert 
collapse.  I do not argue that Kim had a preconceived idea of what a new North Korea might 
look like, and I do not consider him a committed reformer.  Instead, he has implemented and 
continues to implement changes to the political and economic structure over time.   
Certain regularities have emerged and a general direction of the state’s politics and 
economics can be identified.  Kim belatedly came to shift emphasis away from revolutionary 
politics to partially address the dire social situation and institute new checks and balances on the 
system to complement his own ruling style.  While his father was a charismatic revolutionary, 
the younger Kim was a more detail-oriented micromanager who could more effectively divide 
and conquer the state rather than dominate a unified system as his father did.  He lacked his 
father’s gravitas and compelling personal narrative and tried to make up for it with even more 
Machiavellian cunning.  However, Kim Jong Il’s move to a more divided political system would 
be very difficult to reverse, creating a certain stability to the new arrangement.    The cabinet, 
military, and party emerged as peer organizations, checking one another; Kim faced real 
resistance in the military and cabinet if he tried to resubmit their authority to the party, creating a 
stable expectation of continued institutional jostling and pluralism.    
This development eroded the preeminent position of the party.  The decline of ideology 
as fundamentally guiding policy and the decline of the communist party are analytically distinct 
ideas, but they go hand-in-hand in practice.  As the state recognizes a need for more rational 
decision-making, the type of information required changes.  Party ideologues continue to provide 
some input, but they fundamentally lack the necessary skills to make technical or expert 
statements.  Instead of retraining these aging ideologues in specific disciplines like economics or 
foreign affairs or massively migrating existing technical expertise into the party apparatus, 
technocrats housed in the government ministries find themselves with much greater influence on 






Expert knowledge is necessarily diffuse.  Experts are valued for their limited but deep 
expertise.  Only in the aggregate can experts touch on all or most issues that afflict society.  
Experts’ work does not offer a one sized fits all answer to questions in the way ideological 
correctness promises.  Nevertheless, the government’s work, no longer constrained to the same 
degree by ideological minders, continues to run into opposition by those previously in a place to 
squelch ideologically incorrect lines of research.  However, the cabinet is no longer an institution 
subordinate to the party but a peer competitor.   
A similar process occurs in the military.  The military, also previously under the party’s 
domination, has a continued importance as the defender against imperialist aggressors.  Since the 
removal of the Soviet benefactor set in motion a set of crises that intensified economic and 
security concerns, the state has renewed interest in military-directed security strategies.  The 
ideological correctness of military doctrine too became less important.  The military genuinely 
needed to provide for the state’s own security without the possibility of superpower backing.  
However, change here proved least significant.  As noted previously, security is a relatively 
amorphous concept without objective benchmarks of success.  The military could continue to 
argue that more defense spending buys more security, although competing interests as they grew 
more powerful could argue that effective diplomacy and economic contacts provided another 
route to national security.   
With these three institutional actors participating in policy deliberations, central 
leadership increasingly arbitrated between competing proposals that put in sharp relief the costs 
and benefits of strategic choices.  For example, economic and social control goals came into 
conflict in North Korea.  As a small state that cannot grow its own food needs due to its 
particular geography, weather, and past agricultural policy decisions, self-isolation and autarky 
are particularly taxing on the state’s economy.  However, the state’s ideology and security are 
fundamentally rooted in keeping out foreign ideas and influences.  Competing interests and those 
who articulated those interests clashed.  The predominance of ideological correctness became a 
luxury that foreign benefactors (or the lack thereof) no longer demanded, providing greater 
impetus for economic opening.     
Maintaining political stability becomes a precarious balancing act.  The state must accept 
the need for radical changes in certain areas in order to provide basic services while not 
forfeiting the entire game by undermining security.  This is particularly true in the economic 
arena as the command economy’s returns level off and eventually turn negative.  In North 
Korea’s case, the plan’s economic returns leveled off in the 1970s and turned negative in the 
1990s.  After the Soviet collapse, North Korea’s economic maladies became acute and chronic.  
Avoiding the impending risks of continued economic decline required loosening control to allow 
more efficient economic operations and allow international trade.  However, this requires 
accepting the security risks of new ideas flowing into the country and takes some assets and 






question whether that causes its power to increase or decrease.  The state attempts to replace one 
risk with another. 
The state must recreate itself not in the likeness of a Stalinist protector that encouraged 
many new regimes in the early part of the Cold War to follow Stalin’s totalitarian model but in a 
way that maintained as much of what was familiar of the old system and required of the new.  
Change by its very nature is destabilizing.  One can imagine how concern about change would be 
particularly acute in a state predicated on strong control and micromanaging people’s lives.  In 
the post-totalitarian phase, maintaining political stability is not a simple, straightforward 
endeavor.  Paradoxically, the state may have to loosen control in order to maintain it.   
This transition is not a process of optimizing the state’s ability to function for its citizens.  
Kim remained on top and elite families generally stayed the same.  These people have private 
and public interests.  While motives are impossible to observe, it is an oversimplification to 
claim these elites only serve their private interests.  Kim uses gifts and prestigious awards to 
motivate and purges and punishments to compel, yet divergent normative ideas about how the 
regime should operate are routinely expressed in the state media.  Money and status are not the 
only objectives that motivate human action.  Leaders of institutions highlight the importance of 
their institution’s mission and advocate both its institutional interests and policy choices 
consistent with that worldview.  Personal interest cannot explain this regularity.   This 
combination of private and public interest is not unique to the North Korean government but it is 
also not the exclusive domain of democratic governance.   
In face of a real domestic opposition vying for power and failure to provide for the basic 
needs of its population, an opposition could eventually pressure the regime to change radically.  
Poland and Czechoslovakia provide examples of the power of indigenous opposition groups 
within a communist state.  However, North Korea lacks a real opposition within the country.  
The population does not have a clear alternative to the status quo and no semi-organized means 
to pursue it due to continual purges and extensive repression.  Of course, this does not suggest 
that an opposition could not develop, especially given continued material hardship, ideological 
decline, and state ineptitude, but it does not describe the current reality.  Without the pressing 
demands of a domestic opposition, the state has greater opportunity to gradually modify its roles.  
With the state facing increased impotence in these core areas, it can alter its mode of operations 
to recapture its ability to provide basic services to the population and maintain a mantle of 
legitimacy as protector against imperialist forces and/or as champion of a reunified Korea.   
These developments are important, because they demonstrate why North Korea 
developed the way it did instead of moving in the direction of the post-communist states of 
Eastern Europe, post-Maoist China, or elsewhere.  With retaining certain elements of the old 






today than under Kim Il Sung.  A theoretical snapshot of this emerged form of governance is the 
remaining subject of this chapter.    
Post-totalitarian Institutionalism 
The single, most important person in North Korean politics is unquestionably Kim Jong 
Il.  This is the most critical hold over from the old system.  Kim continues to maintain absolute 
authority, although not absolute power.  He can intervene in any part of the policy decision-
making chain he wishes and pursue different strategies to ensure effective policy execution.  He 
is an active micro-manager with particular leadership traits.  His role should not be minimized, 
but it is important to remember that he is just one man.  Kim is not synonymous with North 
Korean politics.  To more fully understand North Korean politics and explain variant policy 
outcomes, one must evaluate the second-order institutions that Kim seeks to command.   
The same two fundamental tasks that faced earlier studies of the post-Stalinst Soviet 
Union face this study.  What are the relevant political institutions below Kim?  And how do they 
affect policy (the criterion for “relevance”)?  Besides Kim, the party is the clearest example of a 
hold-over from the old regime.  It continues to purport an ideologically-based policy guide, 
although it no longer reins supreme over the government and military.  The military continues its 
same basic function of defending the state but has an additional political role now that it is freed 
from its subordination to the party.  It highlights specific security threats and suggests means to 
counter them but largely does not articulate a class-based perspective or specifically ideological 
anti-imperialist orientation.  The newest element is the increased role for the cabinet.  With its 
emphasis on tangible results, particularly in the economic arena, it houses technocrats pursuing 
the most rational agenda.   
This does not discount the possibility (indeed, probability) of sub-institutional divisions.  
Nor does it suggest that individuals or groups within an institution may find common ground 
with others in a second institution.  On the contrary, I suggest such divisions should exist down 
to the individual level.  However, the most salient division exists at the top.  Each bureaucracy is 
a coherent group with visible differences on the most important questions of the direction of the 
state.  It is at this second-echelon – more so than the third or fourth – that variance in important, 
national policy decisions can be explained and understood.   
These three institutions, the party, military, and government, represent distinct interests.  
In the course of strategic policy decisions, these interests come in conflict, forcing a new type of 
institutional interaction.  The party in particular now must compete on an increasingly level 
playing field in policy formation debates.  Ideological guidance is not irrelevant, but it has 
become just one of several arguments for or against a particular agenda.  Different institutions 
with a distinct clustering of personnel, resources and competencies, and shared backgrounds and 






from on high.  Authority remains at the top, and Kim and his inner circle are more than mere 
mediators of competing options.   
 North Korea’s institutions define the range of policy alternatives.  Kim with or without 
advice from inner circle advisers select from these presented options.  Power is more diffuse but 
authority remains centralized.  Institutions are the critical, ignored policy inputs that this study 
largely focuses on.  However, Kim is in no way peripheral to the policy process.  He has the final 
say, but his state increasingly uses rational information inputs as another critical input in a way 
that the more purely ideologically-guided policy choices of his father did not.  This new mode of 
rule necessarily requires more diffuse power.   
 Experts by their very nature have a more limited professional view.  While they may 
consciously attempt to contextualize their own particular area of expertise by being generally 
informed about other areas, senior leadership values their opinion for the specific expertise it 
provides.  Experts are expected to develop and sustain a deep understanding of a specific policy 
area.  As a collective body, competent experts should retain a much more detailed understanding 
of a range of issues than senior leadership.  Insofar as this expertise is valued and sustained by 
senior leaders making decisions, a larger number of nameless people are involved in some way 
in influencing those policy decisions.  Not all knowledge translates into power.  It requires a 
connection of knowledge that authoritative officials value.  North Korea’s modified institutional 
structure puts in place the ability of the bureaucracy to provide expert opinion that would aid a 
rational mode of governance.    
I contend that in North Korea, policy innovation comes from below.  Experts craft new 
ideas and form proposals to challenges they confront.  They do not merely execute policy.  
Instead, they also seek to inform policy based on rational and ideological arguments.  On the 
most important questions of the direction of the state, the largest group of bureaucrats has some 
interest in the outcome.  Of course, the highest ranking bureaucrats will articulate these views 
most commonly.  Given this outlook is shaped and synthesized from below, it is natural for these 
high-ranking leaders to espouse distinct policy preferences from their colleagues leading other 
institutions.  Since Kim holds final authority, these institutions come in conflict and must 
articulate specific goals to the Dear Leader and one another as internal and external events give 
them opportunity to bolster their position.   
The three major institutions dispute views of strategic policy choices prior to high-level 
decisions.  Kim is playing a delicate balancing act with this arrangement, trying to maintain his 
weakened emotional/ideological case for legitimate rule (revolutionary politics) and a case based 
on more effective governance any other domestically foreseeable alternative.  He continually 
reminds elite and mass audiences alike through references to his father and Kim Jong Il’s own 
paternal wisdom that he is the legitimate heir to the revolution.  At the same time, he utilizes 






prescriptions contradict revolutionary orthodoxy.  Kim has not sought out this arrangement any 
more than he sought out the Soviet collapse, his father’s death, or the famine.  It was the product 
of a historically-dependent process described in the following chapter outside of his complete 
control.  Consequently, Kim and his core set of advisers hear both rational and ideological 
arguments from institutions with vested interests in his decision.   
The younger Kim’s system fosters more rational policy options through pluralism.  
Experts apply specific knowledge to policy questions as ideological generalists contribute their 
own piece to the conversation.  Ideology no longer dominates as the deciding factor in policy 
decisions, but it has not vanished from the scene either due to its continued role in Kim’s 
personal narrative of legitimacy.  The central leadership must allow public debate if it is to occur 
in the official media, and one can see competing empirical and normative arguments being 
advanced through different institutional organs in the official newspapers.  Bringing more expert 
voices into the policy arena helps rationalize the North Korean political system in the hope of 
improving the state’s material condition and security.   
Through the course of these debates, Kim and his core advisers are exposed to competing 
expert and ideological opinions on policy direction.  Senior leadership arbitrates between 
competing proposals but is influenced by the type of information their institutions produce.  How 
Kim and his inner circle process these different views is difficult to observe, but certain insights 
can be gleamed.  Though several of these inner circle advisers wear two hats as both an adviser 
and the head of a major bureaucracy with a separate information stream, the inner circle is 
reputed to be highly insular.  Individuals may risk their (and their families’) lives if they get out 
of step with the rest of the group, providing a tremendous disincentive for this group to innovate.   
The extent to which this group provides few new ideas for consideration makes it much 
less important than often assumed in explaining policy change.  Replacing risk-averse group 
thinker one with risk-averse group thinker two should negligibly affect policy.  This is the type 
of analysis that makes some researchers conclude Kim is the only person that truly matters in the 
North Korean political system.  Knowledge valued by the central authority and access to that 
authority are critical elements of power in any system.  Understanding the process of knowledge 
creation, mediation, and dissemination are therefore critical.  The inner circle is mainly a 
disseminating body—one final filter sometimes used that has powerful disincentive to redirect 
the discussion away from the group’s conclusions.   
This is not to suggest that the inner circle is irrelevant.  The existence of a unified inner 
circle has especially important implications for any succession scenario.  Since Kim is mortal 
and has not publicly prepared for his succession as his father did extensively, this group may be 
able to continue Kim’s rule in the short-term in the event of Kim’s sudden incapacitation or 
death.  While it is unclear whether the group could control the state in the medium-term given 






repressive apparatus to maintain stability long enough to reassert the anti-imperialist, 
reunification, and/or economic appeals to legitimate authority to maintain the system in some 
form over time.   
While the central leadership holds the final say on policy decisions, even these high-level 
central decisions face bureaucratic resistance in implementation.  Bureaucratic losers do not get 
on board with national policy and continue to voice opposition publicly to the chosen policy 
direction.  Further, these bureaucracies implement the bulk of policy choices that never reach the 
inner circle level.  Bureaucratic preferences impact policy at this lower decision-making level 
and in implementing high-level choices.  These three institutions critically define the agenda and 
shape for options for even the most fundamental strategic questions.  They debate and bargain in 
the policy formulation stage and present their case to Kim.  Preferences do not end because an 
authority has already decided on a policy question, so this model expects that these institutions 
continue to try to affect such policy preferences in the implementation stage whenever the 
opportunity arises.  As such, these institutions influence policy decisions by agenda setting, 
selectively presenting their case, and making lower-level decisions directly.  Of equal 
importance, they affect implementation by actively and substantially resisting and modifying 
even the highest-order decisions promulgated by Kim himself.   
This model is a fairly straightforward view of bureaucratic politics with a particularly 
strong individual on top, but it radically departs from the conventional wisdom on how North 
Korea functions.  Under this model, the three bureaucracies debate policy in the formation and 
execution stages.  Authority remains centralized, but power is more diffuse than the relatively 
monolithic typologies predict.  It shines light on a part of the system that exists in analytical 
darkness.  If my hypothesis is correct, the regime functions in a very different way than 
previously thought with different downstream consequences for regime stability and reaction to 
foreign events.   
Rationalization – even when partial – has real costs.  The costs include information 
outflow and loosened control over the bureaucracy, allowing some more, limited political 
expression within the regime.  Likely concerned about internal threats, most notably including 
coups, both Kim regimes implemented a vertical information flow.  A party official, for example, 
can push information and analysis up the party chain of command, but he or she cannot 
communicate regularly with lateral contacts in the government or military.  Institutional stove-
piping effectively prevents most cross-institutional communication.   
Still, the demand for cross-institutional communication to reveal preferences, influence 
policy, or coordinate effective responses remains.  More senior officials can communicate to a 
wider audience outside of their own institution in the form of speeches, commentaries, and 
articles.  Although they must be cautious to not overstep their bounds, the official media has 






debate.  It is perhaps more revealing than ironic to note that this state so concerned about 
information security prefers to allow foreign observers to see some of its internal deliberations 
than to allow regular cross-institutional communication.  Such secret communications may allow 
threats to Kim’s final authority to emerge.  Consequently, systematic content analysis of North 
Korea’s elite press is the best way to elicit institutional preferences and interaction.   
Research Design 
 I employ a simple historical analysis to test my theory.  This history focuses on evidence 
of institutional policy positions, institutional debate, and bureaucratic resistance to decided 
policy.  My historical analysis has two tasks.  First, I identify the strategic policy issue areas to 
focus my study.  If power is diffuse on the most important issues, then the central leadership 
likely does not try to micromanage issues it deems relatively trivial.  This approach has the 
advantage of not focusing too narrowly on a single issue area where the technical nature of the 
issue may predispose it towards technocratic input.  However, it also does not overextend the 
analysis beyond a digestible set of primary data on important issues.   
Once the issue areas are established, I conduct a systematic content analysis of North 
Korea’s elite press and speeches to document stated institutional policy preferences in context.  
This allows me to demonstrate how institutional leaders respond to each other and their 
environment.  It allows one to see if institutional leaders can reveal preferences and whether 
differences are institutional or simply vary by the leader of the institution at the time.  The 
remainder of this chapter reviews the specifics of my approach, including coding details, the 
relevant methodology literature, and data sources.   
In the process of synthesizing internal policy debates, any researcher must select 
documents from a larger body.  The most significant test of my theory will be on the most 
significant issues facing the state.  However, reasonable people disagree on which issues are 
most important.  For the purpose of this study, it is imperative to tease out which issues the 
central leadership deems most important.  As early as 1966, Kim Il Sung laid out the key 
priorities for the DPRK: anti-imperialism, reunification, and domestic ideological and economic 
concerns.30  With minor modification, these core goals remain at the top of the state’s agenda 
today.  Indeed, even an ad hoc reading of this body of media would leave the researcher scraping 
to find other significant issues that do not fall under these banners.31   
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31 Domestic policy goals such as maintaining social control is broadly wrapped into the debate on economic opening 
with few other domestic issues demanding cross-institutional conversations at this level.  The only other countries of 
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often debated in the “imperialist” context of relations with the U.S.  Sino-DPRK relations are not discussed at any 






The annual New Year’s Joint Editorial (NYJE) also demonstrates these three issues are 
paramount in Kim Jong Il’s DPRK.  The NYJE is the North’s most significant policy and 
propaganda tool for the year.  Pyongyang lays out the state’s core policy goals, ideological 
imperatives, and reaffirms the leadership every year in the NYJE.  Kim Il Sung delivered a 
speech on New Year’s Day every year until his death.  Kim Jong Il has only spoken publicly on 
one known occasion (and then only to shout a single sentence), so he replaced the New Year’s 
Day speech with the NYJE the first year after his father’s death.  While important joint editorials 
between two of the major newspapers are found occasionally during the year, the NYJE is the 
only document carried by all three major, official media outlets in the DPRK.  Domestic and 
foreign audiences anticipate the NYJE and read it closely.  In short, the NYJE is the best, most 
systematic indicator of the regime’s strategic priorities.32   
 I demonstrate the NYJE focuses on these issues every year by coding each paragraph in 
the NYJE’s policy section by the dominant goal it elucidates.  While the NYJE has some inter-
mixing of the leadership, policy, and ideological sections, it does not repeatedly jump between 
these areas.  When more than one goal is mentioned in a paragraph, I decide which goal is 
dominant.  This does not pose a significant challenge, since the North’s stark terms makes their 
core point exceedingly clear.33  I repeat this process for each full year Kim Jong Il has been in 
power to date: 1995 – 2009.  I use the full-text NYJE translations publicly available from 
FBIS/OSC.34   
   These three goals demanded 95-100% of this section each year (1995 – 2009).  
Together, the economy and reunification dictate a median of 92% of the issue focus.  When 
incorporating U.S. policies, the three issues make up 100% of the issue focus for most years 
(Figure 2.1).  The regime likely considers these issues strategic. 
 My second, longer task is to test whether the state is unified and monolithic as the 
centralized models describe or is more diffuse as I hypothesize.  This section provides the central 
evidence to support or refute my theoretical expectations.  Do the cabinet, military, and party 
each advocate their own policy agendas within these three issue areas and specified time period 
                                                           
32 Inference is not the only tool to highlight the importance of the NYJE.  The North Korean regime explicitly says it 
is the core policy document for the year.  North Korea’s semi-official webpage, The People’s Korea, describes the 
NYJE: “As the DPRK’s key policy statement for the year replacing late President Kim Il Sung’s New Year’s 
Address, the Joint Editorial is published annually on New Year’s Day since 1995 [sic] by the country’s three major 
newspapers – Nodong Sinmun (organ of Worker’ Party of Korea), Joson Inmingun (organ of the Korean People’s 
Army) and Chongnyon Jonwi (organ of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League).  Following the line of the late 
President Kim Il Sung’s annual New Year’s Address, the joint editorial sets forth the new task of the year, looking 
back upon the previous year [sic].”  People’s Daily, “QandA on DPRK’s Joint Editorial,” 2000, http://www1.korea-
np.co.jp/pk/127th_issue/2000011901.htm.  
33 My judgments on the subject of the paragraphs are available for replication.  Since this is a single-investigator 
project, my coding has not yet been subject to inter-coder reliability efforts. 
34 The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, renamed the Open Source Center in 2005, translates foreign media 




































Figure 2.1: Policy Issues in NYJE (1995 - 2007) 
 
(1998 – 2008)?  Do these institutions publicly clash with one another in advocating their own 
policy agendas?  Do policy agendas vary when new leaders assume the top post of a given 
institution and therefore better ascribed to the individual than the institution?  Do implemented 
policy choices tend to come from the universe of options publicly presented by North Korea’s 
bureaucracies?   
 I reviewed a set of speeches and articles presented inside the country by the 48 most 
senior members of each bureaucracy and their successors as defined in the North Korea 
Handbook.35  Despite cross-over in formal affiliations, these lists help determine primary 
affiliation.  For example, Cabinet Premiers have all been party members, but these lists identify 
their primary affiliation with the cabinet.  These officials produced approximately 4460 speeches 
or articles from Kim Il Sung’s death until the end of 2008 on these three issue areas.  This is 
slightly less than half of all publications sourced to Pyongyang.  The most senior leaders spoke 
and published much more often than subordinates, leaving less ambiguity about the institutional 
affiliation.   
North Korea’s official, elite media is a critical conduit for the regime to communicate 
general policy and ideology internally.  Two of the three most important newspapers in the 
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country are consistently available to foreigners: the dailies of the party and government. The 
Korean People’s Army daily Choson Inmingun is not available outside of North Korea.36     
I primarily rely on FBIS/OSC translations.  This material is translated by professional, 
full-time Korean linguists with a secondary line of review.  This provides for a more accurate 
translation than a single researcher could likely provide and allows more researchers (e.g., non-
Korean linguists) to replicate this study.  As will be demonstrated in the empirical section, even 
native Korean speakers have made critical translation errors with profound effects on US-DPRK 
relations, especially given regional variations and the North’s occasional use of intentionally 
vague constructions.  Relying on professionally-trained linguists with a second reviewer has real 
advantages over attempting to translate this material myself.  Under no circumstances do I rely 
on the North’s own English language translations as this is an incomplete body of articles and the 
North occasionally omits and changes portions of the translated text.  
Furthermore, one can be assured that this study is not missing material by utilizing these 
translated sources.  North Korea’s relatively small volume of print media articles and 
commentaries makes a comprehensive review of this media feasible and verifiable.  Nodong 
Sinmun, the party’s newspaper is a six-page daily, Minju Choson, the government’s newspaper, 
is a four-page daily.  Given North Korea’s high priority and the relative importance of its official 
press to OSC’s clients, the entire body of relevant articles is available.  Skeptics of the translated 
documents can spot check the publicly available OSC articles against the original vernacular or 
compare to the duplicate, albeit incomplete, BBC Worldwide Monitoring translations.  The OSC 
translations provide a convenient link to the vernacular text.  I also include relevant leaked media 
reports from third party interlocutors that described specifically bureaucratic positions.  I utilize 
all available databases to include this material.   
My research design hinges on the contention that each institution presents its own policy 
preferences in the elite press.  Elites have information needs beyond what the mass media 
supplies.  The elite media serves an important communication function.  In a state where regular 
cross-institutional communication is restricted, the media helps fill this void.  Sacrificing this 
critical conduit of cross-institutional communication for a disinformation campaign would be 
puzzling.  While the central leadership may be able to sow disinformation, this also undermines 
its own ability to rule.  Elites within the bureaucracies would be less clear about state policy and 
centralized wishes less effectively translated into action.   
Furthermore, the state goes to great pains to continually reinforce the notion that Kim is 
the nerve center directing all wise choices.  Presenting the state as disunited undermines this 
critical propaganda purpose that both the regime and comparative politics theory recognizes is 
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important for regime survival.37  If the military or any other institution serves as the excuse for 
Kim to select a policy, then his power is necessarily constrained.  He not only is challenged but 
is challengeable.  This is not a cost-free idea for a dictator.  Despite the regime’s security 
consciousness, it is less likely that this disinformation campaign seeks to mislead academic or 
policy analyses like this one.       
Additionally, the deception counter-thesis cannot explain why policy divisions are 
institutional rather than personal.  An individual is easier to blame than a whole institution for 
policy failure.  Cadres, for example, know their own unit’s performance better than they know 
the performance of one high ranking general.  Blaming the entire military is a harder sell to this 
elite audience than blaming a single individual that a smaller group of elites would know 
personally.   
I contextualize these policy positions in a contemporary history.  This has several generic 
methodological advantages for a project like this one.  Charles Tilly put the methodological 
argument most starkly: “In the case of state transformation, there is no way to create 
comprehensive, plausible, and verifiable explanation without taking history seriously into 
account.”38  This study at first blush is more limited in time (1998 – 2008) and space (North 
Korea), but it is not a particularistic, atheoretical case study.  Instead, it seeks to both explain this 
case on its own terms and use that knowledge to build and refine comparative politics theory.   
This dual purpose lends itself to this approach.  This study of state transformation 
questions our fundamental assumptions about how the state operates.  It seeks to define the 
relevant variables that have not been identified previously and that exist in complicated two-way 
feedback loops where time intervals are not standard.  The project attempts to uncover the 
processes and mechanisms that produce variable trajectories and outcomes.  This is highly 
context dependent.  All social science attempts to simplify reality, but the initially more limited 
scope of this project requires retaining the specific context as important data.  The historical 
approach allows the incorporation of initial conditions, path dependency, sequences, and 
interaction effects.  In this way, it can expose the political process that evolved and currently 
exists in history.39   
More specifically, the historical approach most effectively deals with this research 
problem.  This approach allows me to identify the evolution of North Korea’s policy debates 
over time, given internal and external circumstances.  For example, do periods of intensified 
hostility with the United States favor the military and their agenda?  Does South Korean 
economic aid foster increased international opening and softening of the North’s foreign policy 
                                                           
37 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).  
38 Charles Tilly, “Why and How History Matters,” in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Robert 
Goodwin and Charles Tilly (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 421. 






choices?  More basically, does Kim select policy from the universe of choices debated in the 
official press?  Do institutions hold relatively stable policy advocacy across leaders of the 
institution or are they a product of new leaders?  In short, my detailed historical discussion of 
this period focuses on whether my theoretical expectations and the downstream consequences of 
my model hold true.   
Integrating the three issue areas into a single chronological history allows one to view the 
bureaucratic debate within and between these issue areas.  Also, the temporal character is 
important.  Are new policy initiatives discussed between agencies prior to implementation?  If a 
new policy idea appears in the elite press as an institutional position before Kim lays claim to it 
or it is implemented as policy, then that policy likely originated from below.  While it is possible 
that the idea originated within Kim’s inner circle, it is unlikely that the top political leadership 
would allow lower-level bureaucrats to claim credit for their idea.  Questioning policy diverges 
from the more centralized models’ expectations.  If the bureaucracies have a say in refining 
policy ideas through inter-agency debate, then institutions weigh in on policy choices and expert 
opinion factors into policy decisions.   
 Furthermore, my hypothesis predicts an element completely alien to the monolithic 
descriptions of North Korean politics: bureaucratic resistance.  I expect the disadvantaged 
institutions to maintain consistent policy positions on strategic policy even after Kim’s central 
decision.  These positions may be somewhat muted or presented more cautiously after Kim’s 
decision, but continued opposition to decided policy is strong evidence of a more plural polity.  
The center does not direct all positions.   
My research hypothesis is falsifiable.  It is possible that institutions do not maintain a 
consistent general outlook on these issues over time.  They may simply reflect the wishes of the 
central leadership, towing Kim’s official national line and not varying on revealed policy 
preferences.  The central leadership may encourage these contrary views to throw off foreign 
observers and select policy consistently advocated by only one institution.  Also, senior 
leadership may ignore these differences and select policies outside the universe of policy options 
debated in the elite press.  Alternatively, powerful men – and here the gendered term is explicitly 
warranted – may rotate between the most senior positions of each bureaucracy, bringing with 
them a new outlook to propound.  Finally, men or institutions may be set up as scapegoats, 
linking certain people or institutions to policies that are bound to fail.  In short, the research 
design can at the outset find supporting systematic evidence for any of the theories documented 
in the literature review – or it can support my own.    
The monolithic ideal types may find support in the following chapters instead of my 
theory.  If the central leadership defines policy and the bureaucracy implements it, then one 
would not expect to find policies debated in the official press.  The central leadership would have 






is personal and not institutional, then a leader’s policy choices should not be tied to the 
institution he leads.  A new Cabinet Premier, for example, would have no reason to articulate the 
same policy line as his predecessor.  By contrast, consistency across leaders of the institution 
suggests the expert professional bureaucracy pushes new ideas up to the political leadership to 
arbitrate, and individual leaders are less important in policy formation than competing models 
argue.  In this case, the institution has expertise and momentum of its own regardless of the top 
leader.   
My theory argues that Kim’s power is limited in the sense that he rules through a rational 
bureaucracy.  His policy choices carry the day, but experts within each bureaucracy present him 
with a universe of policy options.  While “none of the above” remains one of his multiple 
choices, I test with the analysis in the following chapters whether he usually selects from those 
options debated in the press.  If he does, then this is evidence that power is more diffuse than the 
monolithic theories present.  Defining options for policy selection is a critical power.  
Bureaucratic resistance is also strong evidence that Kim’s power is more limited than the 
monolithic ideal types indicate.   
The falsifiable empirical test will allow me to systematically address this question.  My 
research design does not allow proving the theory beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather it tests 
which theory holds the preponderance of evidence.  If my empirical tests correspond with my 
expectations, then they are highly suggestive that the monolithic conventional wisdom is 
incorrect.  More importantly, it demonstrates that my model is more likely to be correct than 
competitors.   
In order for this theoretical model to be deemed applicable to North Korea, several 
empirical regularities must be observed.  Bureaucracies must:   
• be coherent groups;  
• have an ability to aggregate and articulate preferences;  
• conflict with one another on policy questions; and  
• have some bearing on actual policy decisions.   
Bureaucratic resistance to selected policy choices, while more difficult to observe, would 
provide further evidence that bureaucracies articulate and pursue specific interests in a diffused 
manner at odds with the totalitarian model.   
 In chapter four, I argue that the party, military, and cabinet are each coherent groups with 
distinct policy outlooks.  They have different histories and composition.  Conversely, I argue that 
the security apparatus is not a coherent group and therefore cannot be considered a fourth interest 






rubber-stamp parliament (Supreme People’s Assembly) and judiciary – cannot be characterized 
as coherent, semi-autonomous groups that influence policy decisions.   
 Chapters five through seven take up specific policy debates within the system.  I test 
whether each of these three institutions have a coherent message over time and whether their 
policy goals come in conflict with one another.  I also test whether one or more of these policy 
options generally becomes state policy.   If each institution does not present a single policy 
response to arising issues, wavers from institutional interests, does not conflict with other 
institutions, and/or has its policy options routinely ignored, my theory should not be deemed 
empirically valid.   
Before turning to these critical tests, however, it is necessary to sketch the regime from 
which North Korea has evolved.  The following chapter sketches the regime’s six-decade 






Chapter 3: Historical Context 
Introduction 
Kim Il Sung maintained the longest ideologically-driven political system of the 
communist experiment that approached the totalitarian ideal.  His system was remarkably 
resilient and remains popular even among many North Korean defectors who live in South Korea 
today who blame his son for ruining the country.40  The elder Kim was credited with fighting the 
Japanese colonizers, erecting the state, “defeating” the Americans in the Korean War, and 
providing the perception of a higher standard and respectability of living.  Kim Il Sung presented 
himself as a true revolutionary.   
By contrast, Kim Jong Il was born into luxury, lacked his father’s revolutionary bona 
fides and personal charisma, and claimed political legitimacy based on his bloodline rather than 
his own actions.  He avoided public appearances and did not command the same widespread 
personal loyalty.  He also assumed the top leadership position amid economic collapse and 
brewing famine, further compounding challenges in consolidating his rule.  Kim Il Sung spent 
two decades formally grooming his son for succession, yet the two Kims ruled the state in 
distinct ways.  North Korea’s political institutions evolved over the decades and rapidly changed 
in the 1990s.   
The following two chapters begin with a simple assumption: Political evolution is a 
historically dependent process.  Rarely can political institutions be crafted without reference to 
the political past.  In order to understand why and how the contemporary North Korean political 
system functions, one must start with what the current regime evolved out of.  This chapter 
sketches North Korea’s general political history since its founding.  The next chapter takes up a 
related, albeit more specific, task of describing the establishment and evolution of North Korea’s 
political institutions.  The central point of these two chapters is to show how Kim Il Sung over 
time built a totalitarian system with its apex in the early 1970s.  Kim Jong Il inherited and 
precipitated a system in decline.  This decline rapidly accelerated in the 1990s and opens the 
theoretical possibility of discussing the resulting specific variety of post-totalitarian rule.   
Foundations of the Founding 
Kim Il Sung’s North Korea departed significantly from previous Korean political history.  
It provides a convenient, non-arbitrary starting point for evaluating the evolution of the state’s 
politics.  While Korea’s “5000 years of history” undoubtedly shaped the culture, values, and 
social relations that make the nation a single people, this history sheds incomplete light on Kim 
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Il Sung’s early government institutions, their specific functions, and how they related with 
society.    
 Much has been written on the birth of the state and speculation about its pending death.  
Neither evaluates the entire story.  The state changes as it grows older.  The formative years 
critically shape the state’s life, but they do not predetermine its destiny.  North Korea’s relations 
with its neighbors have affected its political development.  Traumatic events and opportunity 
alike have fostered its evolution.  This chapter looks at that evolution in progress.  North Korea 
is a young state, but it is very ill.  The prognosis remains unclear whether North Korea will 
rebound from the 1990s or suffer chronic illness until its eventual demise.  However, to answer 
these questions and others, one must briefly look to the evolution of North Korea’s politics.   
 The Chosun Dynasty reigned over a united Korea from 1392 to 1910, but its lasting 
imprint on the structure and character of the North Korean regime is negligible.  Korean political 
culture from the pre-Japanese occupation era would only survive in the North in the most general 
sense in terms of social values, beliefs, and customs.  Japan’s occupation and annexation – along 
with the strong reaction to it –profoundly shaped the creation of new political institutions on the 
Korean peninsula.   
During Japan’s 35 years of formal annexation of Korea (1910-45), Japan imposed a 
feudal economic structure with land held by only a few owners and industrial production and 
capital investment geared towards extractive and exported goods.  The Japanese dealt with the 
Koreans brutally, suppressing their national identity and language.  Resistance groups organized 
against the Japanese inside Korea and in nearby China before and during the Second World War.  
Following Japan’s defeat in 1945, these guerilla groups vied for power over Korea.  The peculiar 
nature of the right-wing Japanese administration led most resistance groups to take on a leftist 
persona.  The dearth of indigenous, non-communist groups left the United States, for example, 
only one serious contender to recognize as the non-communist Korean government in 1948.   
The Japanese occupation made Korea ripe for leftist politics, but leftism was secondary to 
the primary demand that the new polity be anti-Japanese.  Before it had fully consolidated power 
following the Japanese defeat, the Kim Il Sung faction moved towards a land reform effort that 
initially privatized the large land holdings the Japanese had consolidated.  The socialist goal of 
collective agriculture was put on hold; the initial effort was to move away from the Japanese 
administration, prompting the community party to form individual agricultural plots.  While the 
Korean Workers Party eventually advocated for a more socialist line, prioritizing heavy industry 
and defense over agriculture and light industry, the anti-Japanese element proved more important 
than socialist doctrine.   
The new Korean government was more concerned with its intensely anti-Japanese/anti-






owners and other “collaborators” with the Japanese or Americans were considered anathema and 
poor marriage partners, radically reshaping social relations in the North.  Many of the previous 
elite were killed outright as collaborators, while others either moved to the South or recreated 
themselves as part of the new dominant social and political order as the new guerilla government 
in Pyongyang marginalized and denounced this group.41    
Despite this intense anti-Japanese sentiment, the party’s demand to pursue a more 
modern state encouraged it to very cautiously utilize the skills of these individuals.   The 
Japanese left thousands of trained administrators on both sides of the DMZ after their abrupt 
departure in 1945.42  These administrators brought their skills to the new Korean governments 
and helped bring traditional Korea into the modern world.  Both Koreas developed a modern 
bureaucracy and increasingly utilized and developed science and technology as industrializing 
states.  The pre-modern Choson political institutions had relatively little bearing on the new 
North Korean polity, in particular.  Some Korean nationalists in the North and South are 
reluctant to recognize this historical point, but the Japanese colonial period left a tremendous 
mark on Korea, Koreans, and their political institutions.   
 Further, Kim Il Sung’s faction was geographically and politically distanced from the 
Chosun Dynasty.  These guerillas were from Korea’s northern provinces and lower classes.  This 
was a double strike against them in the Choson system.  The Kim Il Sung faction did not 
demonstrate any affinity towards or significant contact with the Chosun government.  Kim’s 
guerrillas after the Japanese defeat and even through the Korean War actively vied for power 
against those who may have had some contact with Chosun institutions.  The Kimilsungists 
labeled those who stayed in Korea to fight the Japanese as “collaborators” and tried to purge 
them as Kim tried to position himself on top of a new Korean regime.  During the occupation, 
Kim’s group was based in China, more distanced from the center of Japanese power on the 
peninsula, and faced criticism from competing guerilla groups that they had abandoned Korea 
during the colonial period.  Korean leaders who may have known something of the preceding 
Korean political order did not participate in building the DPRK’s political institutions. The 
guerilla experience would be the main indigenous Korean influence on the DPRK’s founding.43  
 Also, Kim and his comrades did not finish middle school. These uneducated guerillas 
made up Kim Il Sung’s political elite.  These men likely did not have much serious exposure to 
Chosun political institutions personally or through reading history.  Further, they were focused 
on ousting the Japanese, not learning how to govern.  There were no Lenins among the 
Kimilsungists; they distrusted intellectuals and actively purged them at various stages after 
consolidating power.  The Kimilsungists lacked the capacity to develop sophisticated political 
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institutions on their own or draw from the past.  Instead, they followed the lead of their main 
international backers and their own collective personal experience leading a small guerilla army.   
 Finally, the Soviets contributed to North Korean institutions.  The DPRK’s first 
constitution was written in Russian and translated into Korean.  The 1948 constitution was 
modeled on the Soviet Union’s 1936 “Stalin Constitution.”  In 1948 and 1949 when the North 
Koreans referred to “suryong” (meaning “chieftain”), they referred to Stalin, not Kim.  Kim later 
made sure “suryong” referred only to him.44  Yet Stalin’s aims were limited in Korea.  He sought 
to install a friendly regime rather than get involved deeply in the regime as he did in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  North Korea had greater room to depart from Stalin’s political model than the 
states behind Europe’s Iron Curtain.   
 Kim was not merely a puppet of the Soviets even in the early years after the Japanese 
defeat.  Kim’s political star was already shinning among his peers before the Soviet tapped him 
for the job.  He commanded up to 300 men in a fractionalized guerilla movement only a few 
thousand fighters strong, mounted at least one offensive inside Korea, topped Japan’s “most 
wanted list” in 1939, and most importantly, avoided total liquidation by the Japanese as many 
other guerilla groups suffered.  After returning to Korea following the Japanese defeat, Kim’s 
political proposals won out amongst indigenous forces over the Soviet-supported factions in 
1946.  Following a Soviet fallout with its first choice Korean leadership team, Moscow turned to 
Kim Il Sung as its favored leader in Korea.45  Soviet influence was undoubtedly important but 
only one element of the founding of the state.    
 Kim’s autonomy from the Soviets grew quickly.  The KWP merged the North Korean 
and South Korean Communist Parties in 1946 – a full two years before the establishment of the 
state.  Kim, the party, and the state concentrated on reunification, not foreign policy.  With a 
significant military advantage over the South and a depleted U.S. military presence in Asia 
following Washington’s rapid demobilization after World War II, Kim effectively lobbied 
Moscow to allow him to reunify the nation by force in 1950, precipitating the Korean War.46   
 The Korean War (1950-53) was a tremendously important event in Korean history and 
20th century world history.  Deprivation was extreme on both halves of the peninsula.  The 
American general in charge of the Far East Bomber Command reported that there were no more 
targets in North Korea, because everything was destroyed.  North Korea’s population 
contradicted by more than ten percent, every major industry was ruined, and agricultural 
production shrank to a fraction of pre-Korean War levels.47  North Korea was virtually a blank 
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slate in every material way.  For ideological purposes, the DPRK media cites the importance of 
the Korean War experience regularly as the great effort to achieve the state and party’s core goal 
of national reunification.   
The Korean War is important, but it was not a revolutionary struggle.  For the North, it 
was an early action of a government that preceded the war and survived it.  A band of anti-
Japanese factions with Kim Il Sung the most prominent among them launched the war, and Kim 
Il Sung emerged from the war still precariously on top.  The Japanese occupation and defeat – 
not the Korean War – revolutionized Korean politics.  Before, during, and after the Korean War, 
Kim Il Sung worked to eliminate internal opponents and strengthen his grip on the DPRK.  The 
Korean War was one more tool, not a cause, for Kim to establish his totalizing regime.   
By the end of the 1950s, Kim eliminated his major domestic opponents and fashioned a 
totalitarian system.  North Korea’s institutions evolved – notably in 1972, 1992, and 1998 with 
constitutional revisions – but they evolved from this Stalinist-guerilla fusion starting point 
coupled with a legacy of the imperial Japanese modes of administration.  Stalinist Russia, the 
Kimilsungist guerrillas, and Imperial Japan shared totalizing aspects that sought state supremacy 
over all aspects of society that profoundly shaped the DPRK’s founding institutions and 
ideology.     
Kim Il Sung and Totalitarianism, 1956 - 1990 
1950s: Consolidating Power. Kim Il Sung consolidated his power in the 1950s, purging 
remaining opponents, and making Soviet support less important for internal control.  He 
removed domestic opposition to allow the communist party to monopolize politics under his 
direction as the totalitarian model predicts.  In December 1955, Kim introduced the country to a 
comprehensive ideology, Juche.  Juche is an inherently flexible, nationalistic philosophy that 
reined supreme over the distinctively “Kimilsungist” political institutions until his death.  The 
injection of nationalism is important, because it marked Kim’s final departure from any Soviet 
puppet status.  Kim had removed internal challengers enough that he could depart further from 
Soviet influence and assert cherished independence.  North Korea never reached its self-reliant 
ideal, but this ideal serves as a source of pride and ideological conviction to this day.  Like the 
Vietnamese, Koreans of all sorts proudly recognize their independent history and have fought 
fiercely to defend that status.  When other states were absorbed by foreign occupiers, Korea 
remained independent.  This is part of the reason the Japanese occupation was so hated, and why 
the North Koreans constantly chide the South Koreans as American puppets.  Kim Il Sung 
tapped into this nationalism and placed himself and the ideologically-guided party at the center 
of the new regime.   
At the first opportunity after Khrushchev’s “secret speech” that denounced Stalinism, 






Soviet-Korean faction (those residing in the Soviet Union during World War II) and the Yenan-
Korean faction (those fighting in Mao’s army during the period) departed from Khrushchev’s 
model in one important way –Khrushchev denounced Stalin after the totalitarian dictator’s death 
and Kim Il Sung was still very much alive.48  Kim responded to the criticism by finally purging 
these two other guerilla factions and asserting his personality cult.  After Kim liquidated 
factionalism, North Korea had a party elite of generally like-minded revolutionaries with intense 
personal devotion to Kim Il Sung, despite concerns about continual purges and evidence of 
corruption.49   
Kim Il Sung called the Third Party Congress in April 1956.  Rather than following the 
Soviet lead away from the totalitarian ideal, Kim further centralized his power and the power of 
the Korean Workers Party.  He instructed the party to implant its representatives within the 
government and in the military organizations (down to the company level) to ensure proper 
policy implementation in accordance with the party line.  Party representatives would have to 
approve any operational military action and controlled promotions, transfers, leaves, and general 
indoctrination.50  Party representative established youth and women’s organizations, agriculture 
and industry work federations, trade unions.  They closely controlled education and made great 
pains to absorb society.51  Kim did not develop a strongman dictatorship along the personalist 
model by maintaining power through simple repression.  His new polity proved much more 
robust, utilizing a massive party apparatus to control society as well as government.  
Kim Il Sung utilized a single comprehensive party and all encompassing ideology as the 
totalitarian ideal type predicts, but he also put himself firmly on top of the party.  Kim’s oft-cited 
“personality cult” runs much deeper than most analyses explicitly recognize.  The Korean War 
created human suffering that outlasted the war.  The large numbers of orphans encouraged the 
state to establish the School for the Offspring of Revolutionary Martyrs, renamed the better 
known Mangyondae Revolutionary School.  The school instilled an ideal that the state was the 
new family with tremendous psychological impact on these boys and young men.52  It bred 
intense devotion to Kim Il Sung and the revolution that later generations not personally marred 
by the Japanese occupation or the Korean War would not appreciate in the same personal way.  
Though some other totalitarian regimes used similar methods to fill the ranks of the secret police, 
graduates of the Mangyondae Revolutionary School came to populate the top leadership 
positions in the North Korean system as first-generational revolutionaries aged.  Kim Il Sung put 
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in place an ideological system with greater potential to be long lasting among this group of elites 
than other totalitarian states.  
Though the regime used repression extensively, it did not survive by it.  It was a more 
stable polity, because it could appeal to intense ideological and nationalistic sentiments and 
articulate them in Juche thought.  The system also gained legitimacy internally in the early years 
from the economic results it produced.  Casual observers of North Korea understandably 
associate it with economic backwardness.  This characterization is generally appropriate after the 
1970s, but in the years following the Korean War, the state saw real economic gains.  North 
Korea expanded agricultural production and reduced the number of people required to work the 
fields.  They shifted workers into the greatly expanding industrial sector and developed an 
educated workforce.  The state enjoyed double digit growth annually in the post-Korean War 
1950s and roughly six percent annual growth in the 1960s, leading one Le Monde journalist to 
note that North Korea was “one of the greatest economic powers in Asia.”  North Korea was 
doing better economically than the South Korea, and the North even accepted defectors from the 
South.  North Koreans did not live in a socialist paradise, but they could reasonably conclude 
that life was getting better and was superior to the alternative.  They attributed this success to the 
command economy – another area where this regime followed the totalitarian ideal type.   
1960s: The Sino-Soviet Split. The Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s prompted North Korea 
to play China and the Soviet Union off one another.  It provided North Korea greater political 
independence and new economic and security challenges.  The Juche ideology’s emphasis on 
independence and more general Korean nationalism produced a reluctance to rely on Chinese or 
Soviet benefactors.  However, what North Korea gained in political independence from this 
posturing, it lost in critical economic aid.  North Korea had to extend its seven-year plan to ten 
years as the plan’s goals were not achieved in the shorter timeframe.  Greater independence also 
produced a type of greater insecurity.  North Korea could not rely on either the Soviets or the 
Chinese wholly to provide for its security.  It intensified the self-reliant line and started efforts 
towards its own nuclear capacity.53 While North Korea’s heavy-industry supporting command 
economy was based on the Stalinist model, the state followed Mao’s lead in the Great Leap 
Forward to modify the Korean economy in the Chollima March.   
With more independence in the 1960s, the state was faced with more responsibilities.  
Technocrats emerged in the military and economic spheres to augment the revolutionaries with 
more competent administration.  In 1962 Kim Il Sung announced the party must put “equal 
emphasis” on military and economic goals, signaling his ability to direct all policy spheres.54  
Kim quickly reversed his slight movement away from the ideologically-driven command 
economy.  Revolutionary generals argued that the state should provide defense before 
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considering economic goals.  Kim Il Sung ultimately heeded his revolutionary compatriots’ 
advice and restricted the role of economic technocrats once again.  Consequently, as Soviet aid 
dropped, the initial gains of industrialization reached diminishing returns, and Kim Il Sung’s 
strategy to arm the entire population and build extensive and expensive underground military 
facilities required a greater share of the country’s increasingly scarce resources, the state’s 
economic growth slowed.  Kim demonstrated some willingness to listen to and empower 
institutions other than the party during his period of rule, but it was limited and always under the 
watchful eye and formal authority of the party.   
The economy slowed starting in the mid-1960s and 1970s, stagnated in the 1980s, 
collapsed to below subsistence levels in the 1990s, and modestly rebounded in the 2000s.  
However, a certain segment of society recalled the period of post-war reconstruction and 
industrialization that produced rapid growth as more than a one-time strategy.  With nostalgia, 
they argued that these socialist strategies could again be put to use, reflecting the party’s general 
position of applying past policies to the contemporary situation.55  As will be shown in the 
empirical chapters, this memory had a meaningful impact on policy debates in North Korea in 
the 1990s and 2000s.   
By the Second Party Congress in 1966, Kim installed his revolutionary brethren in all of 
the key posts and eliminated the technocrats.  By the end of the decade, though, he purged many 
of these loyal revolutionary compatriots.  Kim alone would be the revolutionary hero and would 
not allow even this close group of comrades to remain in high places of power.  Kim followed 
the totalitarian model’s expectations for a permanent purge.   Kim replaced some of his 
revolutionary generals with revolutionary civilians and technocrats.  One must demonstrate 
loyalty to Kim and the party line, but even that did not assure one’s (political) survival from 
arbitrary terror.  Officials naturally develop differing ideas about policy, and they may express 
them.  However, Kim Il Sung’s use of purges like other totalitarian dictators prevented these 
views from advancing or undermining the state’s centralized control.56   
Kim interpreted Juche, not the party, as Marxist-Leninist doctrine would support.  While 
the party began as an important institution, it came to occupy a decidedly second-place role.  The 
party would sit atop and constrain the bureaucracy but follow the orders of a single man.  Party 
representatives resided inside every major unit of the bureaucracy, military, and workplace.  
They assured policy implementation did not depart significantly from Kim’s line and espoused 
ideological correctness.  Just as the party maintained tight control over the rest of the system, 
Kim tightly controlled the party and asserted legitimacy through simple repression, a well-
developed personality cult, a general ideology, and even a recognition of economic growth. 
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North Korea approached the totalitarian ideal type described in the previous chapter in the late 
1950s and 1960s with a level of personal power that even Stalin and Mao did not achieve.57      
1970s: Apex of Power. Kim had so solidified his position atop the system that Robert 
Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee perceptively argued in the 1970s that profound institutional change 
(through evolution or revolution) was unforeseeable in the near future. “Only when organizations 
now totally subordinate to the party… acquire some sense of separate interest and some degree 
of autonomy will the present structure of the party, including the methods of ordering authority, 
undergo significant alteration.  The degree of pluralism attained in the total society, in short, will 
determine the extent to which party monolithism and the cult of personality that tends to 
accompany it can be reduced.”58 In their view, this was unforeseeable in the near future as North 
Korea was the “world’s purest monocratic system.”59  Still, this position would not naturally 
propagate itself and required close and increasingly difficult efforts to maintain. 
North Korea’s 1972 constitution codified Kim’s personal power.  On the heels of Kim Il 
Sung’s important and highly celebrated 60th birthday, the new constitution created the position of 
president for Kim Il Sung, instituting an unprecedented concentration of presidential power 
unseen even in Stalin’s Soviet Union or Mao’s China.60   Kim Il Sung drew advisers from his 
revolutionary brethren and put them in high positions in the party.  They were rewarded for 
general (ideological) knowledge.  Specialists and those with technical knowledge were tolerated 
in the party starting in the 1960s when the Sino-Soviet split provided North Korea greater 
independence and thus created more responsibilities, but technocrats still had no opportunity for 
senior leadership in the 1970s.61  
The 1972 constitution firmly established the supremacy of the party over the state.  It 
formally downgraded the main legislative body, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), 
discarding the previous legal fiction that the SPA was the supreme organ in the North Korean 
system.  It downgraded the state’s main executive body, the cabinet, renaming it the 
Administrative Council.  The new constitution shrank the number of ministries from thirty seven 
to twenty two, and granted the party more functional control over the Administrative Council, 
particularly in economic affairs where economic technocrats had temporarily exerted greater 
influence in the 1960s.  Most of the officially high-ranking revolutionaries held senior positions 
in the party structure and low- and mid-level officials stopped rotating between the party, 
military, and government roles.  They increasingly developed functional expertise in one 
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institution, compartmentalizing roles and information that Kim Il Sung and his revolutionary 
comrades could control.   
Kim’s speeches and writings explicitly and consistently identified the government 
bureaucracy as an enemy to the good.  Like other communist states, party members maintained 
key posts in the government bureaucracy in order to insure proper policy implementation.  The 
Foreign Minister, for example, was a member of the Politburo.  The Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, Armed Forces, Trade, External Economic Relations, and the Committee for Cultural 
Relations with Foreign Countries and the Academy of Sciences all had formal roles in foreign 
policy, but in practice the party was sufficiently staffed and empowered to control these 
bureaucratic elements under Kim Il Sung’s oversight.62  Foreign policy decision-making centered 
on the Party Secretariat’s Department of International Affairs not the separate Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  The party’s decisions would be sent to the rubber stamp parliament and then 
implemented through the Politburo.   
The party was the most important organ advising policy decisions, making policy 
decisions, and executing policy.  Remaining institutions existed as support staff to the party’s 
orders.  This decision-making and implementation process operated under the supervision of the 
Central Committee of the Party – and the President.63  Ideology informed macro-political 
decision-making which was reflected in the state’s institutional formation.   
Kim continued to rule through the party by implanting political advisers with wide-
ranging power in the military and government bureaucracies.  These implanted representatives 
delivered regular reports to the party apparatus.  Party control of the government expanded in the 
Fourth (1961) and Fifth (1970) Party Congresses, although the extent of this expansion cannot be 
firmly identified.64  Particularly in the arena of foreign affairs, the DPRK needed greater capacity 
in the 1970s.  In the early years, North Korea had diplomatic relations with as few as seven 
countries, allowing the condensed party structure to deal with foreign policy.  By the 1970s, Dae-
sook Suh notes, the government had to assume greater policymaking roles due to the greater 
workload, reflected in the 1972 constitution.65   
While Suh’s analysis was restricted to foreign affairs, one could surmise that similar 
pressures faced other areas that increasingly required more specialized knowledge.  The 
government moved from a purely administrative role to having greater policymaking 
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responsibilities as suggested by an infusion of new personnel, more frequent meetings on 
substantive questions, and the Cabinet Premier introducing the new budget to the SPA.  By 
contrast, the KWP Central Committee had already reduced its plenary meetings to once or twice 
a year.   Government personnel increasingly met in joint meetings with Politburo personnel.   
The party was positioned over the military and the government, creating a three tiered 
political structure.  Kim codified personal power but maintained ideology as a guide and 
constraint on political action.  The important role of the party, ideology, continual purges, and 
command economy as key conduits for Kim to control the state and society made his state more 
closely resemble the totalitarian ideal than other models of non-democratic rule.   
 
Figure 3.1: Macro-Political Organization Under Kim Il Sung 
Kim Il Sung’s ideologically-driven process failed to foster the third goal of prosperity 
after the initial gains of post-war reconstruction and modernization diminished.  Kim may have 
been well informed about what occurred, but his leadership often lacked the personal and/or 
institutional capacity to understand why it mattered.  In 1972 – 74, for example, the Minister of 
External Economic Affairs Kong Chin Tae presided over the purchases of massive western 
industry, including the world’s largest cement factory.  North Korea planned to produce 
exportable products.  The enterprise was not economically viable even considering the cheap 
North Korean labor.  Some industries could not produce a product while others could not market 
it abroad.  The 1973 oil crisis and rise in energy costs made the energy-inefficient production 
even more unsustainable.  The short-lived experiment left North Korea with a massive debt and 
no new productive industry.  The North showed no inclination to pay down its debt.  It was the 
first socialist state to default, causing its credit rating to plummet and effectively removed any 
hope of access to foreign capital other than aid.    
 Kim was not above blaming and even purging officials for failed policies, yet he 
promoted Kong to Vice Premier in 1975.  In a rare interview with a western media outlet, Kim 






North Korean goods66; Kim seemed to not understand the severe economic folly of the project 
and its tremendous long-term consequences on the North Korean economy.  Kim Il Sung was an 
ideologue and revolutionary, not a technocrat.  At the time, he empowered the KWP’s State 
Planning Commission with economic decisions while the government ministries could only carry 
out policy.67  Significant events like this suggest that he did not have the institutional or personal 
competence to rule pragmatically.   
 1973 also marked the introduction of Kim Jong Il to the North Korean political scene.    
Kim Il Sung demoted his younger brother, Kim Yong Chu, and Kim Jong Il took on a then 
unspecified senior party role.  The North Korean media started to praise Jong Il as the “party 
center.”  The same year the DPRK Academy of Sciences literally deleted its previous derogatory 
definition of “hereditary succession” as an exploitative, feudal practice from its Political 
Dictionary.68  Though Kim Il Sung effectively maintained political control through the 
totalitarian arrangement, it remained unclear at this time if the younger Kim could exert the same 
power and authority as his father.    
By the mid-1970s, some observers claimed that the North Korean government was 
increasing its role vis-à-vis the party, especially in foreign affairs.  Dae-Sook Suh wrote that the 
1972 constitution fostered this change, while Robert Scalapino responded that the dual-
appointment of party and government officials made such a change of “limited importance.”  
The party and government officials were the same, Scalapino reasoned, and Kim Il Sung could 
control foreign policy by dividing this authority between several institutions.69  Others argued 
that the state had both ideological requirements and national interests to pursue in foreign policy.  
Shifting between these goals was common to communist systems, including North Korea where 
economic demands had come to outpace geopolitical ones,70 but did not represent a division 
between institutional interests.  
1980s: Succession Preparation Intensifies.  There was some shift afoot by the early 
1980s.  Kim Jong Il officially became the supreme leader in waiting at the Sixth Party Congress 
in 1980.  To conclusively answer the question how Kim Jong Il may rule differently than his 
father would have to wait until the 1990s, but North Korea watchers recognized some social and 
political change brewing in general form.  At the 1980 Party Congress, Kim Il Sung warned 
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against a move away from revolutionary principles among a post-Korean War generation.  As 
long as Kim Il Sung was alive, his wishes of maintaining the political objectives of the 
revolution would stand before other goals.  Yet the stage was being set for Kim Jong Il to rule 
differently than his father.  The state saw its first major shift towards employing technocrats and 
Kim Jong Il loyalists in senior positions starting the same year.  Some observers called this not 
only a transition between top leaders but a generational change in which economic pragmatists 
might rule over militant ideologues.   
Everyone was not enthused about Jong Il’s selection.  At the 1980 Party Congress, 
Minister of Public Security Yi Chin-su warned against opposing the tapped next leader – a point 
reiterated in Nodong Sinmun as Kim Jong Il’s personality cult intensified.  The security 
apparatus purged those who opposed Kim Jong Il’s selection.71   
Kim Jong Il demonstrated an early willingness to use not only targeted purges, but also 
arbitrary repression to assert his power, even when his specific goals were not clearly formed.  
Kim Jong Il joined his father in rejecting empiricism as eroding revolutionary principles and 
demanded improved empirical performance from state organizations.  His bloody crackdown 
seemed aimed more at demonstrating his willingness and capability to use arbitrary terror than 
advancing a certain goal.  Kim Jong Il used “Three Revolution Teams” of young and zealous 
Koreans to suppress empiricists and support three vague goals of ideological, technical, and 
cultural advancement.  Kim demanded officials be both ideologically committed and expert in 
their specific area.72  
  In the 1980s, Kim Il Sung reduced his roles as his son increasingly took on more 
responsibility.  As early as 1983, one scholar predicted that the state that Kim Il Sung built into a 
monolith would likely bureaucratize as the tension between competence and ideology expanded 
but at that time there was “no clear dichotomy between Red [ideologue] and expert.”73  Tai Sung 
An and Dae-sook Suh thoughtfully argued that the stage was set for the state to gradually change 
under Kim Jong Il although it remained unclear what the state would evolve into.  Kim Jong Il 
modified his father’s reunification policy, allowing some family reunions and opening inter-
Korean economic discussions and promoted his own loyalists to senior positions, particularly 
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iiipost-Korean War graduates of the Mangyondae Revolutionary School.  The state may be on 
some type of new path, but where it would lead and what the resulting regime would look like 
remained unclear.74  
Even those arguing the state was slowing changing recognized that the party more tightly 
controlled the state and society than any other political system.  The North Korean system still 
sought to eliminate dissent.  North Korea’s previous experience with dissent was a factional 
system in the 1940s and 1950s that the Kims and their senior leadership sought to avoid 
repeating. Even those early scholars who detailed the prevalence of various groups and 
generational change within the North Korean system concluded that by the time Kim Il Sung 
consolidated his rule, he sat atop the party which in turn dominated the other groups.75  In every 
way imaginable, Kim Il Sung’ North Korea approached the totalitarian ideal.76      
On the eve of Kim Il Sung’s death, in-depth studies of the North Korean system 
continued to apply the totalitarian label.  Many did not deny change within the system with the 
ebb and flow of history, but the fundamental character of the regime remained static.  The party 
controlled the military and government with Kim on top, ideological indoctrination remained 
important, and the state monopolized the media and planned the economy.77  In 1994, “The 
North Korean political structure, in short, represents the classic case of the monolithic power” 
where unity defined all the political institutions of the state.78  Bruce Cumings argued that, “The 
North Korea of today is still, fundamentally, the one that was formed in the 1940s.  But time 
goes on, things change.”79  Cumings recognized the increased role of the younger Kim, 
especially by the 1980s but basically saw the system as the same despite calling the younger Kim 
“the world’s first postmodern dictator” after Kim Il Sung’s 1994 death.  North Korea approached 
the totalitarian ideal type under Kim Il Sung, but significant events in the 1990s fundamentally 
reshaped the system.  The nature of that system, of course, is the primary topic of this study.  
The Transition Period, 1991 - 1998 
  North Korea’s political system grew more rational in the 1990s.  The type of information 
senior leadership demanded required a substantially different bureaucratic structure and a 
renewed emphasis on expertise.  The acceleration of North Korea’s political evolution in the 
1990s is more than the simple political transition from father to son, although the skills and 
experience of the top leader had an important role.  As argued in the previous chapter, three 
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events compounded one another’s effect to unleash tremendous economic, social, and political 
forces that hastened the regime’s transformation.  The Soviet collapse in 1991, Kim Il Sung’s 
death in 1994, and the onset of the famine in 1995 had a profound, combined effect on North 
Korean politics.  This section documents the history of this period, paralleling the theoretical 
discussion of these changes found in the previous chapter.    
Shock One: The Soviet Collapse. North Korea lost its primary economic and security 
backer in 1991.  North Korea depended on Soviet military, energy, and food assistance to keep 
its economy afloat.  Though Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev reduced Soviet aid to 
North Korea throughout the 1980s, one-sided “trade” remained at $3.5 billion as late as 1988.  
However, by 1991, Moscow completely shut off the aid valve and trade plummeted to hundreds 
of millions.  Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, North Korea lost its main security 
guarantor.  Moscow eliminated any mention of Russian military assistance to North Korea even 
in the case of direct attack against the North and formally recognized the government in Seoul in 
1991.80   
 North Korea’s economy was modeled on the Soviet Union even more than its politics.  
After the Korean War, Moscow provided technical assistance to build ninety three heavy 
industrial factories in North Korea,81 producing a familiar blend of heavy industrial products 
mainly useful for the military with little investment in light industry and consumer goods.  This 
economic plan required sustained energy input to keep the production chain moving.  With the 
loss of energy aid, the North’s industrial base suffered dramatic declines as the state sought new 
ways to feed its energy needs.82     
North Korea’s economic woes ran deeper than the rest of the former Soviet satellite 
states.  The energy aid shut off put North Korea one major blow away from not being able to 
feed its population.  North Korea used potent oil-based fertilizers to sustain some level of food 
production.  The fertilizers did long-term damage to the soil over decades of use, and by the mid-
1990s, the soil required these fertilizers to produce food.  North Korea also suffers very cold 
winters.  Without oil, North Koreans turned to the forests to provide heating fuel.  Burning 
biomass contributed to deforestation and soil erosion that further hindered agricultural 
production, especially in the most productive agricultural lands.  North Korea is a mountainous 
country with little arable land; indigenous food production is overwhelming concentrated in the 
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“rice bowl” in the south of the country, which is prone to severe flooding.  Given the state’s 
policies that contributed to soil erosion, extreme weather could destroy the country’s crop.   
North Korea’s geography produces a natural reliance on food imports to feed its 
population.  Pyongyang’s policy choices have magnified this dependence on foreign food 
supplies, a fact that is particularly inconvenient to an autarkic government.  Reduced energy aid 
shrank fertilizer production and increased the state’s reliance on foreign food sources at precisely 
the same time when friendly aid sources rapidly diminished.  North Korea had to purchase a 
larger portion of its food from abroad at a time when its industrial production – its economic 
engine – ground to a halt.  The state’s long-term outlook was bleak, and it was one shock away 
from a debilitating food crisis.   
However, North Korea’s new challenges were not simply economic.  It still faced off 
across the world’s most heavily fortified border against a newly democratic enemy.  Despite 
democratization, South Korea elected governments with ties to the former military regime and 
openly hostile to the North during this period.  South Korea clearly outpaced the North 
economically and potentially militarily – even independent of American backing.83  Of course, 
South Korea did enjoy American backing, and the United States maintained troops on the 
Korean peninsula.  While President George H.W. Bush acknowledged publicly that the United 
States had removed all of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea by December 1991, the 
security-conscious North Koreans still had reason to fear the U.S.-South Korean alliance.  With 
its dilapidated economy and no superpower support, North Korea scrambled to survive.   
 The following year, the two Koreas made history.  In February 1992 North and South 
Korea signed the Basic Agreement, whereby both committed to peaceful reunification, 
denuclearization, and cultural and economic projects like family reunions and joint ventures.  
Pyongyang seemingly recognized its challenges and sought to negotiate security commitments 
and extract the necessary food and energy assistance.  Two months later, North Korea revised its 
constitution.  It removed all references to Marxism-Leninism, precipitating calls for “Korean-
style socialism.”  The Cold War was over, and North Korea was searching for a new 
international strategy that would have long-standing effects on its political structure.     
 The Soviet Union was not North Korea’s only ally.  It also cautiously relied upon its 
northern neighbor, China.  The two states have a precarious history.  The Kimilsungist guerillas 
helped the Maoists defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist army in the Chinese civil war.  The 
Chinese reciprocated by sending three million troops to fight in the Korean War.  The two states 
have a relationship forged in blood, but have a historically uneasy relationship.  The Chinese 
have seen Korea as part of its sphere of influence and sought to explicitly dominate – and at 
times conquer – the peninsula.  North Korea tried to play the Soviets and Chinese off one another 
                                                           






after the Sino-Soviet split but eventually decided to rely more on the Soviet Union, fearing losing 
its sovereignty to China as a greater threat.84   
 Furthermore, China and North Korea grew apart through the later Cold War years.  In 
December 1979, Deng Xiaoping announced China’s radical economic reforms.  The People’s 
Republic of China moved away from its Maoist roots.  By the end of the Cold War, the 
relationship had deteriorated.  By August 1992, over Pyongyang’s strenuous objection, Beijing 
recognized the Republic of Korea (South Korea).  Yet China’s interest in regional stability 
ultimately drove it to protect North Korean interests in international fora, especially the UN 
Security Council, in the coming years to prevent the real risk of a North Korean collapse.   China 
also provided North Korea with what one former Chinese Foreign Ministry official estimated to 
be 70-90% of the North’s energy aid and approximately one-third of its food aid.85  China was 
not North Korea’s first choice as an international backer, but the reclusive state cautiously 
accepted its support while pursuing its own independent means to provide for its own security 
and economic needs.   
In this context of eroding sovereignty, North Korea took bold action.  The state could 
address its mounting problems with a new relationship with a more distant great power, the 
United States, or seek to address the security part of its new challenges alone with a nuclear 
deterrent.  On March 12, 1993 the North Korean Foreign Ministry precipitated a crisis, by 
announcing the state would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  In a rare description of 
the internal politics within the DPRK, three of the U.S. top negotiators in the first nuclear crisis 
described their understanding of how the regime made this decision:  
"According to later accounts, the idea of withdrawing from the NPT was advanced by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and championed by Kang Sok Ju, the First Vice Foreign 
Minister. Neither was thought of as a bastion of hard line sentiment within the North 
Korean system. On the contrary, Kang was believed to belong to a group of Foreign 
Ministry officials who were relatively more pragmatic. Nevertheless, in a political system 
where currying favor with the two Kims translated into influence and power (or at least 
survival), the ministry may have advanced the idea of NPT withdrawal in response to the 
wishes of Kim Jong Il, who may have been looking for a way out of an increasingly 
difficult situation.  The Foreign Ministry also had its own motives, chiefly to reassert 
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control over dealings with the United States. It had never been happy with Kim Yong 
Sun’s leadership role from his perch as head of the Korean Workers Party International 
Department. Since his stewardship had produced few results, by autumn 1992 
responsibility had shifted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In December, Kim Yong 
Sun was promoted, taken off the American account, and put in charge of North-South 
dialogue. Later he would claim that he had opposed the North’s withdrawal from the 
NPT. That implied the decision was not simply handed down but perhaps discussed 
within the small coterie of North Korean decision makers."86 
North Korea took action that would allow it to reach an agreement in 1994 that traded a 
nuclear freeze for security guarantees and food and energy assistance.  The Kims halted the 
nation’s most potent military program – the plutonium production at Yongbyon – for eight years 
(1994 – 2002).  The move seemed to address the state’s core problems without requiring 
substantial changes that may more comprehensively affect the regime’s rule.  The military 
retained its prestige and prioritized resource allocation, the state’s economy remained socialist, 
and wider society was largely unaffected by the decision with the notable exception of gaining 
some much needed energy.  The 1994 agreement was a stabilizer, but other events outside of the 
regime’s control again intervened.   
Shock Two: Kim Il Sung’s Death.  The second shock came in the midst of negotiating the 
Agreed Framework.  In 1994 Kim Il Sung, the state’s founder, president, and national hero, died.  
Kim Jong Il fundamentally gained legitimacy from his father’s actions a half century earlier.  He 
inherited the reigns of power, leaving him with a set of political institutions he could not 
immediately change without cost but also not well suited to his strengths.  He could not rule with 
the same revolutionary authority and faced different challenges.  Nevertheless, the younger 
Kim’s institutions and system at the outset were essentially his fathers.   
Kim Jong Il came to power in this context of economic and security crisis.  Lacking 
military qualifications himself and threatened by military coups from the time of his being 
tapped as Kim Il Sung successor in the 1970s to the latest failed coup attempt only two years 
prior, he still concluded the Agreed Framework three months after his father’s death.  Kim Jong 
Il did not move immediately to alter his father’s institutional structure.  Instead, he observed a 
three-year mourning period traditionally reserved for the death of Korean kings.  This show of 
Confucian filial piety likely appealed to both elite and mass audiences who showed grief for the 
late president.  Traditionally, emerging from the mourning period, sons assume their father’s 
roles.  In this culturally prescribed way, the younger Kim bolstered his authority as the legitimate 
heir to his father’s rule.   
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Shock Three: Famine.  Within that three year period, the third shock hit.  Multi-year 
extreme weather beginning in 1995 compounded the effect of years of failed food and 
agricultural policies under both Kims, including reducing production incentives and inefficient 
food rationing and distribution methods.87  The floods destroyed North Korea’s crop, and 
international assistance was not cost-free.  It meant recognizing failure.  More importantly, 
international aid came with inspections.   
The UN’s World Food Program (WFP) requires its staff certify that the aid is going to 
vulnerable populations and not being wholly diverted to the military or regime elites.  
Pyongyang objected to intrusive inspections as well as a number of other questions such as 
whether the donated aid bags could recognize the donor’s country of origin (notably including 
the United States).  Faced with more demand than supply of emergency food aid, the WFP grew 
wary of North Korean demands.  While some negotiated aid eventually reached starving North 
Koreans, the regime’s rigid stance allowed up to a million people to starve or die from disease 
and left a generation of North Koreans malnourished and stunted. 
This third shock built on the previous two to produce social changes in North Korea.  The 
regime conditioned its citizens to depend on the state for food and other critical resources.  When 
food never came and regime instructions to work harder or plant patches of grass to eat did not 
solve the food problem, many died in place.  The regime stubbornly held to its administrative 
solutions to the famine.  Socialist orthodoxy demanded the state lead on these issues and not 
permit market mechanisms.  Ideologically-committed revolutionaries and security-conscious 
elites alike objected to the idea of increased, individual cross-border traffic.  Such moves ran 
counter to socialist principles and risked dangerous information inflows and outflows.  Party 
commentaries continually repeated the risk that society may become infected with capitalist 
ideas in a way that, they argued, hastened the collapse of the rest of the former Soviet bloc.   
Others defied the regime and survived.  Young and able-bodied men and women illegally 
crossed into China in search of food or consumer goods.  A new class of entrepreneurs emerged 
as farmers sold some production in open-air gray markets and traders brought in new goods from 
China.  Those able to participate in this commerce benefited. China strongly backed high-level 
reform efforts based on its own experiences, and Pyongyang began to tolerate some of this 
behavior.  While periodically shutting down these markets or cracking down on Sino-North 
Korean border movement, enough incentive remained for citizens to maintain this trade.88   
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The social and political consequences both paved the way for rationalizing North Korea 
politics and society.  Socially, a new class of risk-accepting merchants arose in North Korea.  
Previously, cadres and party members topped the status ladder.  The state controlled social 
advancement.  However, with this introduction of independent paths to wealth and power, the 
state inadvertently allowed individuals to gain status based on their own entrepreneurial abilities.  
Self-made businessmen enjoyed status outside the state.  Status is scarce, so this move cut into 
the prestige of those same cadre and party members, providing both an individual and 
institutional reason to oppose market mechanisms.   
The famine also weakened society’s trust in government.  While ideology had been 
eroding for decades, Kim Jong Il’s taking power shifted society’s focus somewhat from the 
revolution to effective governance.  Under Kim Il Sung’s charismatic authority, the psychic 
needs of elites and populace could be satisfied by faith in the revolution.  Through socialist 
principle, the state would achieve ultimate victory against the imperialists, promote a moral, non-
material way of life, and ultimately transgress the “arduous march.”  “Good socialists” who 
entered the party or military earned individual reward in terms of status and wealth as well, 
providing further incentives for this path.  During the famine, however, those who made the 
greatest gains were those who defied the regime and explicitly pursued individual interests in 
markets.   
Kim Jong Il announced his regime would pursue “emergency management,” allowing 
policies that did not subscribe to the socialist orthodoxy for pragmatic benefit.  Such a move 
shifts the elite and popular focus to results.  Kim Jong Il repeatedly cited his father, but 
increasingly he needed to produce effective policy outcomes.  The legitimacy of the Kim regime 
came to increasingly rely on rational calculations.   
Such a move was very risky for Kim.  Kim Il Sung was a self-made man, but Kim Jong Il 
was not.  He had to walk a fine line between recognizing the role of self-made men and 
individual expertise without delegitimizing himself.  Once one starts to focus on one’s effective 
performance, it raises the possibility that another person may lead the country more effectively 
than Kim.  The ruling myth becomes increasingly hollow.  Kim’s almost supernatural ability to 
“sagaciously” interpret Juche philosophy and guide the state like a “shining star” takes on less 
importance.  Kim did not want to move in this direction, but eventually, after immense human 
suffering, Kim took some measures to address these new ground realities.  
  The state accelerated its bureaucratization to rationalize politics.  Faceless bureaucrats 
informed policy based on their individual expertise, not their pedigree or status.  While Kim and 
his core advisers remained on top, the hybrid system is much more impersonal and erodes 
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charismatic authority.89  This enhanced the role of technocrats, especially in the economic 
sphere.  They were charged with crafting policy that would help extract the state from this deep 
crisis. The Administrative Council came to employ most of these technocrats.  Kim Jong Il 
would rule differently than his father.   
 At the same time, Kim needed the military to deter foreign invasion and maintain his 
ideological mantle of legitimacy.  The state still tried to justify its rule in terms of blocking 
imperialist advances.  Kim responded to this dilemma by raising the status of the military 
nominally.  He could hope to well up some support from the military.  However, he would also 
need to divide and conquer his bureaucracies by institutionalizing constraints from competing 
institutions and the security services to prevent the hostile military from threatening Kim 
himself.   
  This was not a Kim-directed change, but the exogenous shocks of the mid-1990s put in 
play important social and political forces that the state, faced with difficult trade-offs, codified in 
the 1998 constitution.  The shocks encouraged the leadership to incorporate novel elements into 
the political system in face of potential collapse.  While it did not collapse, it emerged from these 
crises changed.  North Korea had less domestic and international reason to keep up socialist 
constraints on policy choices.  Ideological correctness would become just one factor in policy 
choices rather than guiding policy.  It was appropriate, therefore, that South Korea received its 
highest-ranking North Korean defector in 1997 – North Korea’s lead Juche theorist Hwang Jang 
Yop.   
  Forces outside the state’s control prompted changes in North Korean politics.  This leads 
to the conclusion – uncomfortable to many – that Kim Jong Il effectively managed this situation, 
given his goals.  The collapsist school was implicitly correct that the risk of state collapse was 
high.  Their error was in overstating their case as determininistic.  While one can easily dispute 
the morality of his choices, Kim achieved his core objective of staving off collapse by 
overhauling the state’s founding institutions and crafting a new ruling order.  He codified this 
new rule in the 1998 constitution.  The role of the party, ideologically-driven policy, and the 
command economy all suffered under the new arrangement.  North Korea moved away from the 
totalitarian model not by choice but out of state weakness.   
Post-totalitarian Institutionalism, 1998 – Present  
Towards a New Constitution.  By September 1998, North Korea emerged from its 
transition period and modified the constitution.  The new ruling order marked not only a 
revolutionary break in politics the way Kim Il Sung carried out a half century earlier.  Instead, 
the younger Kim modified, or redirected, the state out of an evolving internal and external 
environment.  The functions and operations of this post-totalitarian institutional state is the 
                                                           






primary subject of the previous chapter.  The state attempted to address challenges in three core 
areas: inter-Korean relations, U.S. policy, and economics.  Each of these issue areas 
fundamentally related to systemic survival and incorporated competing economic, military, 
ideational, and political goals.  Though the empirical chapters take up the task of documenting 
specific policy debates in North Korea on each of these core issue areas in detail, this section 
describes the broader historical brush strokes of this time of change and the subsequent North 
Korean political history.  North Korea made this decision in a particular contemporary historical 
context.   
In 1998 South Korea elected a political heavyweight, Kim Dae Jung, on a platform that 
included reconciliation with the North and explicitly discussed reunification as a long-term goal 
that could be addressed in the future.  This gave rise to Seoul’s “Sunshine Policy” that involved 
tension reduction measures, discussion on reuniting families divided since the Korean War, and 
economic, food, and energy assistance to prepare for eventual reunification.  Pyongyang reacted 
positively to this development in advance of their constitutional revision.  North Korea sent 70 
letters to South Korean politicians through Panmunjom’s “truce village,” and the Secretary of the 
Party’s Central Committee commented that the letters signified North Korea’s desire to discuss 
and negotiate with South Korean government officials, political parties, and organizations to 
“promote coexistence, co-prosperity, common interests, mutual collaboration and unity between 
fellow countrymen.”90   
The United States focused on North Korea at the beginning of this period through the 
Four Party Talks.  The Talks, involving the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea, never 
got off the ground.  Within seven months, they concluded with parties unable to reach basic 
agreements.  However, U.S.-DPRK relations were not yet at a crisis point.  Both sides prodded 
the other to uphold its Agreed Framework commitments, but neither had completely abandoned 
the agreement to date.     
North Korea’s economy meanwhile was in shambles.  The regime started to emerge from 
the depths of the famine at the end of the 1990s.  Coping mechanisms learned during the famine 
and Chinese and South Korean aid and investment became so significant that they began to 
transform the economy from below.  Seoul and Beijing urged Pyongyang to allow greater 
grassroots marketization and take more significant political moves to follow China’s post-Maoist 
development model.  North Korean generals and party officials objected, arguing that socialism 
collapsed in Eastern Europe, because the system opened to foreign and capitalistic influences.91  
But some increased use of markets on a larger scale gradually caught on as economic technocrats 
cut into the ideological purity and security arguments presented by the party and military.       
On the eve of North Korea’s constitutional revision, Pyongyang’s position on each of 
these three areas was precarious but not in crisis.  It cautiously but positively responded to its 
southern neighbor’s new overtures of economic aid and investment, pursued eased tensions with 
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the U.S., and clung to its socialist economic methods at the commanding heights of the economy.  
Despite heavy rains five times the historical average and immense flooding that destroyed much 
of the country’s rice and corn fields and new U.S. allegations of a suspected underground nuclear 
site,92 North Korea went ahead with introducing its new form of government.   
The state reintroduced the newly articulated concept of military first politics in an August 
22, 1998 Nodong Sinmun editorial and flight tested the Taepo Dong-1 rocket over Japan on 
August 31, prompting substantial international concern.93  The following week on September 5, 
the Supreme People’s Assembly officially retired the position of president, elected Kim as 
Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC), and codified the new constitution only 
four days before the important anniversary of the founding of the state.  Kim uses drama and 
important anniversaries to highlight important political events.  This succession of events 
suggests he wanted the country – and the world – to take notice.    
The “Kim Il Sung Constitution” was unveiled with a dedication in the preamble to the 
country’s founder: “The DPRK Social Constitution is the Kim Il Sung Constitution; it legally 
embodies Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Juche state construction ideology and achievements.”  This 
preface was necessary, because the new constitution proved anything but supporting the political 
institutions and roles of Kim Il Sung.  The younger Kim sought to bolster his legitimacy through 
referencing the revered leader and this Confucian show of filial piety, but he did not have the 
personal charisma to rule like his father.  He was not a revered war hero, a gifted orator, or even 
very self-confident.  He would rule differently, but this was not a sudden revelation.    
The younger Kim codified the mode of rule that had gradually intensified over the last 
two decades – as Kim Il Sung increasingly passed governing responsibilities to his son.  North 
Korea’s political evolution did not start or stop with this constitutional revision.  The constitution 
did not signal an abrupt switch from totalitarianism to post-totalitarianism, but it helps clarify 
when the regime acknowledged a significantly new mode of governance.  Kim dramatically laid 
down a marker to not only his own domestic audience but a foreign one as well that he was in 
charge after three years of mourning, and he would rule in a certain way.  He effectively codified 
a post-totalitarian state structure, not a transitional polity or one in rapid decline.  North Korea 
had found a fairly stable equilibrium outcome as an impoverished authoritarian regime.   
The new regime still relied heavily on ideological indoctrination to control the masses 
and elites alike.  This period saw the increased prominence of military first politics, or military-
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first ideology, first introduced the previous year.  Some observers claim the new ideological 
mantra replaces Juche, while others claim it merely supplements it.  The state continually cites 
both to this day.  This debate over the supremacy of the party or military mirrors questions of 
whether the party or the military is now the dominant institution in North Korean politics.  Of 
course, this discussion assumes there is a single dominant institution in North Korean politics 
and Kim does not seek a divide-and-conquer ruling style as I describe in chapter two.  Military 
first politics reflects the KPA’s greater institutional political role as well as Kim’s need to placate 
the powerful institution and leaders.  The empirical chapters support this argument by 
documenting how the military and party pursue policy preferences through the jostling of 
bureaucratic politics rather than being able to dictate orders.   
The military had long enjoyed prioritized resource allocation, but this military-first 
ideological move raised the military’s political and social status.  It marks a move away from the 
party dominated totalitarian model.  The regime has long credited the KPA with safeguarding 
and building the socialist revolution.  According to the national narrative, without Kim Il Sung’s 
guerilla fighters, there would be no communist party in Korea.  The new ideology extended the 
military’s ideational and practical roles, however.  The military-first policy’s twin goals of 
building a “powerful and prosperous nation” required focused attention on ideology, politics, the 
military, and the economy.94  Under military-first politics, the KPA would have a more 
expansive say in national policy in all four of these areas of national policy decision-making and 
implementation, not simply the military arena.95   
The ideology’s flexibility allows central authorities to praise the military and focus on 
empirical results, while maintaining Juche and socialist revolutionary demands at the same time.  
This effort to maximize material and ideological gains demanded an institutional structure that 
could produce these goals more effectively.  Central authorities continued to try to balance the 
concerns of ideologues and pragmatists, and used competing institutions to promote those goals.  
The next chapter reviews the history and composition of the main institutions in North Korea, 
and how they have come to compete for influence and pursue ideological or pragmatic policy 
goals.   
The new constitution formally removed previous roles of the party and simplified the 
bureaucratic structure.  Formally, the military and cabinet no longer reported to party officials.   
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The military did not replace the party as the key organ, rather they were rebalanced as peer 
organizations.  The Korean Workers Party, Korean Peoples Army, and the cabinet jointly 
dominated national politics under Kim Jong Il.96  Despite these important governmental changes 
and efforts to highlight the event with a major rocket launch, immediate concern about the rocket 
launch quickly came to overshadow the new constitutional arrangement.  Commentators 
overwhelmingly focused on the state’s outward actions while voicing bewilderment at the 
supposedly one-man-rule state’s decision-making.  With newfound authority, the three 
constitutionally autonomous institutions discussed the missile launch publicly.   
2000s: Diverging Policies.  The new constitutional arrangement and systemic change 
ushered in a period of disjointed North Korean policy choices.  Pyongyang compartmented its 
inter-Korean, U.S., and economic policies.  The more flexible political system capitalized on 
Seoul’s rapprochement, positioned itself against toughening American policy, and allowed 
domestic economic policy to proceed apace with relatively little interference from outside actors.  
There was a great deal of back-and-forth on inter-Korean policy documented in the empirical 
chapters, but the ten years of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) 
administrations in Seoul saw a general expansion of economic engagement, social interaction, 
and political trust building.  The gradual reunification policy enjoyed popular support in South 
Korea following the 1997 financial crisis.  Rapid reunification jeopardized the South Korean 
economy too much; gradually transforming the North Korean economy, society, and politics 
could set the stage for eventual reunification with fewer costs.   
The most dramatic breakthrough on inter-Korean relations occurred in 2000 when Kim 
Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il met in Pyongyang.  The first ever inter-Korean summit produced a 
series of cabinet-level civilian and military meetings and significant South Korean economic 
engagement with the North.  Progress was anything but smooth and uninterrupted, but 
discernible.  Seoul treated Pyongyang particularly gingerly in an effort to induce social, 
economic, and political change to the great consternation of South Korea’s conservatives and 
some foreign allies, including the conservative administration in the United States.    
South Korean public opinion shifted dramatically after North Korea tested a nuclear 
weapon in October 2006; South Korea’s opposition party’s long-held position that this 
engagement produced no significant results developed a newfound resiliency.  The charge stuck 
particularly well against liberal president Roh Moo-hyun who, by this time, was widely 
identified as an ineffective president.  This helped set the stage for South Korea’s election a year 
later of a conservative president, Lee Myung-bak, who pledged competence and economic 
revitalization.  Lee also promised a tougher North Korea policy that prioritized near-term 
denuclearization over long-term reunification preparations.  Inter-Korean relations soured 
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significantly in the months after Lee’s inauguration in February 2008 as the new administration 
backed off expanding economic engagement, criticized the North’s human rights record more 
vocally, and pursued a policy Pyongyang generally labeled as “confrontational.”  The diplomatic 
fall-out from the nuclear test and reaction to President Lee’s approach to the North marked the 
most dramatic inflection point in inter-Korean relations in the decade after North Korea’s new 
constitution.     
While inter-Korean relations had one dramatic turn in this ten-year period, relations 
between Washington and Pyongyang had two.  Though this area also saw more ups and downs 
as more fully documented in the empirical chapters, the broad brush strokes reveal modest gains 
in U.S.-DPRK progress in the last few months of the Clinton administration in 2000, renewed 
confrontation in the first six years of the Bush administration, and a return to productive 
negotiations after the nuclear test and congressional elections in 2006.  In late 2000, the United 
States and North Korea seemed to finally be reaching some agreement on North Korea’s 
missiles.  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang in October 2000 and met 
with Kim Jong Il in preparation for a possible summit with President Clinton.  Pyongyang sent a 
high-level emissary to Washington to meet with President Clinton and several cabinet officials.  
However, time proved too short as working-level talks broke down, and Clinton pushed the issue 
to the next administration.   
Pyongyang voiced early skepticism about the new leadership in Washington in early 
2001 but refrained from recasting its U.S. policy until Washington completed its policy review.  
The policy review prompted the new administration to commit to an engagement strategy in 
summer 2001, though this policy would never be implemented.  In the words of the 
administration, “9/11 changed everything.”  Washington crafted what Pyongyang labeled a 
confrontational policy towards it.  U.S.-DPRK relations continued in a downward spiral after 
October 2002 when an American negotiating team traveled to Pyongyang and raised the North’s 
uranium enrichment program.  The American delegation reported that the North Koreans 
admitted to the uranium program, prompting Washington to end its Agreed Framework 
commitments.  Pyongyang claimed it did not admit to a uranium program but maintained a 
neither confirm nor deny stance towards the uranium program.  It cited Washington’s abrogation 
of the Agreed Framework to unseal Yongbyon, verifiably frozen for eight years, and begin its 
withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty.  Negotiations continued on and off with little 
sustainable progress until the fall of 2006 after North Korea flight tested its longest range rocket, 
tested a nuclear weapon, and possibly proliferated nuclear technology to Syria.   
In October 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and, the following month, 
Democrats won enough legislative seats to reclaim the congressional majority.  While the 
nuclear test prompted South Korea to eventually back off its engagement strategy, it helped 
jumpstart Six Party Talks.  Key hardliners in the U.S. administration resigned as engagement 






As Seoul and Washington traded places with their engagement and confrontational 
policies, Pyongyang’s economic policy saw its own swings.  Pyongyang increasingly accepted 
illegal coping mechanisms during the famine.  When the state failed to provide rations sufficient 
to prevent mass starvation, enterprising North Koreans skirted the law and traded to survive.  As 
the state emerged from the famine, it tried to reassert a measure of control over this activity 
without prompting another food crisis.  On July 1, 2002, it instituted significant wage and price 
reforms that recognized part of the ground reality.  Central authorities also adopted several 
heavily debated management and enterprise reforms to increase economic efficiency.  North 
Korea took limited steps away from its command economy and the totalitarian ideal.   
The state backed off some of these economic decisions in 2005, most notably, 
reintroducing socialist control over food distribution.  However, market reforms demonstrated a 
certain staying power as the regime again slowly backed off its efforts to crackdown on market 
measures in favor of their demonstrated ability to enhance the domestic economy.  Throughout 
this period, this debated raged in the official press and has not been definitely resolved.  The 
state has pursued a slow two steps forward, one step back dance towards greater marketization.   
Conclusion 
 History’s dynamism makes snapshot theoretical descriptions of states difficult.  The 
Japanese defeat in 1945 and rise of Kim Il Sung revolutionized North Korean politics.  The 
system defined itself as anti-Japanese, yet incorporated some modern elements from Japanese 
administration.  More importantly, it incorporated the guerilla movement’s traditions and 
depended in part on Soviet assistance, especially in the early years.  North Korea increasingly 
asserted its sovereignty as Kim Il Sung consolidated his power after the Korean War and the 
Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s allowed Pyongyang to play the Chinese and Soviet off against one 
another more.  Kim Il Sung reached the apex of personal power in the early 1970s as his 
totalitarian regime began a slow decline.  Kim Il Sung tapped his son as his successor and Kim 
Jong Il’s roles in the North Korean system expanded in the 1980s.   
 The 1990s saw the most dramatic changes as the Soviet collapse, Kim Il Sung’s death, 
and the famine modified ground realities.  Changes outside of the Kims’ direct control produced 
new challenges that the younger Kim attempted to address.  After the traditional three year 
mourning period following his father’s death, Kim Jong Il moved to codify his new mode of 
operations.  The younger Kim demonstrated his intention to divide and conquer the 
bureaucracies, pitting the cabinet, military, and party against one another in helping inform and 
execute policy decisions.  This post-totalitarian style of rule held particular attributes that are 
described in the theory chapter.  Jong Il’s divided political system allowed the state to shape 
economic policy, inter-Korean efforts, and foreign policy towards the U.S. on separate tracks.  
Though these tracks could be linked, linkages themselves remained a subject of debates between 






central decisions reflected a greater diversity of state views as central authorities grappled with 
competing pragmatic and ideological demands.97  North Korea developed a new type of politics 
that emerged out of Kim Il Sung’s totalitarianism that this study label post-totalitarian 
institutionalism.     
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Chapter 4: North Korea’s Political Institutions 
Introduction 
 North Korea has three main political institutions: the Korean Workers Party (“the party”), 
the Cabinet (“the government”), and the Korean Peoples Army (“the military”).1  This chapter 
demonstrates that these three institutions are the most important institutional actors in North 
Korea and that the others are either nominal or do not exert a systematic influence on a wide 
range of national-level policy decisions.  These three institutions along with Kim’s unique role 
guide strategic-level policy.  They can speak to linkages across issue areas and regularly voice 
preferences in the North Korean press.   
This chapter reviews the history and composition of each constitutional institution and 
the security apparatus.  Since any evaluation of the political history of North Korea under Kim Il 
Sung necessarily must evaluate the evolving roles of these institutions, much of this discussion is 
contextualized in the previous chapter.  This chapter builds on that discussion, primarily taking 
up how the three main institutions evolved under Kim Jong Il and evaluating the more marginal 
constitutional organizations more comprehensively, since they are not part of the wider national 
political narrative.  In this way, I seek to shed light on how each organization has developed or 
not developed a coherent set of policy preferences and how it can turn those preferences into 
national policy.   
The Korean Workers Party 
 The party is the most central organization in the totalitarian model.  In Kim Il Sung’s 
polity, the Korean Workers Party was a key organ charged with important ideological work.  
Applied ideology guided specific policy decisions, and party members were implanted deep 
within the government and military structures to make sure that government “functionaries” and 
military cadres carried out the party’s line.  The party was the most important institution under 
Kim Il Sung with his closest personal allies in the guerilla struggle and Korean War taking senior 
posts in this organization.  It was charged with strategic policy goals like pursuing the socialist 
goals of the revolution, defeating the imperialists – Japanese and American – and forcing 
national reunification on the North’s terms.   
Seen as carrying out a comprehensive ideology, the party prescribed right action from the 
individual to state level.  It had formal authority over virtually every aspect of one’s life, fusing 
public and private spheres towards a utopian moral order.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the party’s 
revolutionary purpose held greater weight as global communism was much stronger than today 
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and personal memories of the brutal Japanese occupation and great losses of the Korean War 
were fresh in the minds of the political class and masses alike.   
 The North Korean Communist Party in 1945 was fairly diverse.  It consisted of roughly 
equal parts of industrial workers; rural peasants; and mix of petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and 
businessmen.  Kim Il Sung did not control the party completely during this period.  The party 
was insufficiently institutionalized.  Lower party units may not have received orders from the top 
leadership or simply did not carry them out at times.  Consequently, party consolidation was an 
earlier priority than even the formation of the state.  The North Korean Communist Party merged 
with the South Korean Workers Party in 1948 to form the Korean Workers Party led by Kim Il 
Sung.  The KWP grew from roughly four percent of the population in 1946 to over eleven 
percent in 1970 with 1.6 million members.2  Kim took a diverse set of individuals with 
competing loyalties and, through purges and indoctrination, forged a unified, mass party under 
his control.  The political history of Kim Il Sung’s North Korea described in the previously 
chapter is fundamentally a story of the relationship between Kim Il Sung’s personal power and 
his utilization of the party to run the country.    
However, as communism failed to achieve its utopian objectives worldwide and died out 
in most other parts of the world by the end of the 20th century, the Korean Workers Party did not 
reconstitute itself.  It remained a revolutionary organization that relied heavily on suppressing 
information about the outside world that undermined its stated objectives.  The party tried to 
maintain the totalitarian order, including a monopoly on the means of communication and 
propaganda.  Along with the attendant challenges described previously, greater information 
inflows challenged the party’s information monopoly and narrative that the country was 
proceeding apace towards a socialist utopia.  By the time Kim Jong Il came to power, the party 
was a fish out of water.  Aging officials from a previous era continued to trumpet the importance 
of applying revolutionary principles to specific policies as the calls rang increasingly hollow.   
 Further, Kim Jong Il is a different type of leader than his father.  He does not enjoy Kim 
Il Sung’s claim to revolutionary politics and lacks his personal leadership qualities.  Kim Il Sung 
was a very strong leader who mobilized a nation in a tremendously perverted direction.  Kim 
Jong Il lacked his father’s abilities and internal and external circumstances to pursue the same 
objectives in the same fashion.  The younger Kim modified the way his father ruled.  For this 
section, the most important point is that the role of the party declined under Kim Jong Il.  The 
party is no longer preeminent but it operates more on par with the military and cabinet 
organizations, engaging one another’s arguments rather than simply dictating to the formerly 
subordinate bodies.   
Kim has publicly chastised the party, emphasized other competing institutions, and 
gradually rationalized policy against the party’s Juche bulwark.  In 1992 Kim Jong Il remarked 
                                                           




publicly that he reads the army’s daily newspaper every morning before the party’s daily 
newspaper.  The symbolism was not lost on North Korea’s populace.3  At the December 1996 
graduation ceremonies at Kimilsung University, Kim Jong Il praised the army while noting the 
party’s dwindling abilities.  He blamed the party for policy failures during the famine at this 
important event.  The following year, Kim imprisoned or executed several leading party officials 
but left the military untouched.4   
 These statements and actions set the stage for shrinking the party’s role.  While 
consolidating his power, Kim Jong Il could not alienate large numbers of powerful people, yet he 
also could not afford to leave potential opponents in positions of power.  Kim had no need to 
abolish the party or humiliate revolutionaries.  Rather he would simply demote it by enhancing 
the authority of competing institutions.  Under Kim Il Sung, revolutionaries led key ministries.  
Kim Jong Il kept his father’s loyalists as the head of ministries and other organizations but 
simply did not empower many of these positions any longer.  Ministers are now largely nominal 
positions.  These positions are filled by Kim Il Sung’s elderly compatriots still in many cases, but 
their deputies have all the power.  Just as Kim Jong Il was North Korea’s number two leader for 
twenty years, his number two counterparts in each ministry now rule.  The younger Kim’s move 
allowed these men and their families to save face while achieving his practical goal.  Likewise, 
the 1998 constitution made Kim Il Sung North Korea’s “eternal president,” as Kim Jong Il took a 
primarily military – not party – title from which to rule the country.   
 Some important, trusted officials with strong family backgrounds retain their party titles.  
Yi Chol, North Korea’s Ambassador to Switzerland; Kang Sang Chun, the head of Kim’s 
personal office; and Won Yong Rok, the head of North Korea’s unofficial diplomatic 
representation in Germany all continue to sign external correspondence with their titles of Vice 
Director of the Party’s Organizational Guidance Department.  These figures are long-standing, 
important figures in North Korea, but they derive their power from their inner circle status.  They 
do not control large bureaucracies; they gain power by their access to the Dear Leader.  Kang’s 
access to Kim is self-apparent as he heads Kim’s personal office.  Chol and Won head important 
overseas missions where Kim’s family members live or have lived.5  Kim’s sons were educated 
in Switzerland; Yi Chol was responsible for them.  Kim’s second son and possible heir, the 27-
year old Kim Jong Chul was videotaped touring at four Eric Clapton concerts in Germany in 
June 20066; Won was responsible for him.  Ambassador to Switzerland Yi Chol is also rumored 
to help manage a significant portion of Kim’s personal funds abroad.   
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These men are important but do not demonstrate the importance of the party despite their 
retaining their party titles.  This highlights the continued role of a few personal relationships at 
the apex of power, while the bureaucracies increasingly produce impersonal, expert opinion to 
inform and influence political decisions.   
 Kim Il Sung created the Party’s Central People’s Committee specifically to control the 
bureaucracy7; the younger Kim abolished the guidance organ outright in the 1998 constitution.  
Kim Jong Il was still concerned about control, but he would not utilize the party as an 
intermediary between him and the military and government.  The party still proposes policy, but 
it has lost its critically important function of directing policy across the otherwise stove-piped 
bureaucracy.  The 1998 revision is said to have reduced North Korea’s official personnel by 
thirty percent over five years in order to save scarce resources during the famine.8  This is one 
explanation for the bold move; the other requires a closer look at the military.   
The Korean Peoples Army 
 North Korea’s military also claims to pre-date the state.  Although Kim Il Sung’s rag-tag 
group of about 300 anti-Japanese guerillas in the early 1940s looked very different than a Soviet-
supplied North Korean military of 1950, the military still argues its origins are rooted in this 
guerilla experience.  The military holds a sacred place in the state’s ideological narrative.  The 
military protects the party and advances the revolution.  Under Kim Il Sung, the senior levels of 
the party and military were highly fused.  Many senior party members were four-star generals, 
and the military valued political correctness at least as much as military effectiveness.  
Militarism was central to the anti-imperialist and reunification goals of the revolutionary state.  
Consequently, the history of the North Korean military under Kim Il Sung is inherently wrapped 
up in the general political evolution.   
 Kim Jong Il separated the political roles of the party and military after his father’s death.  
He granted the military organization direct access to the Dear Leader, without having to 
subordinate political ideas to party leaders.  By 1998, Kim had seemingly raised the National 
Defense Commission (NDC) to the pinnacle of institutional power.  When Kim retired the 
position of president with his father, he took the ruling title of Chairman of the NDC.  The state 
introduced the military first concept in 1997 and increasingly reiterated it in the following years.  
There is little doubt that the military plays an important role in the North Korean system, but 
questions persist as to whether it is the preeminent institution under Kim Jong Il in the military-
first era.    
 Much has been written on the gradual rise of the military in North Korean politics.  In 
1991 Kim took the rank and title of Vice Marshal of the Korean People’s Army.  In 1995 after 
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his father’s death, he had himself promoted to the supreme commander of the military.  The 
seating order at important state events like Kim Jong Il’s birthday celebrations and Kim Il Sung’s 
funeral changed; it listed members of the NDC before Politburo members.  These lists 
historically had provided a pecking order of officials.9  In 1996 Kim expanded the number of 
national holidays from five to seven.  The two new holidays were both named after the military: 
Foundation Day of the Korean People’s Army and the Victory Day of the National Liberation 
War.  Kim had the Supreme People’s Assembly elect the Vice Marshal and Director of the KPA 
General Political Department (the military’s top official after Kim Jong Il), Jo Myong Rok, to the 
second highest office in the land: First Vice Chairman of the NDC.  Jo also gave the keynote 
address at the fifth anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s death and visited the White House in 2000 to 
meet with President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen.10      
 Arguments citing the rise of the military generally note Kim’s reliance on that 
organization.  One scholar concluded that “It was the military that carried Kim Jong Il through 
the most difficult times from 1994 to 2000” and therefore Kim emphasized the role of the 
military over the party.11  Yet Kim has had an uneasy relationship with the military.  He purged 
600 officers after an alleged coup attempt in 1992 and completely dissolved the VI Corps in 
1995 and replaced it with personnel from the XI Corps due to massive corruption.12  Further, 
both Kims have employed an extensive security apparatus.  The cabinet, party, and military each 
have their own security service that checks on the military, the bureaucracy, and each other.  
Like most dictators, Kim is suspicious of the military and has sought to keep them close so as not 
to lose control of their extensive coercive potential.  
 The core question is whether this shift towards the military is a real shift of power or 
merely for show.  Kim has long had a difficult time with the military, so heralding the military’s 
critical role may be an attempt to keep a lid on its power rather than raising its actual authority.  
It is also possible that evaluating these changes at face value is the correct view.  The party is 
ineffective, and the military’s bureaucracy is relatively disciplined.  Kim may have decided to 
rule through the military bureaucracy, because it distorts his policy prerogatives less.   
 It is important to recognize that the National Defense Commission and the Korean 
Peoples Army are not the same institution.  Arguments citing the rise of the military in North 
Korean politics inevitably cite the NDC and conflate its functions with the KPA.  The NDC is a 
small senior leadership body, not an institutional representation of military interests.  Senior 
generals take many of these seats, but the NDC is better understood as an extension of Kim’s 
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iiiinner circle at the top of the system than a broad, deep, and impersonal policy apparatus. Of 
course, the “inner circle” concept is sufficiently vague that it is not particularly helpful or 
falsifiable.  It encapsulates very different functional roles to different readers.  As a rough 
parallel, the NDC can be conceptualized as a particularly powerful National Security Council 
with a large representation of generals and more expansive authorities that extend into domestic 
areas as well.  It is unclear if the NDC coordinates policy formation and implementation with 
reference to institutional positions or draws on independent perspectives to brief Kim.  It is also 
not exactly clear when the NDC weighs in on policy questions or its influence on particular 
policy choices.  What is clear, however, is that the NDC should not be confused with some type 
of super-Defense Ministry or group of military chiefs with direct and extensive institutional 
support.  The NDC gains power from its direct and personal contact with Kim, not from the 
depth of new information or policy detail it can provide from an extensive bureaucratic support.  
 Military-first politics has not catapulted the military into bureaucratic primacy.  Rather 
Kim uses the government, military, and party to check one another and carry out policy 
collectively.  New benefits granted to the NDC and the military establishment have been largely 
nominal.  Kim has honored the military and raised its prestige.  Rhetoric and prestige matter but 
as far as honors placate the military establishment, Kim can reduce dissatisfaction enough to 
pursue interests in conflict with the military’s actual policy preferences.  
With the notable exception of raising the bureaucratic importance of the NDC, each of 
these actions is merely honorific.  These actions were not without purpose.  Prestige can be a 
cheap and effective motivating force.  Honoring the military allowed Kim to both dampen 
mistrust and provide an excuse for dismantling much of the party’s functions.  Kim’s actions can 
be better understood not as a shift from Juche-supporting institutions to military-first supporting 
institutions, but a move that freed his hand in directing the state from many ideological 
constraints.  Kim would pit the military against the cabinet and foster limited debate over some 
of the core problems facing the country – notably questions of economic reform, reunification, 
and foreign policy towards the US.  Kim Il Sung’s goals of security, prestige, and prosperity 
remained in an emergency management government where these tangible goals were discussed 
publicly.   
The Cabinet 
The People’s Committee was the earliest rendition of the North Korean government.  
Kim Il Sung described it as the linkage between the party and the masses, serving to implement 
party decisions on the land reform and industrialization.  It executed orders rather than 
participating widely in policy decision making.13  The 1972 constitution not only established 
Kim Il Sung’s position as President but gave the party greater roles in ensuring the government 
implemented policy as directed.  It renamed the Cabinet the Administrative Council to reflect its 
                                                           




position as a support body.  The previous chapter describes these changes at some length since 
the changing roles of the government are integral to the general political history.  Although under 
different names and to different degrees, the government’s position in policy decision making 
was firmly subordinated to the party under Kim Il Sung.  It was a relatively insignificant 
institution until Kim Jong Il substantially upgraded its roles.    
 The 1998 constitution changed the “State Administration Council” into the Cabinet and 
enhanced its management authority.  The cabinet’s primary responsibility is to implement policy 
promulgated by the rubber stamp parliament.  It is the bureaucracy responsible for executing 
policy.  However, with the abolition of the Central People’s Committee and vacant position of 
president, the cabinet has become a formally independent actor, albeit in practice responsible to 
Kim.  The constitution granted the cabinet broad management responsibilities.  The cabinet 
could modifying its own structures for implementing policy, change rules of administration, 
modify strategic-level national management practices, and create, inspect, and abolish key 
administrative organs.   
 The new constitution also raised the cabinet’s status to the second most important 
bureaucratic element after the National Defense Commission.  Nominally, the Supreme People’s 
Assembly remained above all other elements, but the constitution even removed the formal 
authority of this body – that rarely meets in the first place – to check the military and 
government.  Despite this heightened authority and real power, the cabinet and its government 
ministries did not get the praise the military enjoyed.  On the contrary, the government ministries 
continued to be blamed publicly for distorting policy directions when policy outcomes did not 
meet expectations.  Furthermore, Kim’s new titles do not reference the SPA or the cabinet, rather 
he is (in order) the General Secretary of the Korean Workers Party, Chairman of the National 
Defense Commission, and Supreme Commanding General of the People’s Armed Forces (who 
has never appeared in military uniform).14   
 The cabinet is low on prestige but not on power.  The cabinet’s roles expanded in 1998 
especially in the area of the economy.  The cabinet became the dominant force in economic 
policy, and each of Kim Jong Il’s three Premiers gained a reputation as the most influential 
proponent of economic reform against other institutional interests in the security sphere.  
Economic reform is at the center of many debates on the strategic direction of the state – in and 
out of North Korea – which cannot be adequately reproduced here.  Despite widespread 
disagreement about the nature and extent of economic reform,15 Pyongyang has certainly 
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decentralized some power in the economic sphere.  Technocrats and specialists have a greater 
role in governments guided by policy goals rather than ideology.    
    The bureaucracy has always housed specialists – even in the political sphere where 
technical or specialized knowledge seemingly has less utility than in the physical sciences or 
economics.  However, even Kim Il Sung’s rule recognized that international politics required 
expertise.  Foreign Ministers held posts longer than other ministers, and their tenures only grew 
longer (Table 4.1).  While these men were party members, they were granted longer tenures 
since an effective foreign policy was critical to the state’s existence, and an effective foreign 
policy required specialized knowledge.   
Table 4.1: North Korea’s Foreign Ministers 
  Foreign Minister Years Duration Subsequent Position 
1st Pak Hon Yong 1948 - 1953 5 Executed in 1953 during 
Kim Il Sung’s power 
consolidation effort 
2nd Nam Il 1953 – 1959 6 Died in office of cancer 
3rd Ho Tam 1959 – 1969 10 Chairman, Committee 
for the Peaceful 
Reunification of the 
Fatherland; Kim Il 
Sung’s brother-in law; 
Died in 1991 
4th Pak Song Chol 1969 - 1983 14 Honorary VP, SPA 
Presidium 




1983 -1998 15 President of SPA 
Presidium 
6th Paek Nam Sun 1998 – 2007  9  Died in office of natural 
causes 
7th  Pak Ui Chun 2007 - Present   




 This same role for specialized negotiators and advisers extended within the Ministry.  
Unlike American diplomats who are trained to become generalists, North Korean diplomats 
specialize in one area and developed effective tactics to make diplomatic gains disproportionate 
to the state’s power.  A string of American negotiators have sat across the table from Kang Sok 
Ju and Kim Kye Kwan for many years.  Whether one finds this an effective means of training 
diplomats is not the point.  It shows the North Korean leadership finds even international politics 
an appropriate area for specialized knowledge.  These specialists report the results of 
negotiations to Kim.  If he did not value this specialized knowledge, he could change the Foreign 
Ministry’s operation or re-empower the party’s international relations arm.   
 The Foreign Ministry has long had an important place in the cabinet.  North Korea’s first 
three Foreign Ministers, spanning the first 22 years of the state all served as Vice Premier in the 
cabinet structure, including one of Kim Il Sung’s earliest and most important rivals who was 
executed after the Korean War.16  It should come as little surprise that a state so extensively 
concerned about its external security would place great importance on both its military and its 
foreign ministry.  While key personnel in the foreign ministry have direct access to Kim and may 
even sit on his inner circle, it is possible to include this organization as part of the cabinet.  
Formally, it resides under the cabinet structure.  More importantly, it conducts its business as a 
specialized organization.  Each of the three main institutions have internal divisions, but the 
generalizations about their composition and advocacy hold even for the Cabinet-Foreign 
Ministry relationship.  
 The Foreign Ministry and other ministries under the cabinet’s authority serve as the main 
interlocutors with foreign embassies in Pyongyang and in important inter-Korean negotiations 
and talks with significant regional powers, including the United States.  Despite requests to meet 
with party representatives, western Ambassadors stationed in Pyongyang consistently report that 
the party is uninterested in meeting with them beyond an initial courtesy call.  The real work of 
foreign affairs, including economic engagement, flows through the cabinet ministries, which 
channel this information through the North Korean bureaucracy.  Likewise, the cabinet’s Foreign 
Ministry has spearheaded negotiations with the Americans under Kim Jong Il and advocated 
internally for diplomatic solutions to the North’s economic and security challenges.   
The Security Apparatus 
Especially in a state where the military is recognized as a key institutional actor in 
politics, one could reasonably suspect that the security apparatus may serve as a fourth 
institutional actor. Alternatively, the intelligence and police organizations could support one of 
the other three political actors, giving it a specific advantage in policy debates.  If the security 
apparatus was a coherent, semi-autonomous body, this may be true.  Though it is more difficult 
to cull public and declassified sources on the North Korean intelligence and police services, 
                                                           




broad outlines of its structure and functions can be deciphered.  The basic conclusion of this 
section is that under both Kims, the security apparatus should not be seen as an important 
political player in its own right.  
North Korea’s security apparatus developed in a time of great flux for the country in the 
1950s.  However, by 1962 the Ministry of Public Security held wide-ranging powers, including 
stamping out “anti-revolutionary” activities, conducting domestic surveillance, running overseas 
intelligence operations, maintaining prison camps, and providing basic crime control and air 
defense.  The party controlled the ministry at each level of its organization, implanting personnel 
to keep the organization under its control as the party did with the government and military as 
well.  The security apparatus under Kim Il Sung had multiple roles, but it was a singular 
organization firmly controlled by the party.17  The security apparatus did not have an 
independent voice in politics.   
In contemporary North Korea, the security apparatus is not a political institution and has 
been divided into four parts (Figure 4.1).  The younger Kim’s efforts to divide and conquer the 
bureaucracy saw a parallel in these coercive bodies.  Each of the three major institutional actors 
has formal control over one of these organizations and the fourth reports directly to Kim.  
Though informal lines of control further complicate this hazy picture of intelligence control, the 
general picture still supports the main contention that the security apparatus lacks a discernable 
influence on a wide range of political decisions.  In practice, elites in the party, government, 
military, and security practitioners themselves fear different elements of the security apparatus, 
but they cannot employ it to systematically influence policy.   
The primary role of the three security apparatuses is to protect the Dear Leader and his 
state from foreign and domestic threats.  However, their similarities do not extend much beyond 
this, and they are better understood as rival organizations than a coherent body.  First, the 
National Defense Commission formally controls the State Security Department (SSD).  The 
NDC is a small organization composed of senior leaders, including Kim Jong Il, and the SSD 
plays a critical role as the regime’s most significant intelligence agency.  The exact nature of this 
control relationship is not well documented, but it is plausible that Kim Jong Il himself or a 
trusted colleague like his brother-in-law, Chang Song-taek, may spend a considerable portion of 
their time managing the SSD directly.  At this level, Kim or a trust adviser like Chang could 
utilize competing security institutions and military elements to control the otherwise unwieldy 
SSD.   
Indeed, the SSD has had a long and deadly history of tense relations with the military.  In 
this regard, it is no different than most communist states.18  After Kim Il Sung designated his son 
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as his successor, the elder Kim purged military officers in 1976 – 77 who voiced displeasure 
with this move.  Another purge of military officers for unknown reason occurred in 1987 – 88.  
The SSD likely carried out Kim’s orders.  When the SSD exposed an alleged military coup 
attempt in 1992, 600 officers were purged.  Likewise, the SSD uncovered massive corruptions in 
the VI Corps in 1995, prompting the Corps’ reorganization.  The SSD helps the top leadership 
keep the military in check.   
Of course, the military also helps keep the SSD in check.  Top intelligence officials 
suffered when they opposed policies favoring the military.  In 1998 top intelligence leaders were 
purged following the introduction of military-first politics.  Kim Yong Ryong, the deputy head of 
the SSD, was executed on made-up charges following his voicing opposition to the military first 
doctrine.  Kwon Hui Gyong, North Korea’s former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the 
Director of the Party’s Central Committee on External Information Collection Department was 
exiled.  Other opponents simply disappeared.19  These types of actions are not publicly debated.  
They demonstrate one of the repressive tools at the disposal of the North’s top leadership.  It is 
highly unlikely that anyone other than the top leader could amass enough power to order mass 
purges – without himself being purged.   
 As part of this complicated web of dividing and ruling the security services, Kim Jong 
Il’s personal protection force is separate from the SSD organization.  The KPA and Ministry of 
People’s Armed Forces (MPAF) control the Guard Command.  Although the Guard Command is 
part of the KPA formally, their personnel have a reputation for arrogance and heavy handed 
tactics against their military colleagues.  For example, when Kim visits units, Guard Command 
personnel keep the rank and file soldiers far from Kim.  Stories abound about the Guard 
Command requiring the soldiers to stand in the dirt off of military runways, while Kim briefly 
waves from afar or Guard Command personnel hitting the soldiers with rifle butts and generally 
showing disdain for the average soldier.  The truth of individual reports is beyond the point.  The 
Guard Command is another check on potential rogue elements in the KPA and the SSD with a 
mission of protecting the top leadership.    
The KPA and MPAF also technically control the Security Command.  The Security 
Command has a similar function to the Guard Command.  It is responsible for investigating and 
eliminating individuals or groups disloyal to Kim.  However, shortly after the younger Kim came 
to power, he reportedly gave functional control of the Security Command to the State Security 
Department.  The overlapping functions of the Guard Command (KPA) and Security Command 
(SSD) foster additional competition and internal checks.  The complex web of security 
relationships demonstrates the top leadership’s concern about violent overthrow from within and 
concerted efforts to make sure someone is spying on the spies.   
                                                           






Figure 4.1: Security Apparatus Under Kim Jong Il 
 




More clearly, the party controls a small but elite security services.  The Central 
Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs (CCSCSKA) has approximately 15,000 
personnel.  The party’s CCSCSKA controls the important Operation’s Department (OD) as well 
as three other bureaus (Office 35, Unification Front Department, and the Foreign Liaison 
Department).  The OD is credited with carrying out intelligence operations overseas, including 
the high-level assassination attempts and kidnappings of the 1980s and efforts to raise hard 
currency through illicit activities.  The organization is small, but it also requires close high-level 
scrutiny to keep it in check.   
 The cabinet controls the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS).  The MPS is the lower 
level security agency that serves as the national police force.  It numbers approximately 130,000 
people and tries to compete with the SSD.  Like the SSD, it was reorganized in the 1990s several 
times amid concerns about corruption, higher illegal border crossings into China, and its inability 
to contain low-level disorder after the floods and famine.  The MPS lost its function over border 
control in 1995 and part of its authority to control travel in and out of Pyongyang in 1997; the 
MPAF took up this role, marking a partial militarization of border control and travel 
restrictions.20   
 Though the difference between formal and informal lines of control over the various 
security agencies in North Korea is by no means clear, there does seem to be a real effort to erect 
a divide-and-rule arrangement to keep a lid on the military, government, party, populace, and the 
security apparatuses themselves.  Though the empirical evidence is much less extensive than in 
regard to the national policy institutions, it seems that the three security apparatuses in North 
Korea check one another.  The important point for this analysis is that they do not represent a 
coherent whole.  They do not participate publicly in institutional debates in the North Korean 
press – even cautious, as the three main political institutions do.  While it is possible that the 
security establishment’s influence on national policy is real and hidden, these divisions suggest 
that the lack of observed political behavior by the security apparatuses can be taken plausibly at 
face value.  Though one may only have moderate confidence in the specific details of the above 
lines of control given the anecdotal nature of data points, the wider, important point for this 
analysis should elicit less controversy: the security apparatus is not an institutional player on a 
wide range of policy decisions. 
Supreme People’s Assembly 
The Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) is formally the DPRK’s highest constitutional 
organ and its leader is the nominal head of state.  While the Prime Minister meets with some 
foreign visitors, the SPA lacks an independent source of power, any real responsibilities, or even 
a permanent staff.  It only meets a few days a year to rubber stamp policy decisions.  Under Kim 
                                                           




Il Sung, the SPA held a moderately more important international propaganda purpose as the 
communist world presented itself as more democratic than the exploitive capitalist West.        
The SPA does not reach the “quasi-independent agency” standard.  While on paper the 
organization has many of the same powers as most democratic legislatures, it lacks any real 
power in practice.  The state determines which candidates will be listed on the ballot without any 
alternative candidates.  Citizens can vote “yes” or “no,” and in many cases citizens must walk to 
the other side of the voting room to place their ballot in the “no” bin as security officials watch.  
The regime claimed results were 100 percent in favor of their candidates often rather than more 
modest claims of election results in the high 90 percent range as in other parts of the communist 
world.  Elections to the organization are meaningless.  
The elections themselves are hardly worth protesting, since representatives lack any real 
power.  The SPA is not a coherent, permanent institution.  At the height of its authority, the SPA 
would meet twice a year for rarely more than a week.  This capacity has only shrunk.  The SPA 
now meets once a year and Kim Jong Il himself rarely even attends the SPA meetings.  The 
personnel do not appear to have an independent power base or any discernible influence on 
policymaking.21    
Sub-national Governments and the Judiciary 
 Provincial and local governments and the judiciary round out the remainder of the 
permanent institutions enshrined in North Korea’s constitution.  The 1998 constitutional 
revisions abolished the Party’s Central People’s Committee that formerly supervised local 
governments and the judiciary.  The judiciary is now only subject to the nominal oversight of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly – an organization formally responsible for all sectors of government 
but which rarely meets and lacks the institutional capacity or motivation to do much of anything.  
Though both sub-national governments and the judiciary gained a degree of autonomy in 1998, 
neither weighs in on national policy questions. 
Most information known about North Korea’s sub-national governments is formal but 
their roles have shrunk as the state has had increasing difficulty providing basic services to its 
people.22  Sub-national governments are less powerful considering the centralized nature of the 
North Korean state.  Even a question like food distribution is often delegated to a mobilized 
national institution – the military.  A national police force deals with local crime.  Most 
importantly for this analysis, provincial and local governments have not voiced policy position 
on strategic questions of national policy.     
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 Like local governments, the judiciary does not exert a systematic influence on North 
Korean national political decisions.  The judiciary is divided into prosecutors and courts.  The 
railroads and military have their own parallel legal systems.  Both the prosecutors and courts 
have three layers of administration: national, provincial, and local.  Local prosecutors’ work is 
supervised by provincial prosecutors.  Provincial prosecutors’ work is supervised by national 
prosecutors.  And national prosecutors’ works is reviewed by the SPA.  National-level judges 
and prosecutors are appointed by the party and rubber stamped by the SPA.  In this regard, they 
must have some political connections to reach this level.  Once appointed, they need only to 
worry about the informal and potentially arbitrary attention of a small number of high-level 
officials. However, there is no serious judicial check on other government institutions.  The 
courts provide a means to try and imprison alleged common criminals and are one stop on the 
path towards political prisons.  They do not protect individual liberties, enforce the rule of law, 
or otherwise participate in policy decisions and implementation.   
These two institutions complete the permanent bureaucracies that make up the North 
Korean state.  They have some influence on society, but the decentralized nature of these 
bureaucracies and their parochial outlook prevents them from contributing systematically to 
strategic, national-level decisions.  As we will see in the empirical chapters, individuals from 
these constitutional entities do not enter the national debate on questions of redirecting the state.  
They do not lead on any questions that seek to inform, craft, or implement policy.   
Conclusion 
North Korea’s formal institutions have evolved since the founding of the state, yet 
today’s party, military, and cabinet have a systematic impact on national policy creation and 
implementation.  Other constitutional entities – the Supreme Peoples Assembly, sub-national 
governments, and judiciary – as well as the divided security apparatus do not systematically 
influence national policy decisions.  The primary argument in this chapter is to understand why 
and how each of these three institutions can be understood as coherent groups, not amorphous 
clusterings of like-minded individuals, that actually coalesce to influence policy outcomes in a 
consistent direction.  These institutions have a corporate identity and act in such a way as to 
suggest an institutional worldview that colors reactions to specific events and policy advocacy.  
The next three chapters test these theoretical expectations by evaluating specific policy debates 
articulated in the North Korean press from the 1998 constitutional revision to the present to 
document whether these groups do indeed exert systematic influence on the North Korean policy 





Chapter 5: Institutional Jostling for Agenda Control, 1998 - 2001 
Introduction 
The following three chapters provide the empirical tests to the theoretical expectations 
put forward in chapter two.  On specific policy questions, do the cabinet, party, and military 
provide consistent institutionally-derived policy options to the senior leadership?  Do they debate 
policy alternatives in the press?  Does the senior leadership select from this set of policy options 
presented?  Do institutions resist senior policy decisions?  In short, these chapters seek to 
evaluate whether North Korea’s second-echelon institutions have had a systematic effect on 
national-level policy since Kim Jong Il’s consolidation of power and whether the system 
operates more closely to the theoretical expectation I put forward or previously-held models.   
This chapter concentrates on the first three years of North Korea’s new constitutional 
arrangement, September 1998 – January 2001.  South Korea elected a new president committed 
to cooperative relations with the North. China maintained its policy of backing North Korea, 
while prodding it to open up economically.  Relations with the United States were strained, but 
North Korea’s main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon remained frozen and the two adversaries made 
diplomatic progress on the missile issue.  China, South Korea, and the United States had many 
different views about policy towards North Korea but found basic agreement on the need to 
change Pyongyang’s strategic orientation.   
In this context, North Korea announced important internal changes in the form of a 
revised constitution.  The party attempted to maintain its position of supremacy over the 
government and military, while the newly empowered institutions asserted their own policy 
preferences more forcefully.  A systematic reading of the North Korean press reveals divergent 
policy preferences by institution on questions of both domestic and foreign policy – on the 
nuclear and missile issues, inter-Korean economic projects, international trade and investment, 
and resource allocation.  The party maintained an ideological approach to economic issues, inter-
Korean projects, and relations with the U.S.  It rejected marketization efforts, international 
opening, and diplomatic accommodation.  The party tried to keep its institutional supremacy 
despite the constitutional revision that raised the formal status of the military and the cabinet to 
its peers.   
The military shared many goals with the party but asserted interests distinct from the 
party and resisted party efforts to claim authority over the military institution.  The military 
rejected economic opening efforts on pragmatic grounds, voicing concern about information 
security, and opposed inter-Korean rapprochement and diplomatic agreements with the United 
States.  It expanded its purview beyond traditional state-to-state military concerns.  The state’s 
“military first” policy encouraged citizens to model their lives on the soldier, not the party 
member.  This highly militarized society now allowed generals – wearing their military hats – to 
enter the policy fray on questions of economics and foreign policy.   
The break from the past was subtle but important.  Generals who previously engaged in 
wider policy debates as party members when these two institutions were more tightly interlinked 
under Kim Il Sung.  Kim Jong Il’s divide and conquer strategy separated more clearly the party 




voice institutional positions on a wider range of policy questions.  In short, under the military 
first policy, the KPA gained autonomy as the party lost its monopoly on controlling a single, 
comprehensive policy platform.  Though military leaders shared many of the same ultimate 
objectives as the party, these military leaders articulated a distinct policy outlook than the party 
based on a different rationale and knowledge base.   
The cabinet departed most significantly from the other two organizations under Kim Jong 
Il’s rule.  Though the cabinet had been gaining some ground for decades, the new constitution 
gave it more authority to reject party demands to subordinate itself to the institution previously 
charged with comprehensive policy guidance.  Like the military, the cabinet fought back against 
party efforts to reassert its bureaucratic hegemony.  The cabinet advanced an agenda of 
economic revitalization through greater market mechanisms.  Just as the military’s main 
international mission blurred into linked domestic policy areas, the cabinet’s domestic authority 
blurred significantly into inter-Korean policy and foreign relations.1  The cabinet argued that its 
formal authority over economic management gave it a voice on key debates around inter-Korean 
economic projects and international trade that fundamentally required improved relations with 
South Korea and the United States.  All three institutions attempted to expand their bureaucratic 
fiefdoms, creating a natural expectation of conflict.       
The specific policy disputes during this period suggest remarkable consistency among 
institutional platforms.  Each institution maintained policy positions that fit squarely within this 
general framework to even include objecting to decided policy when it ran counter to this general 
policy outlook.  However, national policy varied tremendously, reflecting the tension between 
institutional positions and one platform winning out over the other at a given time.   
Furthermore, these institutions pursued contradictory policies simultaneously.  For 
example, the military engaged in deadly military clashes with the South Koreans, strongly 
condemning its southern neighbor, and calling for war at the same time as the cabinet expanded 
inter-Korean trade to record levels and warmly congratulated the South on its World Cup 
success.  Though one may assert that central authorities could have put some (but certainly not 
all) of these actions into motion much earlier, it does not support the centralized models’ 
expectations.  If central authorities could not shut off a congratulatory message or naval 
provocation, for example, then institutions have greater power than the centralized model holds.  
Put differently, focusing solely on the center leaves significant variance in national policy 
decisions unexplained.       
Of course, policy was not always uncoordinated.  Central authorities put the brakes on 
one institution’s advocacy and pursued another’s.  Most policy disputes tended to erupt as 
reactions to foreign actions with a few notable exceptions.  As a small, highly security conscious 
state, external events affect policy swings greatly.  North Korea is tremendously reactive to 
foreign actions and acts fairly predictably based on its particular internal and external interests.  
The remainder of this chapter delves into the specific policy disputes during this three year 
period to document institutional positions, evaluate this institutional interaction, and when 
possible, evaluate how central authorities ultimately decided policy on each issue.     
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Taepo Dong-1 Launch 
In September 1998, North Korea revised its constitution.  To mark the important 
occasion, the state launched the Taepo Dong 1 rocket for the first time.  The rocket overflew 
Japan, prompted substantial international concern, and overshadowed the constitutional revision.  
All three bureaucratic actors within the North Korean state responded to the launch, 
demonstrating their conflicting outlooks on the specific incident and related, wider concerns.  
The party lauded the Taepo Dong 1 “satellite” launch as a victory for socialism, the KPA praised 
the Taepo Dong 1 “missile” launch as a military victory, and the cabinet tried to minimize its 
impact on its negotiations with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.   
The party took credit for the rocket launch, hailing it as evidence of the power of socialist 
ideology: “The successful launch of our first satellite is the greatest pride of Juche Korea and a 
brilliant fruition of the prolonged and arduous struggle of our party and people…. Today's reality 
demonstrates the validity of our party's self-reliant economic line…. Apart from socialism, we 
cannot think of [science and technology] development or a worthy life for scientists and 
engineers.”2  They repeated this idea that the launch demonstrated the value of socialism over the 
coming weeks.  This was a noteworthy national achievement to be celebrated, and it never could 
have been achieved without the party’s leadership on pursuing a socialist economic line.  The 
party argued that its policy platform produced long-term achievements and national glory.   
The party claimed the rocket was a satellite, not a missile.  The party often uses highly 
inflated and threatening rhetoric, but it refrained for doing so in this case, describing the launch 
as a peaceful satellite.  The launch had dual-use applications; the same tested technology could 
be used to fire a medium-range ballistic missile, putting Japan in range of North Korean missiles, 
and have peaceful science and technology satellite applications.  As will be demonstrated 
throughout the rest of this study, the party does not try to avoid heightened international tensions.  
The party’s characterizing the rocket as a satellite was more likely an effort to claim credit for 
itself rather than to cede the glory to the military instead of an effort to assuage international 
concern.   
The KPA diverged from the party, calling the Taepo Dong 1 a missile launch.  As such, it 
was a military victory, not a party achievement.  Kim Yong Chun, Chief of the KPA General 
Staff, recognized the role of the party and socialism in a major holiday speech, but he stressed 
the importance of the launch in building a strong army to “mercilessly annihilate” any invaders.3    
The rocket was not a product of the party’s science and technology platform but an outgrowth of 
investment in defense.  Both the party and military hailed the rocket launch in nationalistic terms 
and claimed credit for the historic event.  Beyond the prestige associated internally with the 
launch, claiming credit may allow either institution to further its own agenda and obtain scarce 
resources.   
The launch demonstrated a recurring theme within the party-military interaction.  The 
two institutions often held very similar objectives but came to their policy positions from 
different directions.  Since many of the most senior officials in North Korea hold both military 
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and party titles, some observers claim there is no meaningful distinction between the party and 
military4 while others prefer to discuss the role of “hardliners” within the state.5  This effort to 
simplify a description of North Korean politics has real merit but it overlooks an additional 
benefit of recognizing the diversity within this “hardline” camp.  There is value in understanding 
the process of how divergent groups come to the same positions that is masked by looking at 
only the policy outcomes.  Those committed to Juche orthodoxy and others committed to 
military security have different fundamental interests even if they come to similar conclusions in 
the end.  Understanding those interests is important for anyone seeking a fuller understanding of 
the North Korean system or one who seeks to influence and modify their final conclusions.  
Military and Party “hardliners” can and do differ on policy advocacy, but more importantly, they 
find different arguments persuasive.  One advantage of going inside the red box is detailing these 
differences to craft more effective diplomatic strategies, reduce surprise, and ease” intractable” 
conflict.    
The Foreign Ministry, a key organ of the cabinet, projected a substantially more subdued 
response to the launch.  It did not mention the relationship between ideology or the state’s 
economic system and the launch.  Instead, it was the only one of the three institutions to 
explicitly offer a way forward to negotiate how North Korea would employ the newly-
demonstrated technological capability.6  After laying out the rationale for continuing talks with 
the U.S., the Foreign Ministry turned to the rocket launch: “We made it clear that the 
development, launch, and use of a satellite are internationally recognized rights of a sovereign 
state for independence….  Through the talks, we consider it fortunate that although it is late, the 
United States has re-entered the stage of implementing the framework agreement as promised.”7  
In wake of the launch, this institution took a decidedly measured tone.  It agreed with the 
party’s characterization of the rocket as a satellite but disagreed with the party’s following policy 
prescription.  The cabinet organization reiterated its commitment to the Agreed Framework – an 
avenue which its bureaucracy controlled.  The institution recognized why the U.S. did not supply 
the fuel oil pledged in the Framework and encouraged a return to the agreement.  A Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson said, “[T]he United States failed greatly in 1998 to meet the timetable for 
the construction of the light water reactor [LWR] project and for supplying heavy oil because of 
opposition by the U.S. Congress and because it was unable to procure the funds for 
implementing the framework agreement properly due to the so-called economic crisis of the 
members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization [KEDO].  This caused us 
to doubt the United States' will to carry out the framework agreement, and compelled us to 
suspend the storage of spent fuel and to prepare for more relevant measures.”8   
In this statement coming just days after the launch, the Foreign Ministry associated the 
launch with what it saw as the U.S. not upholding its part of the nuclear agreement.  The cabinet 
did not relish in the launch the way the party and military did, rather it used the event to urge a 
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resumption of the negotiating track.  It focused on its own contribution to North Korean history: 
maintaining the Agreed Framework and fundamentally altering its relationship with the U.S. and 
the outside world.  The KPA and KWP did not voice support for negotiations, reflecting their 
consistent preference for a confrontational approach with the U.S.  The KPA celebrated the 
technical, military applications of the event, the party highlighted an achievement of socialist 
science and technology policies, and the cabinet focused on the diplomatic consequences and 
opportunities it presented.   
North Korea “launched” its constitution dramatically, but the rocket crisis that followed 
did not create a situation where a clear decision by the Dear Leader was required.  The action put 
the ball in the court of its foreign interlocutors.  The state presumably sought to prod the U.S. in 
particular into supplying the LWR and heavy fuel oil.  Dissatisfied with years of slow-to-no 
progress on the Agreed Framework’s implementation, the small state tried to pressure the large 
one.  However, revelations outside of the regime’s control intervened to change the discussion 
before the policy process could run its full course on this issue.  The Taepo Dong-1 incident 
demonstrates how institutional responses vary in accordance with their more general policy 
outlooks and objectives, yet it did not produce a clear, single policy response.  Each institution 
provided different interpretations and policy recommendations to central authorities as the post-
totalitarian institutionalism model predicts and creates a new puzzle for the more monolithic 
models.  As such, it does not say much about how policy disputes are resolved.  The intervening 
crisis would help clarify this issue.   
The Kumchang-ri Suspected Nuclear Facility  
Following the leak of a newly discovered, alleged underground nuclear facility at 
Kumchang-ri, American demands to inspect the facility started to overshadow the Taepo Dong 1 
launch.  The demand provides an excellent early case study of the North Korean bureaucracy in 
motion.  The allegation was new, forcing each institution to voice its position, and it required a 
single, unambiguous decision by a central authority.  The state either would allow the inspection 
or block it; there would be no uncertainty about the policy outcome.  The inspection demand was 
related to a more general, important, and on-going debate within the North Korean bureaucracy 
over whether Pyongyang should negotiate with Washington at all.  Each of the three institutions 
explicitly linked arguments for or against allowing the U.S. inspection to wider positions of 
continuing with the Agreed Framework process or abandoning it outright.   
Also, the bureaucratic players knew something the Americans did not: the allegation was 
factually incorrect.  This allows one to see the importance various institutions placed on 
primarily ideological versus pragmatic action.  Interestingly, once the inspection demonstrated 
there were no traces of nuclear material at the underground facility, the party and KPA did not 
gloat.  The American allegation had been proved wrong, but they had still lost the debate to 
prevent the inspection in the first place.   
The party, military, and cabinet developed three distinct policy responses to the 
inspection demand.  The party rejected the inspections on principle, arguing it undermined the 
state’s sovereignty.  Party commentaries likened the inspection to a police officer’s humiliating 




only the latest example of American tricks to delay implementing the Agreed Framework.  They 
noted their grave suspicion of the agreement and called for negotiations to end.   
The military took a different stance in opposing the inspections.  The KPA argued the 
U.S. should not be allowed to inspect any military sites.  Allowing a hostile state to inspect 
military sites presented a dangerous precedent for the military and likely reflected some concern 
about inspecting Kumchang-ri itself.  Though inspections eventually showed the heavily-guarded 
site had no traces of nuclear residue, it may have contained conventional military technology that 
the military would have had to move in the months between the allegation and the permission 
granted to inspect the tunnels.  The military took a pragmatic opposition to the inspection, 
reflecting institutional interests.   
The military also connected their position to a wider concern about negotiating with the 
Americans, arguing the KPA should have access to all necessary weapons to fight and defeat the 
Americans, including nuclear weapons.  The Agreed Framework’s commitment to trade North 
Korea’s nuclear program for security commitments and aid did not appeal to this group.  Military 
articles did not focus on abstract ideas like the party’s but berated the Agreed Framework on 
non-ideological grounds.  Suspicious of paper agreements with the Americans and relinquishing 
their central role in providing for the state’s security, a spokesman reiterated that the KPA as an 
institution had always opposed the Agreed Framework.  This reflects a consistent institutional 
policy position and suggests institutions resist decided policy when possible and actively pursue 
policy reversals.   
The cabinet, again through the Foreign Ministry, first presented the American demand to 
the rest of the bureaucracy.  It initially did not comment on the accusation, but then discussed the 
possibility of allowing a one-time inspection in exchange for economic aid.  The Foreign 
Ministry took what the rest of the bureaucracy called an offensive demand and turned it into a 
platform that would advance the cabinet’s institutional agenda.  The cabinet and Foreign 
Ministry had long sought economic concessions from the U.S.  While the U.S. rejected the cash 
demand and Pyongyang settled for continued U.S. food aid instead, the cabinet demonstrated 
both its commitment to achieving substance over symbols and its main vehicle for negotiations – 
the Agreed Framework.  After months of debate, the state implemented the cabinet’s advocacy 
amongst competing proposals.   
The Foreign Ministry led off, announcing the U.S. allegation of the underground nuclear 
facility.  A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry said, “The U.S. side suspected that we were 
building an underground facility to promote a nuclear program in secret.  During the talks, the 
talks were also delayed by the assessment that our satellite launch was a ballistic missile test and 
by the claim that issues that had already been agreed upon [U.S. supplying heavy fuel oil] had to 
be reconsidered due to the negative atmosphere that was formed…. we made our position clear 
that we will take practical measures to show that we cannot be unilaterally bound under the 
framework agreement and sacrifice our own nuclear power industry if the United States again 
takes a backward step in carrying out the framework agreement.”9  
                                                           




Utilizing brinkmanship tactics, the Foreign Ministry was not shy about making threats of 
scuttling the Agreed Framework.   Four years had passed since the agreement’s signing and most 
of the heavy fuel oil still had not arrived.  Yet the institution left an opening at the end of the 
statement, urging the Americans to take forwards steps by supplying the fuel oil.  The cabinet 
was the only institution publicly advocating this line.  The inspection demand, coming on the 
heels of the criticism of the Taepo Dong 1 launch, accelerated more fundamental debates about 
whether the state should continue to negotiate with Washington at all at this time.   
Negotiations continued despite increased discussions in Pyongyang about abandoning 
talks.  The Foreign Ministry reiterated its statement, implicitly indicating the value it placed on 
open lines of communication: “at the DPRK-U.S. high- level talks in New York, the DPRK 
made clear its position to show in practice its will not to sacrifice its nuclear power industry.”  
The party’s newspaper spun the Foreign Ministry statement in a different direction, summarizing 
it with a focus on the ultimatum and missile “slander.”10  The party newspaper concurrently ran a 
signed editorial –evoking the name of both Kims – describing its view that, “enemies within and 
without were making desperate efforts to disintegrate and stifle Korean socialism with the 
fictitious ‘nuclear problem.’ [Kim Jong Il] frustrated their maneuverings with a bomb-like 
declaration...  For dozens of years he together with the president [Kim Il Sung] has crushed every 
one of the imperialists' moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK.”11  While the Foreign Ministry 
presented the DPRK’s interests in New York, the party advocated crushing American 
“deception” and refocus on ideologically-driven military means to complete the revolution and 
reunify the nation.  
The party would not stand for the U.S. trying to “stifle and isolate” Korea, repeating 
ideological sentiments questioning Washington’s underlying goals.  For party ideologues, 
imperialists only schemed to crush socialists, so it was naïve to believe one could compromise 
with them.  The party objected on principled grounds to the U.S. inspection demand, indicating 
such a move undermined socialism, security, and sovereignty.  It connected this specific incident 
with its opposition to negotiations.  The cabinet and party highlighted different elements of the 
same statements and interpreted American moves in different ways.   
The KWP’s position stemmed from the 1950s that through socialism and military might, 
the state would defeat the imperialists. The party refused to be swayed by imperialist pressure 
through the Agreed Framework apparatus, including the inspection demand.  The party’s 
position arose out of ideological conviction, intense distrust of the “imperialists,” and its view 
that a nuclear weapon strengthened the state’s defense and enhanced its international prestige.   
Consequently, the party said Pyongyang should block inspections.  Through Kim Jong 
Il’s wisdom and “scientific” understanding of world politics, the state would “smash the 
commotion of the nuclear inspection maneuver of the imperialist allied forces.”  The party 
explicitly specified that they based their international strategy on ideological correctness: “[O]ur 
party was able to consistently adhere to the socialist principle while not even once wavering 
from the aftermath of the modern revisionism and modern social democracy…. This is the secret 
behind our party and people's display of invincible feats in a time when the imperialists' 
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maneuvers to isolate and crush us has reach[ed] an extreme point.”12  The party expressed its 
vision for the DPRK’s future through a single ideological prism.   
The party linked the inspection demand to its more general rejection of the Agreed 
Framework: “We are not afraid even if the agreement breaks down.  We are not willing to be 
restricted by it while having our sovereignty violated.”13  The party’s alternative is clear: the 
class enemies must be confronted through military might. “[N]o matter how hard they may try to 
embellish capitalism and launch all sorts of ideological-cultural offensives, they will never be 
able to avert the hatred of our people for the class enemies.  Just as a wolf cannot take the form 
of a sheep, the aggressive nature of the imperialists will never change.  Fighting against the 
enemies to the end is the thoroughgoing class stance of our people.”14  For the party, U.S. action 
was a constant.  The U.S. may attempt to present its position as compatible with mutual gains, 
but it was simply trying to trick the North.  The U.S. only sought to bring down the socialist 
system.  Opposing the Agreed Framework was a sacred duty of protecting the socialist system.   
Indeed, suspicion of negotiations extended beyond the specific framework agreement.  
The party also objected to the pending Six Party Talks, calling them a platform for “treason.”  
“The so-called multilateral party talks, which profess the security of Northeast Asia, are nothing 
but a repetition of the six-party talks by divisionists who often used the talks to intensify division 
and to fabricate the concept of two Koreas… the talks are an anti-reunification idea that is simply 
unrealistic and cannot be accomplished….Therefore, the multilateral security dialogue is a 
criminal act that can never be forgiven… On behalf of the nation, we firmly denounce the South 
Korean puppets' proposal of multilateral security dialogue, which sells national interests and 
permanently divides the country.”15   
The two Koreas had already joined the UN as separate countries and signed the Basic 
Agreement, recognizing one another as the DPRK and ROK, respectively.  The party’s position 
again was locked in the past.  However, the past was not irrelevant.  It used the nostalgic 
argument for reunification as another talking point against the new negotiating proposal.  
Bilateral talks were bad enough but multilateral talks that included the South Koreans risked 
recognizing the government in Seoul as a legitimate, separate state.  This “divisionist” move 
could be presented as an affront to Korean nationalism, but the party’s argument failed to carry 
the day.  
More directly, party commentaries denied the underground facility and rocket launch had 
any military uses but ended with a thinly veiled threat that the satellite could be used as a missile: 
“whether the launch of our artificial satellite is used for military purposes or not entirely depends 
on the attitude of the United States and other hostile forces.”16  The party injected more 
brinkmanship into the situation as it pursued a confrontational agenda.  Just as boldly 
confronting the Japanese in the 1940s allowed them to move from a band of fringe guerilla 
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fighters to the state’s elite, confrontation with the Americans may somehow pay off in achieving 
national goals and glorifying their – or increasingly their families’ – lifelong efforts.   
The KPA added to the mix, showing its distinct opposition to negotiations after the 
inspection demand surfaced.  The (North) Korean Broadcast Station announced, “Our people and 
People's Army are strongly united around Comrade Kim Jong Il, the respected and beloved 
supreme commander, and fully prepared for any military adventure by the U.S. imperialist 
warmongers.  If the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets dare to light a fire of 
aggression against our Republic after all, this will only be a foolish self-destructive act like 
jumping into the fire carrying gunpowder.”17  This original rhetorical flourish likely 
demonstrated the military’s difficulty of justifying publicly its specific concerns about U.S. 
inspections of the site.  The KPA would not want to admit that the heavily-guarded site may have 
some military applications or allow a hostile state access to the facility.   
Although less colorful, later publications exposed the KPA’s institutional policy more 
clearly.  The KPA expressed its long-held opposition to negotiating with the Americans; 
negotiations had only gone forward because other, unspecified bureaucratic interests won out.  
For the military, the inspection demand proved their opposition to negotiations was correct and 
institutional opponents were wrong: “The Korean People's Army expected nothing from the 
[framework] agreement and had no interest in dialogue and negotiation through diplomatic 
channels.  Now, the United States, throwing away the mask of ‘appeasement’ and ‘engagement’ 
which it had once worn for some time, is openly revealing its design to invade the DPRK, 
threatening to break the Agreed Framework and spreading a plan for the second Korean war. The 
present developments prove that the KPA's judgment and stand were completely correct.”18  The 
KPA opposed the diplomatic track – past, present, and future.    
The bureaucratic players also blamed the Americans in distinct ways.  The Foreign 
Ministry sought to inject greater nuance into the debate.  Abandoning negotiations outright was 
not the only way to register displeasure with the inspection demand.  Current difficulties in 
negotiations could be more narrowly sourced and potentially overcome.  The Foreign Ministry 
noted that inter-branch conflict in the U.S. prevented it from upholding its preliminary 
obligations under the Agreed Framework.  By contrast, the party sourced the cause of this 
outcome to the “insincere attitude of the United States toward implementing the agreement” and 
dismissed the Foreign Ministry’s more nuanced explanation: “The United States has recently 
been unable to pay a penny to build the light-water reactors, due to this or that pretext.”  The 
party expressed a more fundamental suspicion that lent itself to a radical break from negotiations 
altogether.   
When the party commentary recognized the role of congressional opposition at the end of 
the article, it claimed this showed why the agreement will never be implemented and should be 
abandoned, “Hard-line conservatives in the United States did not approve in Congress the budget 
for the heavy oil supply.  Therefore, prospects for the heavy oil supply are dim.  Nevertheless, 
the United States is helpless about this.... It is self-evident that in this situation, we cannot pin our 
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hopes on the agreement with the United States…. [W]e have no intention to adhere to the Agreed 
Framework.  Even if the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework is broken, we have nothing to fear.  
Rather, we will be freer.”19  The latest hang-up in the Agreed Framework was more evidence it 
should be eliminated altogether rather than an issue to be addressed at the negotiating table.    
Party commentaries drew on historical examples or pure ideological exhortations but 
overwhelmingly searched for current evidence to bolster their consistent policy advocacy 
towards confrontation.  The party followed-up by publishing another ideological article on how 
the “imperialists’ aggressive nature cannot change” and how the U.S. slyly sought to split the 
North Korean leadership by falsely presenting a “peace strategy” which is “simply another 
version of war strategy.” The party recognized the possibility (if not current reality) of divisions 
within the state and concluded by presenting its advocacy as superior to its internal opponents’: 
“Only when the revolutionary people of the world, penetrating into the imperialists' aggressive 
and plunderous nature, further intensify the anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. struggle, can global 
peace and security be ensured.”20  Accommodation was counterproductive.   
An unattributed (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) broadcast presented a 
more moderate path: “If the U.S. side persists in inspecting our underground structures, we can 
show them to it.  However, if they prove to be civilian structures, the U.S. side must compensate 
for its aspersions on the DPRK.”21  The policy option did not seemingly originate in the party or 
from central authorities as four days later the party continued to call for preventing the inspection 
and scrapping the Agreed Framework.22  The position was out of step with the main current of 
thinking expressed in the North Korean media.  Such a move can be personally dangerous and 
helps explain why the piece was unattributed.  It also demonstrates how new ideas can be floated 
internally to minimize the personal and professional risks associated with being the individual 
out of line with the rest of the state.   
The cabinet later pursued this option more explicitly, suggesting the article probably 
originated there.  The cabinet negotiated specifics of U.S. compensation for inspecting 
Kumchang-ri and eventually reached a settlement that became state policy.  Central authorities 
selected between the competing options fiercely debated in the North Korean press.  Though the 
cabinet’s proposal to accept food aid for inspections and maintain the Agreed Framework won 
out, this was far from a foreordained conclusion.  Before the central authorities selected the 
compensation-for-inspection solution, another crisis intervened to make the decision more 
difficult.  The cabinet won its policy of continuing negotiations (albeit in an increasingly difficult 
environment), and lost on its economic construction agenda for the time being.  The existence of 
competing proposals and arguments from below that inform top-level decisions is out of step 
with the monolithic models.  The nerve center does not select policy without reference to its 
institutional supports, and those institutional supports present a consistent policy platform in line 
with the organization’s interests.       
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 A related crisis soon dominated North Korea’s relations with its neighbors and the United 
States.  The newly revised Combined Forces Command’s Operation Plan (OPlan) 5027 outlined 
joint U.S.-South Korean military actions in case of a military contingency on the Korean 
peninsula.  The U.S.-South Korean command first wrote the defensive plan in 1973 to prepare 
for a possible North Korean invasion of the South and revised several times.  However, the 1998 
revision was the first version to detail more expansive plans to permanently eliminate the DPRK 
if it ever attacked the South.  Previous plans focused on ending a second Korean War quickly, 
but the revised plan put forward the contingency response goal of “abolish[ing] north Korea [sic] 
as a state.”23   
 All of the DPRK’s institutions united in opposition to this development, but they still 
maintained divergent responses.  The party linked the OPlan development to the inspection 
demand, highlighting a general U.S. “hostile policy” towards the DPRK.  They capitalized on the 
negative atmosphere the OPlan revelation created to advance its predetermined opposition to 
inspections and the Agreed Framework.  The new facts fed into an existing platform.  The KPA 
reacted in stronger terms, calling the move tantamount to a declaration of war.  Though the 
military and party use the “declaration of war” characterization loosely, it does register a high 
level of dissatisfaction and call to stiffen defense measures.  The cabinet explicitly recused itself 
from this public discussion, noting that bilateral relations had deteriorated so much that the 
cabinet could not present an alternative to the confrontational approach in the contemporary 
political climate.   
 The party jumped on the OPlan news, connecting the document to the inspections issue.  
“Worse still, the U.S. Defense Department in a recent ‘Report on U.S. Security Strategy for East 
Asia’ said that they would ‘exercise military power’ to prevent the DPRK from resuming 
‘nuclear development.’  As seen above, developments are turning for the worse and the U.S. is 
putting tougher pressure upon the DPRK for its refusing to accept the ‘inspection.’  However, 
any ‘pressure’ and ‘threat’ will not break our determined position of principle.  We declare once 
again that our underground facility is not related with nuclear activity and that, accordingly, we 
will not in the least allow any ‘inspection’ of the facility.”24  Although not explicitly sourced to 
the party, the party newspaper subsequently published another ideological article elucidating 
many of the same points, stressing that the party’s ideological pureness could transcend any 
challenge.25  The OPlan was a long-term document that surfaced during this crisis.  It did not 
have a clear linkage to the inspection issue, but the party was willing to bridge the issues to 
advance their agenda.  The party sought to link each of these actions that it could label hostile to 
support its principled argument that Pyongyang should harden its U.S. policy.     
The KPA opposed the inspection in much stronger and direct terms than the party as one 
may expect from the institution most directly responsible for military plans.  The spokesman for 
the KPA’s General Staff also linked the OPlan with the inspections demand.  The state must 
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respond to this OPlan news, the military argued, by adopting the military’s position on 
inspections and emphasize the military’s interests as one would during wartime.  “Our 
revolutionary Armed Forces will respond toward the challenge of U.S. forces of aggression with 
annihilating strikes without forgiving it at all…. The puppet South Korean traitor, who had 
maintained his existence with flunkeyism and submission, curried favor with his master in 
response to this bragging [of ‘regime change’ in OPlan 5027], and preposterously raved that the 
North must accept the inspection of the underground facility.  The Japanese reactionaries, who 
viciously raved that our satellite launch was a ballistic-missile launch, are again making vicious 
attempts.  At such a time, U.S. conservative hardliners made the violent remarks that they would 
abrogate the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework and make a resolute response if no inspection of 
our underground facilities was conducted.  This is, in essence, like a declaration of war.”26   
Calling actions a “declaration of war” in the official press is common enough that it does 
not merit particular attention, but a long series of articles and broadcasts delineated the statement 
as important.  For the next week, soldiers, sailors, veterans, workers, students, intellectuals, and 
foreigners all allegedly supported the KPA General Staff’s view.27  North Korea’s elites likely 
did not read these propaganda articles as genuine expressions of interest by these groups, but the 
extreme repetition did indicate that the KPA wanted to highlight this statement in a way that is 
rarely seen.  The position had apparently taken some hold in senior KPA circles.   
The KPA General Staff statement rejected negotiations in general and built on the 
negative atmosphere to advance its institutional agenda against economic reform and opening.  
Though national policy on economic planning would soon change in the military’s favor, the 
institution never wavered from its core precepts.  The KPA linked the launch response, 
inspection demand, and OPlan to its long-held argument that the state should reject U.S. 
“appeasement efforts” (negotiations) and economic opening.  Instead, North Korea should be a 
closed society and emphasize military security.  “Lately, the U.S. imperialists are hyperbolic 
about aggravating a situation which resulted from the matter of our non-existent underground 
nuclear facility and satellite launch because they aim to come up with an excuse to light the fuse 
of war in accordance with Operation Plan 5027.  It is obvious why the United States has 
launched into implementing Operation Plan 5027, relieving itself of appeasement and 
engagement, with which they briefly disguised themselves.  As it has failed to destroy our 
socialist system even with its strategy of isolation and suffocation and the strategy of 
appeasement intended to lead us to reform and openness, it finally has lost its sense and launched 
into a reckless adventure.  Originally, our revolutionary forces never had any expectations 
toward the appeasement policy proposed by the United States, which is inherently trying to 
demolish our socialist system….  The general situation formed today clearly reveals that the 
sharp caution and the revolutionary position of our revolutionary forces were extremely just…. 
Although we do not want a war, we also will not avoid a war.”28 
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The KPA statement pays some lip service to socialism, but it is not a class-focused 
statement.  However, it fit well into the party’s ideological conviction that capitalism and 
socialism cannot coexist.  A contemporary party commentary draws out the class distinction at 
much greater length and focus, showing how the party came to the same conclusion that reform 
and opening must be abandoned by a different logical path: “Today, when the U.S. imperialists 
and their dirty hirelings have openly taken off their cunning masks of dialogue and negotiation 
and have taken out their swords of aggression, what do we realize most keenly, and what 
awakens us once again?  They are the firm anti-imperialist revolutionary idea of our party, which 
is firmly holding revolutionary arms in its hands, and its firm anti-U.S., class spirit with which 
we have always fought relentlessly…. We are keenly realizing now how just and wise it is for us 
to have consolidated our resolve, a thousand times, to firmly hold our bayonets and cherished a 
class-oriented belief in our hearts…. Based on their class-oriented stand, they also must have 
clear-cut views, a firm faith, and a firm resolve.…[We are engaged in] a life-and-death class 
struggle in which for us to live, they must die, and in which for them to live, we must die.”29  
The party’s position is necessarily zero-sum, removing any possibility of effective compromise 
or value in give-and-take negotiations.30  The central problematic is the class struggle not a more 
narrow military confrontation.   
U.S.-DPRK relations had soured.  Pyongyang had to object to the OPlan; it could not 
accept as legitimate a document that threatened to eliminate the state – regardless of the 
circumstances or caveats outlined in the military plan.  However, the OPlan leak did not likely 
change any planning or strategic thinking in Pyongyang.  The state operated under the oft-
repeated assumption that the U.S. wanted to wipe the country off the map – even absent North 
Korean aggression.  It probably came as little surprise that in the event of a second Korean War 
the U.S. and South Korea would attempt to eliminate the DPRK.  Both Koreas attempted to force 
reunification in the Korean War and committed themselves to this principle in their respective 
constitutions throughout the Cold War.   
In this case, unobservable, private discussions may have significantly diverged from the 
public rejection of the OPlan.  In particular, the Foreign Ministry’s public role may show only 
part of its advocacy.  A Foreign Ministry statement said, “DPRK diplomats have little to do 
because the DPRK-U.S. relations are rapidly turning toward military confrontation.”31  The 
Foreign Ministry removed itself from the public discussion, but it likely did not remove itself 
from behind-the-scenes politicking.  Such a move would be anomalous and puzzling given its 
general policy advocacy, access to Kim’s inner circle, and important institutional equities 
involved.  Though no one continued to press the compensation-for-inspections idea in the official 
press, the party continued to publicly oppose it.32  These commentaries would be puzzling if no 
one was pushing this agenda privately.   
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The Foreign Ministry was the only institution not on record opposing the phantom 
proposal.  Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju negotiated the Agreed Framework and is reputed 
to be one of Kim’s two dozen or so inner circle advisers.  Given his institution’s advocacy and 
personal ties to the Agreed Framework, it is possible that he attempted to leverage his position 
privately to present the inspections-for-compensation idea to central authorities.  Indeed, the 
proposal eventually became state policy over party and military objections.  Although impossible 
to firmly verify at this point, the pieces of the puzzle seem to point to a role of the Foreign 
Ministry in pushing this agenda.      
Outcry over North Korea’s rocket launch, inspection demands, OPlan 5027, and 
continued failure to provide Agreed Framework commitments effectively muted cabinet 
moderates who publicly advocated negotiations.  Party and military hardliners seemed to gain the 
upper hand.  Though the regime eventually allowed inspections for aid, hardliners won out in 
internal deliberations for a change in linked issue areas.  Their calls for a more planned economic 
structure – for ideological and security concerns associated with increased openness –carried the 
day.  Though this trade-off process remains hidden from view, it is plausible that Kim, not 
completely comfortable with ceding to the American demand during this heightened state of 
tensions but taking actions to preserve the Agreed Framework, sought to placate party and 
military demands in other areas.  Such moves could also reduce Pyongyang’s dependence on its 
neighbors and the United States at a time when such reliance seemed even less prudent than 
normal. Indeed, each institution had previously advocated publicly that the state should link issue 
areas.  The state announced the change in economic policy in the important New Year’s Joint 
Editorial.    
The Second Chollima March 
 The 1999 New Year’s Joint Editorial announced the state would pursue a “Second Grand 
Chollima March” in line with the party and military’s advocacy.  Chollima is a winged mythical 
horse reputed to be especially fast.  The first Chollima March was an administrative push to 
quickly accelerate economic construction and provide the country’s food needs by collectivizing 
agricultural land.  Started in the late 1950s, Kim Il Sung’s plan mirrored Mao’s Great Leap 
Forward in actions and initial failures.  However, the first Chollima March finally started to 
produce gains once Kim Il Sung introduced private incentives for over-quota production a few 
years into the program.   
The Chollima March has a positive connotation in North Korea.  The economy grew 
following the post-Korean War reconstruction until the 1970s. There are several large statues of 
the Chollima horse in Pyongyang to commemorate the administrative push that the state credits 
with pulling the state out of poverty.  For much of the isolated and indoctrinated population, the 
improved economic situation was because of – not in spite of –forced collectivization.  Kim’s 
announcement of the second Grand Chollima March denoted a move towards nostalgia and 
renewed centralized economic control over agriculture.33  It marked a tremendous policy win for 
the party and military and defeat for the cabinet.  It committed to recentralizing economic plans 
and cracking down on market activities.  For the party, this was an ideological win; it was a 
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move towards socialist orthodoxy.  For the military, it was a move to restrict information outflow 
and reassert state control over the economy.  For the cabinet, it meant removing production 
incentives and more inefficient food distribution methods that contributed to prior food 
shortages.   
The renewed administrative push for economic construction filtered into all three 
strategic issue areas of the economy, reunification, and anti-U.S. policy.  The party in particular 
attempted to reassert its larger “rice bowl,” or bureaucratic domain, following this first post-1998 
constitution NYJE.  The move to annex further bureaucratic fiefdoms triggered reaction, 
especially from the cabinet.  National policy became more disjointed that during any other period 
under consideration with different institutions pursuing different agendas simultaneously.  The 
result is puzzling for the monolithic ideal types but squarely explained by post-totalitarian 
institutionalism’s theoretical expectations.  The monolithic ideal types expect top-down control 
of a unified policy.  Policy should not be self-contradictory in significant ways nor should 
institutions openly fight over controlling the agenda, yet the rise and fall of one institution’s 
influence relative to another’s continued.   
The party began to reestablish its bureaucratic clout over the economy.  In a front-page 
editorial in the government’s newspaper only four days after the NYJE, the KWP interpreted 
Kim Jong Il’s new guidance as requiring a “redoubled” socialist push to build a powerful 
country.  North Korea’s ideological mantra refers to a “powerful and prosperous nation.”  The 
party editorial makes clear its preference for powerful over prosperous and calls on the cabinet to 
implement the party’s policy preferences: “No goal of nation building is more sacred and greater 
than the building of a powerful nation…. The most important in this is for all the [cabinet] 
functionaries to grasp the wishes reflected in the New Year's joint editorial and have their minds 
made up to implement them to the end.  The basic idea of the joint editorial is that we glorify this 
year as the year of a great turning-point for building a powerful nation by accelerating another 
great Chollima march under the leadership of the respected and beloved general just like we have 
built the socialist fatherland of independence, self-reliance, and self-defense from scratch under 
the guidance of the great leader through the [first] Chollima march.  Building a powerful socialist 
nation is a long-range blueprint that the great Comrade Kim Jong Il has long elaborated as well 
as a shining milestone for nation building.”  The party’s position was not a stretch; it cited Kim’s 
decision to give it greater power in economic management and tried to preemptively whip the 
competing bureaucracy to get in line.   
The party continually reminded the government that Kim Jong Il ruled on this economic 
question and they must get on-board.  The cabinet did not reply in the press initially, but the 
party was well aware of their opposition.  In case the cabinet “functionaries” did not get the 
message the first time in the front-page article in their own newspaper, the party continued, 
cabinet functionaries “must see that the rules and order are thoroughly observed in the economic 
work and remain vigilant against and reject any tendency that runs against the principles of the 
socialist economic management, no matter how trifling it may be.”34  The party published further 
articles on functionaries’ duties under the new NYJE guidance, clearly relishing their newfound 
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authority.35  For the party, their role to direct policy ran deep.  It must apply to all sectors at 
every level.  They even published articles on the proper Juche method of the “cannon’s roar 
signaling the potato farming revolution,” noting its “grandeur” and contribution to a powerful 
state.36  The party pushed its authority quickly and forcefully while it still had the bureaucratic 
upper hand.   
The party addressed the possibility, and their expectation, of bureaucratic resistance.  
This expectation suggests bureaucratic resistance is not uncommon and part of the system.  The 
party would not be surprised if the cabinet tried to subvert subtly the NYJE, rather it prepared for 
this real possibility.  Indeed, the cabinet did exactly that.  It recognized the NYJE’s clear policy 
guidance that awarded leadership on economic policy to its institutional rival with a very 
different economic agenda, but it also immediately began undermining that goal.  The possibility 
of bureaucratic resistance is completely alien to the monolithic ideal types but an expectation of 
the post-totalitarian institutionalism model.  It is an important component of the model that 
shows these institutions do not simply set the agenda for senior decision-makers – a key function 
in its own right – but actively press an agenda regardless of central decisions.  Though this 
certainly does not rise to the level of resistance found in democratic states with well-established 
opposition parties and organizations, but it does indicate a level of bureaucratic autonomy not 
recognized in the monolithic descriptions of the North Korean system.  
The cabinet replied in a front-page article in the party newspaper that they will adhere to 
socialist principle but made clear to spin the need to focus on rational results.  In short, they were 
waving a white flag while holding their guns steady.  They resisted decided policy, capitalizing 
on the inherent vagueness of high-level proclamations, and attempted to push their agenda 
against the tide of decided policy.  “What is important in the cabinet's work as the nation's 
economic headquarters is to precisely establish combat operations to thoroughly implement the 
party's economic policy in conformity with actual conditions and to carry out works in a 
revolutionary and effective way…. The goal of combat, which was legislated through the 
cabinet's decision, is to revive the economy, which has suffered temporary difficulties, within the 
next few years, and raise the level of production already attained by all sectors of the national 
economy.”37  The NYJE was a win for the ideological purists but the general guidance could still 
be cloaked in a pragmatic need for results.  The party cited its delegated claim to authority over 
economic management but had a difficult time implementing this agenda.   
Furthermore, the party attempted to expand upon this policy win by interpreting Kim 
Jong Il’s Chollima March declaration as a clarification of the new constitutional arrangement.  
The party presented the government as its subordinate.  The party contended that the government 
must relegate its preferences to the party’s ideologically-guided demands and follow its 
planning, citing authority granted from Kim Il Sung rather than Kim Jong Il.  The party wanted 
to claim victory in the bureaucratic war, while the cabinet refused to recognize complete defeat 
even in this individual economic battle: “In the course of leading the socialist economic 
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construction, the great leader [Kim Il Sung] consistently adhered to the principle of giving 
priority to the ideological work.  The great leader's firm creed was that as long as their ideas are 
set in motion, the masses can fulfill any kind of difficult and vast tasks.… Armed with the spirit 
of self-reliance, the whole population is vigorously speeding up the second grand march of 
Chollima aimed at opening a new great turnaround in the economic construction. The 
centralized, planned guidance over the economy is further strengthened and the work of 
establishing discipline and order in the economic construction is being deepened in accordance 
with the demand of the new state organizational system.”38  For the party, the “new state 
organizational system” looked very similar to the old one; it meant the party on top, pursuing a 
centralized, planned economy with ideologically-directed decision-making.   
The party repeated this notion that the NYJE did not simply grant it more discretion in 
economic affairs; the party noted its guiding roles were comprehensive.  The Chollima March 
reference implied that the party was back on top and the constitutional revision three months 
earlier could be “reinterpreted” into non-existence.  Kim Jong Il had just completed the three-
year mourning period for his father a year earlier.  The party tried to present the constitutional 
revision not as the final word on the younger Kim’s modus operandi but just one decision that 
could be undone.  The party wanted its institutional supremacy back, but neither the military nor 
the cabinet was prepared to satisfy the party’s desire.    
Kim Ki-nam, Secretary of the KWP’s Central Committee, laid out the party’s view that 
the economic guidance extended into reunification and anti-U.S. policy issue areas too.  In a 
major speech marking the sixth anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s election as the NDC Chairman, 
Kim Ki-nam emphasized economic self-reliance and enhancing the role of the defense industry 
to promote economic growth: “Our national defense industry has also become a precious asset in 
building a country with a powerful economy... It is our party's consistent principle and firm 
position to advance the construction of the economy and national defense and to invariably 
adhere to and develop our independent economic structure.  We should consider the foundation 
of the self-reliant economy, which we established by tightening our belts and exerting every 
effort, and the national defense industry, which is based on its foundation as a valuable asset to 
the revolution, and further enhance and develop them.”39  Since the party’s economic agenda 
meant investing in defense to promote growth, it naturally addressed policy towards those states 
that the military expenditures sought to counter.  Lower-level party officials drew out this point 
more forcefully and starkly.   
The party’s economic policy gave it pretext to address both reunification issues and U.S. 
policy.  The North’s administrative push in economic policy and greater self-reliance meant 
reducing its dependence on South Korean investments in inter-Korean economic projects.  Party 
officials returned to traditional arguments that  the South must join the North in communism to 
reunify the nation.  “The country-selling traitors in South Korea, given to toadyism and reliance 
on outside forces under the veil of ‘the government of the people,’ have raised increasingly high 
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barriers on the path to reunification. This reality demands even more pressingly the nation's 
adherence to the principle of national independence.  Today the only way out for South Korea 
from its present crisis lies in the attainment of reunification through coalition with communism 
and with the North.”40   
Likewise, the party took aim at the South Korean Ministry of Unification.  The Ministry 
is charged with inter-Korean dialogue and economic projects.  Their main interlocutors in the 
North are in the cabinet.  The party labels the ministry anti-reunification, citing again the party’s 
preference for reunification through force:  “The South Korean people should step up more 
courageously their struggle to get all anti-reunification institutional devices – including ‘the 
National Security Law,’ ‘the ministry of Unification,’ and ‘the National Security Planning 
Agency’ – scrapped or dismantled…. And, by doing so, they will hasten the day for the 70-
million to reunite as one.”41  The party won its desire to reapply Kim Il Sung’s economic 
policies; now it attempted to implement the long-term Kimilsungist peninsular policy of 
removing U.S. troops and pressing the South into submission.   
Not surprisingly, the KPA agreed with the party that the state should prioritize military 
resources and take a militaristic stand in reunification and anti-imperialism efforts.  Citing again 
only half of the “powerful and prosperous nation” mantra, the Chief of the General Staff, Kim 
Yong-chun, said, “We have to achieve independent reunification of the fatherland and 
consummate the Juche revolutionary cause amid the fierce struggle against the enemies.  The 
people's army should… guarantee with military force our people's struggles for the reunification 
of the country and for building a powerful state…. All the situations more clearly show how the 
imperialists' aggressive and brutal nature will never change and that the victory of the socialist 
cause can only be guaranteed through the bayonets of the revolution…. This is our army and our 
people's unchanging firm standpoint and firm will.”42   
These two institutions openly and consistently advocate a reunification policy line that 
some observers claim is so unrealistic that no institution or individual could genuinely hold such 
a view.  North Korea’s reunification rhetoric must be mere propaganda.  By 1999, South Korea 
could likely defeat North Korea on the battlefield even without American support.43  North 
Korea’s military hardware has increasingly become antiques and an emphasis on missile and 
nuclear technology suggests a deterrent rather than offensive orientation of the portion of its 
military gaining the most resources.  Reunification propaganda only serves to keep the masses in 
check by reinforcing an empty ideology, but serious policy advocates must have abandoned this 
view.   
However, dismissing these positions as rhetoric without substance misses the DPRK’s 
peculiar reality and the difference between short-term and long-term objectives.  Kim Il Sung 
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reportedly could not sleep at night in the late 1940s, because he was so consumed with thoughts 
about his nation’s division.44  Today’s Kimilsungists likewise seek to strengthen the North’s 
means to force unification despite its requiring tremendous sacrifice and even greater risk.  They 
take the long view and emphasize their greater resolve than the Americans.  They emphasize 
guerilla tactics and special operations forces and encourage the severely weakened radical left in 
South Korea.  Though conditions are far from ripe for invasion or fomenting revolution in the 
South, these revolutionaries and military men argue that history is not foreordained and the 
conviction of the North Korean soldier means victory will be theirs.   
Those permitted to read this study may find these people’s logic unrealistic and flawed 
but that does not imply that it does not represent their genuine advocacy.  With the personal risks 
an accommodation-driven reunification poses to elites and their families, it is perhaps not 
surprising that some elites prefer the status quo with the distant possibility of a unified Korea in 
their favor.  Indeed, imposing this same metric of rejecting “unrealistic expectations” as 
impossible and mere rhetoric makes the North’s nuclearization and attending extreme sacrifice 
equally implausible, yet it is their reality.  These institutions have taken observable steps to 
advance these general agendas.  In short, North Korea is not well positioned to reunify the nation 
by force but that does not preclude ideologues and cadres from trying to position the state now 
for the long-term possibility of completing the revolution.   
The party and military sought to expand their authority after the NYJE to each of the 
major policy areas by rearticulated their comprehensive platform.  Both institutions continued to 
link the reunification question with anti-U.S. policy.  The U.S. must be driven off the peninsula 
if Pyongyang is to reunify the country.  Reunification means absorbing the South’s economic 
and agricultural production potential and makes the state sustainable.  As such, both the party 
and the military took the opportunity to reiterate their long-standing, institutional opposition to 
the Agreed Framework – the cornerstone of addressing U.S. policy through accommodation 
rather than confrontation.  
Laying out its complete U.S. policy anew, the party explained only eight days after the 
NYJE why it objected to negotiations with the United States: “The U.S. implemented none of the 
Geneva agreement although four years have passed since its adoption.  Moreover, the ground for 
the light-water reactors has not been broken today when nearly half of the set time elapsed.  The 
U.S. has not faithfully discharged its obligation to supply heavy oil, with the result that its 
shipment is in arrears.  The U.S. sanctions against the DPRK have not yet been lifted, and the 
nuclear threat is further increasing.  In fact, the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework has been reduced 
to an empty paper.  In the final analysis, we have gained nothing but economic losses in ‘reward’ 
for earnestly implementing the Geneva agreement.  The U.S. is clamoring about ‘missile threat’ 
and the ‘suspected underground nuclear facility’ in the DPRK, politicizing humanitarian food 
assistance together with its followers.  What it seeks in this is to disarm the DPRK.  This is a 
declaration of abandonment of the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework, a declaration of war and 
provocation against the DPRK.  If the U.S. wants, let us kill the Agreed Framework and take our 
own way. This is our position.”45   
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The party’s position was consistent but also stretching the authority that the Chollima 
March reference provided it.  It attempted to run as far as it could with the new authority.  Seeing 
an opportunity, the military jumped on-board too.  Also within days of the NYJE, the KPA 
announced its renewed institutional opposition to the Agreed Framework that, the statement 
claimed, stemmed from the very inception of negotiations: “The United States' insincere attitude 
and stand toward the Agreed Framework prove once again that the position of the Korean 
People's Army is right.  From the outset, our People's Army did not have expectations for the 
Agreed Framework, nor was it interested in dialogue and negotiations through diplomatic 
channels.  When the nuclear crisis was concocted on the Korean peninsula in 1993 and hostile 
forces violated our sovereignty by raising the ridiculous issue of inspecting the objects, our 
Army strongly called for responding to this with resolute self-defensive steps.  There has been no 
change in such position and attitude by our Army thereafter. Rather, its position and attitude 
have become more solid…. The KPA’s position is that diplomatic negotiation is not the only 
way for solving matters.”46 
The military once again argued that it never supported accommodation with the U.S.  It 
goes so far as to explicitly note its institutional opposition to high-level decided policy.  It 
wanted to continue the nuclear crisis created in 1993 when the North announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and reprocess plutonium.  For the military, this was 
not an empty threat or diplomatic tactic.  It was part of a long-standing military plan to enhance 
its war-making potential.  A nuclear North Korea may be able to raise the stakes high enough to 
dissuade the U.S. from joining a peninsular war and eventually allow the North to move forward 
on its historical mission to reunify the peninsula on its own terms.   
All bureaucratic actors were not on the same page.  The NYJE did not indicate a 
permanent policy win for the party.  They no longer sat atop the bureaucracy and directed all 
policy choices as editorials earlier in the year hopefully claimed.  The cabinet reasserted its role 
in economic affairs.  It published an article citing the “cabinet’s plan of operation” in regards to 
agricultural policy without reference to party guidance.47  The cabinet decided to ignore the 
party’s demands that it get on board with its expansive agenda.  The cabinet continued to rely on 
pragmatic policy metrics in making economic policy and opposed efforts to end the Agreed 
Framework.  The North’s main avenue to nuclear weapon status – the Yongbyon nuclear reactor 
– remained frozen.  Relations with the U.S. were strained and diplomatic progress slowed, but 
Pyongyang did not radically depart from the diplomatic structure.  Inter-Korean projects 
experienced the most national-level policy variance in the coming months.  Policy coordination 
declined as the three institutions pursued policies in contradiction with one another – a 
development unexplained by and puzzling for the monolithic theories but accounted for by 
institutional politics under Kim Jong Il’s authority.  
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Despite the New Year’s Joint Editorial’s decisive statement on socialist economic 
construction, the cabinet actively undermined the policy.  While the party attempted to extend its 
domain, the cabinet largely disregarded party guidance – or at best provided lip service to it.  As 
a result, each institution pursued contradictory, strategic objectives simultaneously.  Though the 
regime already demonstrated its willingness to shift strategies over time, this period would be 
particularly puzzling for those subscribing to the monolithic ideal.  The military, party, and 
cabinet each maintained a consistent strategy, but the nation did not.  During this period, 
national-level policy was notably fragmented and disjointed.   
One scholar describing inter-Korean relations during this timeframe perceptively noted 
how the North’s uncoordinated bureaucratic actors pursued their own policy lines.  “Rarely have 
they [inter-Korean relations] seemed more bifurcated or more puzzling than in June [1999], 
when a naval battle erupted on the Yellow (West) Sea while simultaneously on the other side of 
the Peninsula cruise ships of the Hyundai group – Korea’s largest chaebol – continued to ferry 
South Korean tourists to the scenic Mt. Kumgang on the northern side of the demilitarized zone 
as if nothing was happening.”48   
The KPA was the sole participant and spokesperson for naval clashes, while the cabinet 
controlled the economic projects.  The bifurcated policy that worked at cross-purposes is 
puzzling if one expects the state to act as a monolith or at least as a coordinated entity.  However, 
these actions square well with each institution’s consistently expressed preferences.  Institutions 
started to move on their agendas as lines of institutional dispute resolution appeared to not be 
fully developed.  Indeed, events beyond inter-Korean relations further demonstrate that distinct 
bureaucracies tried to cautiously test the extent of their authority during this period.    
 North Korea continued to negotiate in Geneva with the U.S. on its demand to inspect the 
suspected underground nuclear facility despite party and military opposition.49  Washington 
rejected Pyongyang’s demand for $300 million but offered continuing existing food aid.  
Bilateral talks reached an impasse.  After months of stalemate, Kim Jong Il traveled to China – 
his first trip abroad since his father’s death.  The move marked a long trend of private North 
Korean consultations with the Beijing leadership followed by Pyongyang announcing its 
willingness to talk.  Two weeks after Kim’s trip to China, North Korea consented to American 
demands to inspect Kumchang-ri in return for continued American food aid and U.S. training on 
potato farming.50  Despite losing on the administrative economic push, the cabinet won on the 
compensation-for-inspections proposal.  
 Unfortunately, there is no data available on the final stage of decision-making.  Though 
such information would undoubtedly improve our understanding of the policy process, this 
information gap does not prohibit a theoretical understanding of the state’s policy formulation 
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and execution.  What is most important for validating post-totalitarian institutionalism’s 
theoretical expectations over the monolithic ideal types is the consistent policy expectations of 
each institution, conflicting policy goals and approaches between institutions, and the separation 
of wins and losses on an issue basis.  Institutional divisions exist on core political questions and 
central authorities tend to select from these options in crafting and implementing policy.   
The cabinet won its advocacy on the inspections issue but lost on the economic agenda.  
No single institution could claim permanent, comprehensive supremacy over another as the party 
enjoyed under Kim Il Sung.  Institutions continued to resist one another’s wins according to their 
preconceived policy platforms even after central authorities decided policy.  Institutional leaders 
attempted to get the rest of the regime on board for policy implementation even after decisions.  
It was not automatic.  Kim’s central authority is critical, but it often does not end debate.  The 
North Korean system is locked in an equilibrium outcome of institutional interaction defining the 
range of policy options, institutional competition informing and influencing policy decisions, and 
similar competitive dynamics playing itself out in implementing decided policy.   
The United States inspected Kumchang-ri in May 1999.  The inspection turned up empty 
tunnels without nuclear traces.  The news opened the door for further diplomatic overtures.  By 
the end of the month, former Defense Secretary William Perry traveled to North Korea to offer a 
deal:  if Pyongyang halted missile flight tests, then Washington would remove substantial 
sanctions and improve diplomatic ties.51  Perry met with the figurehead SPA Presidium 
Chairman and held meetings with key players in the Foreign Ministry, Kang Sok Ju and Kim 
Kye Kwan.  The Foreign Ministry issued a simple statement saying, “The talks took place in a 
sincere and frank atmosphere full of mutual respect.”52  The cabinet’s win put it in an 
advantageous position to expand its comprehensive policy agenda.   
Two weeks after the long-debated inspection and Perry’s visit, the North Korean media 
first mentioned the inspection.  Instead of continually repeating in ideological essays that the 
North Koreans were correct that the tunnels indeed lacked any traces of a nuclear use, the 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling for a return the Agreed Framework, “The visit 
proved objectively that the underground facility in Kumchang-ri is an empty tunnel, not related 
to nuclear development at all.  As a result, it was clearly proved once again that we have been 
sincerely implementing the Geneva Agreed Framework.”53  There were no party commentaries 
or KPA statements on the inspection.  Their euphoria for pursuing a confrontational policy 
towards the Americans was on hold.  They had to find other ways to undermine the state’s 
decided policy of accommodation with the U.S.  
 Instead of speaking about the inspection issue, the KPA responded with actions.  It sent 
patrol boats across the Northern Limit Line – the disputed sea border between North and South 
Korea.54  The UN Command drew the line in 1953, although the North Koreans refused to 
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recognize it in the armistice.  The NLL proceeds from the Military Demarcation Line at the 
center of the DMZ and hooks northward, hugging the North Korean coast.  The NLL recognizes 
portions of the West (Yellow) Sea north of the 38th parallel as South Korean waters.  Pyongyang 
prefers the Maritime Military Demarcation Line which continues as a straight line from the 
middle of the DMZ.  The land border between the two Koreas slopes southward as it reaches the 
west coast of Korea, providing the North with segments of the West Sea south of the 38th 
parallel.  The border dispute has been a long-standing area for clashes. 
The KPA regularly sends patrol boats across the NLL.  However, this time they engaged 
a South Korean warship.  A South Korean warship attempted to chase the North Korean warship 
back across the Northern Limit Line.  When the North Korean warship refused to retreat, the two 
navies exchanged gunfire, and the South Korean navy sank the North Korean vessel, killing all 
20 North Korean sailors on board.55  An unnamed source familiar with the overhead imagery 
leaked, “There was plenty of time for North Korea's military leadership to tell them to back off, 
but clearly they wanted to send a message that they were not about to back down.”56   
Interestingly, the KPA statement blamed the Americans for its role in establishing the 
Northern Limit Line decades earlier and only blamed Seoul as a “puppet military, under the 
command of the U.S. Forces.”57  Nevertheless, the KPA’s actions stalled the cabinet’s inter-
Korean negotiations.  The next day, the North suspended talks with South Korea “for the time 
being.”58  However, the cabinet quickly resumed them, concluding an eleven-day inter-Korean 
negotiating session within three weeks of the incident.  The talks broke down over an unrelated 
issue regarding family reunions.59 
Without recognizing the competing bureaucratic interests within North Korea, U.S. 
officials called the clash a “stupid” mistake; others said the regime was not serious about 
negotiations.  This incident provides more evidence of the importance of correctly understanding 
North Korea’s internal politics if one seeks to interact with or influence them.  Donald Gregg, a 
knowledgeable former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, noted “like everything the North 
Koreans do, no one is entirely sure why they did it" while another unnamed senior official 
simply labeled the action as the North Koreans again doing “something stupid.”  Some 
congressional opponents to the Agreed Framework cited the clash as evidence of the talk’s 
futility; viewing the state as a singular entity, they said North Korea was not serious about 
negotiations.60   
In fairness, these comments may have been aimed more at influencing the U.S. foreign 
policy agenda than analyzing the situation.  Nevertheless, they demonstrate the analytical paucity 
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of the monolithic model of North Korean politics; the comments indicated foreign policy 
specialists saw the move as perplexing, to be dismissed as an anomalous act or indicative of a 
strategic policy contrary to negotiations.  These analysts did not recognize – at least publicly – 
the possibility that the clash was uncoordinated bureaucratic freelancing and reflected different 
agendas within the DPRK.  It would be entirely consistent to expect that the KPA wanted to 
derail inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK talks, while the cabinet seriously pursued diplomatic 
rapprochement.   
The naval incident delayed negotiations briefly.  By the next month, the Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement calling on the U.S. to return to the Agreed Framework.  Competing 
institutions interpreted the statement the following week differently.  Facing different 
interpretations of its statement within the DPRK, the North Korean Foreign Ministry had to 
publicly clarify its own statement: “It has only been several days since the press statement of the 
spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry was issued, but this is already drawing great attention 
at home and abroad and bringing about a positive response.  In the press statement, we once 
again put forth the principled position that we do not consider the United States the sworn 
enemy, and that if the United States recognizes our sovereignty and freedom of choice and treats 
us with good faith, we will develop relations with the United States based on the principles of 
equality and reciprocity.  This is our Republic's fundamental position and consistent attitude 
regarding the United States.”61  On behalf of the entire system, the Foreign Ministry was ready to 
deal.   
 However, the whole republic did not support this position.  As the Foreign Ministry 
called for developing relations, the party indicated its desire to escalate military confrontation.  
Three days after the Foreign Ministry clarified the state’s “consistent attitude,” an unnamed 
detractor using the party’s boilerplate language cited the Foreign Ministry’s statement and 
concluded quite differently: “The touch-and-go situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula 
reminds one of a time bomb that may go off at any moment.  The present situation compels us to 
maintain a higher vigilance and stronger revolutionary stand than ever before.  Our armed forces 
and single-hearted unity, which have become invincible thanks to our party’s military-first 
politics and military-first revolutionary leadership, regard it as their inborn quality and intrinsic 
mode of counter-action to return fire for fire and artillery fire for pistol fire.  The further the 
United States escalates pressure upon us, the stronger our reaction will become, bringing 
unpredictable consequences.”62   
The Foreign Ministry had authority to entertain negotiations, but the party actively sought 
to derail those negotiations and advocated military escalation.  Its efforts for the time being 
would not bear fruit as the Foreign Ministry could pursue its agenda.  The KPA’s effort in the 
West Sea and the party’s more general opposition did not prompt the regime to reverse course on 
its U.S. policy.   
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Missile Negotiations and the Inter-Korean Summit 
At the same time, a U.S. intelligence leak revealed that North Korea was preparing its 
Taepo Dong-2 rocket for launch later in the summer.  If successful, the leak indicated the rocket 
would put the United States within North Korean missile range.63  Party and army organs 
denounced the allegation and the United States more generally until the Foreign Ministry 
announced that the U.S. had agreed in Berlin to remove some sanctions against the DPRK.64  
The Foreign Ministry called the move “a reflection of the U.S. political will to stop pursuing its 
policy hostile to the DPRK and to improve relations” which “create[s] an atmosphere favorable 
for a negotiated solution to outstanding issues between the two countries.”65  The announcement 
again only temporarily took the wind out of the sails of institutional opponents.  The state 
stepped down its threat to test fire another long range missile and planned to return to the table.   
The party and military again lost.  Rhetorically, the KPA dug up the NLL issue again.  
The KPA rejected the maritime border’s validity and reiterated earlier claims that the border 
extended 35-40 miles south of the NLL.66  It was a tenuous effort to antagonize the other side.  
The old trick did little as much bigger agreements were in the works.  U.S. and North Korean 
negotiators agreed in Berlin that the U.S. would “ease some sanctions” in exchange for North 
Korea suspending any long-range missile launches.67  The Clinton Administration upheld its 
pledge five days later, marking the first easing of U.S. sanctions against North Korea since 1953.  
The Foreign Ministry could point to concrete progress that the negotiating track allowed, shoring 
up its position internally vis-à-vis the party and military.   
 A Foreign Ministry statement paralleled the divisions within the U.S. political 
establishment on North Korea policy with divisions within North Korea on U.S. policy.  The 
institution stated explicitly that some elements within the North Korean leadership preferred the 
confrontational path to the cabinet’s negotiating path: “At the Berlin talks held in September and 
November both sides agreed to hold high-level talks to discuss pending issues in near future, 
depending on a climate to be created for them.  However, Republican congressmen are 
threatening to prevent the administration from carrying out its policy towards the DPRK….  It is 
hard to guess which is the true U.S. policy out of the conflicting policy options of the two 
parties…. In fact, we hear assertions made by different domains in the DPRK that the present 
U.S. Administration's policy towards the DPRK is intended to disarm and destroy it step by step 
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in the end.  They prefer the Republicans' assertion to be adopted as a U.S. policy to compel them 
to confront the U.S. militarily.  In other words, we are fully prepared for both events: 
improvement of relations with the U.S. And showdown with it.”68  The Foreign Ministry’s 
discussion of “different domains in the DPRK” and use of the third person to refer to North 
Korean institutions that prefer a confrontational approach suggests further that the Foreign 
Ministry is the institution committed to a negotiated solution to outstanding issues between the 
U.S. and North Korea and battles internally against those that fundamentally disagree with this 
approach.   
 Despite historic movement on sanctions, the KPA continued to press its concern about 
South Korean warships in the West Sea.  The KPA reaffirmed its resolute stand against South 
Korean ships in “North Korean waters,” arguing that the U.S. prodded the South Korean 
“puppets” to sink the North Korean warship.  The statement is particularly interesting since it 
came in December, a full six months away from the height of the crab season that makes the 
waters lucrative and around which the inter-Korean naval clashes usually develop.  The KPA 
usually denounces any clashes quickly after the event, and they could not cite any new evidence 
that the U.S. “prodded” the South Koreans to defend their territorial waters.  The KPA talking 
point was grasping at straws to find any recent evidence to object to negotiations with the U.S.   
The KPA continued, “The U.S. imperialists have worked hard to disarm the DPRK under the 
name of ‘improvement of relations,’ while escalating its military pressure upon the DPRK.  
However, the Korean people have taken firm and resolute measures against their moves, neither 
yielding to their military pressure nor being taken in by any appeasement and deception.”  KPA 
stood ready to win another Korean War, it concluded.69  Lacking more recent evidence of U.S.-
DPRK or North-South confrontational policies, the KPA’s argument against diplomatic progress 
weakened.  Central authorities did not register any sympathy with the KPA’s argument.       
The cabinet enjoyed a string of recent policy wins, but it did not become permanent.  
Engagement continued in a stop-and-go fashion.  Working-level U.S.-DPRK talks in mid-
November 1999 failed to produce results, while Japan and North Korea announced the following 
month that they would resume normalization talks previously stalled since 1992.70  At the end of 
January 2000, North Korea agreed to send a delegation to Washington to discuss the missile 
issue.  However, by end of March, the state had reversed itself: "We cannot visit the United 
States with the cap of a terrorist," according to the North Korean ambassador to China, Chu 
Chang Jun, referring to North Korea’s position on the terrorist list.  Such a move would force 
North Korea to negotiate from a position of weakness, he reasoned.71  Concurrently, the state 
                                                           
68 “DPRK ForMin Denounces U.S. Congress Debate on Korea,” KCNA, December 8, 1999.  
69 “U.S. Design To Stifle DPRK Comes Under Fire,” KCNA, December 30, 1999.  
70 Gaku Shibata, “Lawmakers, N. Korea to Urge Talk Resumption,” The Daily Yomiuri, December 4, 1999, p. 1. 
“Seoul Welcomes Normalization Talks Between North Korea and Japan,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 3, 
1999. Calvin Sims, “North Korea, Apparently Seeking to End Its Isolation, Agrees to Resume Talks with Japan,” 
New York Times, December 4, 1999, p. A8. Shingo Ito, “Japan, North Korea Sign Deal to Resume Rapprochement 
Talks,” Agence France Presse, December 3, 1999.  
71 John Pomfret , “N. Korea Threatens to Skip Talks; Visit to U.S. Tied to Removal From List of Terrorism 
Sponsors,” Washington Post,  March 29, 2000, p. A20. “DPRK Ambassador: U.S. Must Drop 'Terrorist State' 




pursued a blitz of establishing new diplomatic relations with Western states, including Italy, 
Australia, and Britain.72   
Pyongyang seemed to be moving generally in the strategic direction of accommodation, 
although it would not abandon its characteristic brinkmanship tactics.  Deciphering between 
tactics and strategic reversal is difficult but important.  When the cabinet raises a new demand 
like removal from the terrorist list when an agreement is about to be concluded, it suggests a 
brinkmanship tactic to secure more concessions rather than a more strategic effort to abandon 
negotiations altogether.  The party and military’s negotiating demands are much more far-
reaching, preventing any real possibility of acceptance by the other side, such as a complete and 
immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula or South Korea joining the 
North in communism.  Neither the military nor the party advanced the terrorist list removal 
demand this time, indicating the Foreign Ministry was just trying to get more out of the deal than 
was originally negotiated.  Still, the tactic delayed the missile meeting until the following fall.  In 
the interim, the two Koreas made historic progress towards easing tensions.   
 The June 13-15, 2000 Summit in Pyongyang between South Korean President Kim Dae 
Jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was the first summit between the two Koreas.  Ending 
only ten days before the important fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War, Seoul and 
Pyongyang pledged to wide-ranging cooperative endeavors aimed at reducing inter-Korean 
tensions and paving the way for eventual reunification.  Kim Dae Jung argued that rapid 
absorption of North Korea, even if it could occur peacefully, would severely damage the South 
Korean economy.73  Seoul sought international cooperation to develop and open North Korea’s 
economy to pave the way for gradual reunification and to exert some leverage over Pyongyang 
in the process.  Meanwhile, North Korea gained economically from this cooperation but some 
within the regime voiced concern that significant opening risked unraveling the state.  They cited 
the former communist states of Europe as evidence that economic change precipitated political 
regime change.  These distinct views between the DPRK bureaucracies came into sharp focus 
around the historic summit.   
 The cabinet argued that the political consequences of economic changes were 
manageable.  Economic projects could be contained to avoid political consequences and 
provided a means to rehabilitate the North’s dilapidated and declining economy.  Immediately 
following the April 8 announcement of the June summit, the cabinet quickly and publicly 
supported the inter-Korean dialogue.  It is possible to infer that the cabinet even had a role in 
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pushing the summit behind the scenes, considering all other major actors remained in opposition 
before and after the Summit announcement and earlier cabinet efforts to promote inter-Korean 
economic projects.  Only two days after announcing the first inter-Korean summit, Premier Hong 
went on record to support the talks: “Our people… fully support and concur with the North-
South agreement reached on 8th April on holding highest-level talks between the two sides.  
They are also filled with the burning determination to expeditiously realize the fatherly leader's 
behest for the fatherland's reunification.”74  
 During the summit, Kim Jong Il openly admitted to Kim Dae Jung that the party objected 
to the inter-Korean negotiations.  Party Secretary Kim Yong-sun told South Korean President 
Kim Dae Jung that the U.S. military must remove all its troops from the peninsula.  Kim Jong Il 
interrupted, “What problem would there be if the U.S. military remained?” Kim Yong-sun began 
presenting the party line, and Kim Jong Il replied, “Secretary Yong-sun, stop that.  Even though I 
try to do something, people under me oppose it like this.”75   
 This incident could have been staged.  However, North Korea’s highest-level defector has 
described Kim as one who often publicly castigates senior officials on a whim.76  Political 
psychologists note he is prone to impulsive remarks and stands.77  In short, it is also possible that 
this display actually reflected different bureaucratic positions within the state that Kim seeks to 
control.  Indeed, public debate in the North Korean media after the summit and a joint 
announcement of a dramatically new inter-Korean policy further suggest Kim’s statement 
reflects the political reality in Pyongyang rather than an effort to deceive international observers.   
Diplomatic progress between the two Koreas spilled over into U.S.-DPRK relations.  
Clinton Administration officials announced the same day that the U.S. would drop a broad array 
of sanctions against North Korea and leave open the possibility or removing the DPRK from the 
terrorist list.78  Two days later Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced a newly-
scheduled trip to South Korea and China the following week, explicitly noting her intention to 
build on recent momentum to reach an agreement with North Korea to halt its missile launches.79  
North Korea too responded quickly, announcing its suspension of missile launches during 
Albright’s trip to the region.  The United States pledged to reopen missile talks with North Korea 
on the development and proliferation of long-range missiles.80   
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 The 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War came and passed on June 25.  North 
Korea cancelled its annual celebration of the anniversary, while Kim Dae Jung controversially 
scaled back the remembrance and used the holiday to highlight the importance of promoting 
inter-Korean peace.81 By the end of the summer, the two states reached tentative agreements on 
family reunions, opening liaison offices, establishing military-to-military communications (e.g., 
hotlines), economic cooperation, and rail and road connections across the DMZ.82  North Korea 
joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July and sent its Foreign Minister to the ARF 
meeting.  By August, Pyongyang held a ten-day meeting for the leaders of each of South Korea’s 
major newspapers, broadcast stations, and newswire.  South Korea repatriated 63 North Korean 
spies serving prison sentences in the South, and Kim Jong Il’s aide, Kim Yong-sun, visited Seoul 
to reaffirm inter-Korean economic projects.  The cabinet’s agenda was on a roll, and the party 
and military grew marginalized for the time being.   
 U.S.-North Korean negotiations proceeded apace on the missile issue.  Russian President 
Vladimir Putin announced that Kim Jong Il had voiced support for a deal that would allow 
foreign governments to launch satellites on North Korea’s behalf.  Such a deal would permit 
North Korea to maintain and advance its rudimentary satellite presence and the accompanying 
economic benefits without worrying the region and the U.S. about its missile capability.  The 
North Koreans replied that this offer was said in jest, raising questions whether the offer was 
miscommunicated or later rescinded due to Kim’s rethinking the idea or internal deliberations.83   
During this period, missiles and nuclear developments dominated the U.S. agenda for 
negotiating with the North.  Based on interviews with senior North Korean officials and direct 
experience with the American deliberators, Bob Carlin and John Lewis concluded that 
bureaucratic politics helped explain Pyongyang’s reaction to U.S. efforts: 
“In some cases, the United States faced perplexing DPRK demands or delays, which 
were often connected to turf battles within the DPRK.  For issues on which the DPRK 
Foreign Ministry had the lead—and that meant virtually anything directly connected with 
the Agreed Framework—the Americans could usually arrange meetings with minimal 
difficulty.  Issues outside the clear purview of the Agreed Framework, by contrast, raised 
problems because they engaged competing bureaucracies within the DPRK hierarchy.  As 
noted above, the missile talks were difficult for many years because the Foreign Ministry 
could not make a convincing case that this subject was a significant foreign policy issue 
for the ministry rather than purely (or mostly) a subject that fell to those elements in the 
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Workers party and the military involved with the production and sale of missiles.  In this 
instance, moreover, the Foreign Ministry had an even more difficult case to make, not 
least because the United States did not act if it were seriously concerned about the issue, 
and which it did not begin to do until 1999.  Before that, the talks never had a chance to 
develop a momentum of their own or move beyond mere repetition of the U.S. position. 
Repetition of talking points, not surprisingly, was never sufficient to put the message 
through to the right places in the DPRK leadership on a priority basis.”84 
By October 2000, President Clinton’s time in office was short.  His Administration 
rushed to make progress on the missile issue.  With less than three months left in office, 
President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen met in Washington with North Korea’s second-highest ranking official, Vice Marshal 
Cho Myong-rok.  The North sent a uniformed official but one representing the state; Cho carried 
a letter from Kim Jong Il.  Both sides signed an agreement to "improve fundamentally their 
bilateral relations.... The two sides agreed to work together to develop mutually beneficial 
economic cooperation and exchanges to explore the possibilities for trade and commerce... To 
further the efforts to build new relations, the DPRK informed the U.S. that it will not launch 
long-range missiles of any kind while talks on the missile issue continue." And "It was agreed 
that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will visit the D.P.R.K. in the near future... and to 
prepare for a possible visit by the President of the United States.”85 
 Later that month, Secretary of State Albright visited Pyongyang.  Both governments 
labeled the trip productive, but high-level commitment to improved relations soured as technical 
discussions the following month yielded no results.86  Citing the on-going Supreme Court battle 
in late 2000 over who won the U.S. presidency, President Clinton decided to forego a U.S.-
DPRK Summit and left the missile issue to his successor.   
 In 2001 North Korea’s movement on the missile issue and inter-Korean reconciliation 
again became more disjointed.  Pyongyang adjusted its policy towards the U.S. considerably as 
the incoming Bush Administration defined a new approach.  Pyongyang reacted in predictable 
ways as the cabinet’s continued advocacy for a negotiated solution became more difficult to 
sustain.  Party and military positions on U.S. policy began winning out internally.  They 
effectively argued that the U.S. sought to “suffocate” North Korea and foster rapid regime 
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change.  Nevertheless, the state showed its ability to pursue distinct policy lines on U.S. policy, 
reunification, and economic management.  The cabinet shifted to merely limit the party and 
military’s agenda on U.S. policy and focused on maintaining its momentum in inter-Korean 
relations and market-based economic construction.   
Conclusion 
 The first 27 months after North Korea’s September 1998 constitutional revision saw 
tremendous institutional jostling for bureaucratic supremacy and agenda control.  The party tried 
to treat the military and cabinet as its subordinates, directing policy out of an ideologically-
guided lens, and the military and cabinet resisted this power grab.  The constitutional revision 
formally made them peer institutions and diluted the party’s ability to dictate to the others.  The 
military and cabinet’s fighting back against the party’s assertion of continued dominance 
reflected inter-institutional jostling over specific policy questions.  Institutions advocated and 
even implemented policy preferences in contradiction to one another.   
Although central arbitration between institutional policy positions remains hidden from 
view, policy was markedly uncoordinated in the early months after the announcement of this 
new constitutional arrangement.  The three institutions simultaneously implemented 
contradictory policies.  These contradictions led thoughtful contemporary observers to note this 
posed a theoretical puzzle for the monolithic interpretations of the North Korean state.  If policy 
was defined at the top, how did one explain the fundamental contradictions pursued 
simultaneously in North Korean policy?  The post-totalitarian institutionalism model helps 
explain this puzzle.   
The party, military, and cabinet held distinct policy outlooks on a broad array of strategic 
policy questions.  They debated policy in the controlled media and advanced institutionally 
consistent policy platforms.  National policy varied as central authorities selected between one of 
the policy options presented from below.  Policy innovation did not originate from the “nerve 
center.”  In every major case, policy was first proposed by one of the state’s institutional organs.  
The range of policy alternatives is more restrained and predictable than previously analyses have 
allowed.  Kim may be impulsive, but a close reader of the North Korean press can delineate the 
type and scope of North Korea’s policy responses to external events.   
This chapter demonstrates not only distinct institutional views and advocacy, but the 
critical role of these institutions to define the agenda.  Though Kim and his central leadership is 
not bound by these options, they have generally selected from a range of ideas presented and 
debated between these institutions.  The North Korean system is more inclusive of a wider group 
of elite opinion and pluralistic than previous characterizations allow.  Institutional debates are 
prevalent and observable and provide the contemporary analyst charged with predicting North 
Korean actions an opportunity to critically narrow the body of possible actions by looking at 
those being seriously discussed within the regime.  As will be discussed later in this study, 
recognizing the drivers of North Korean strategic decision-making further reduces the 
uncertainty laden in any effort to predict a state’s meaningful actions.    
The following chapter evaluates a distinct time period after North Koreans generally 




confirm or deny the empirical validity of this new model’s theoretical expectations.  The 
following chapter shows how institutional positions remained constant, but central authorities 
responded to the new U.S. policy with a confrontational policy.  However, the state also 
compartmented its U.S. policy from inter-Korean and economic marketization efforts.  In short, 
North Korea continues its pattern as a post-totalitarian institutional state beyond the timeframe 




Chapter 6: Segmenting Policy and Issue Linkages, 2001-2006 
Introduction 
 From 2001 – 2006 North Korea continued to react to its external environment.  The three 
major bureaucracies maintained their general policy frameworks, and the state pursued a 
moderately varying policy.  This period demonstrates how Pyongyang can segment different 
aspects of its policy.  Each institution advocated a comprehensive platform, but each could only 
pursue part of its agenda at a given time.  During this time, institutions tried to extend policy 
wins in one area by arguing that other issues were closely related and therefore should be linked 
to the original policy question.  The most significant instance of this linkage strategy was found 
in U.S. policy.  With the downturn in U.S.-DPRK relations, the party and military enjoyed 
greater freedom in this area and repeatedly attempted to link the U.S. with South Korea and 
marketization efforts to stem the cabinet’s agenda in those areas as well.  The linkage strategy 
failed as Washington and Seoul diverged significantly on North Korea policy, and Pyongyang’s 
central leadership pursued distinct policies towards the two allies.   Though the party and 
military cited contemporary examples of what they termed the U.S.’s “hostile policy” to put 
U.S.-DPRK diplomatic progress on hold, central leadership still accepted the cabinet’s advocacy 
to advance inter-Korean projects and marketization efforts at the same time, demonstrating how 
Pyongyang can separate issue areas.   
The Bush Administration reviewed Washington’s North Korea policy in the first few 
months after inauguration.  During this period, the North Korean bureaucracy debated its future 
direction towards the United States, but the state deferred major changes until the end of 
Washington’s policy review.  The policy review concluded in the summer of 2001 that 
engagement was the only option but before it could be implemented, terrorists struck the United 
States on September 11, 2001.  Washington’s focus changed to fighting terrorists and state 
sponsors of terrorism.  Citing statements by high-level officials, including the 2002 “Axis of 
Evil” State of the Union Address, party and military officials argued that North Korea too may 
be targeted for regime change operations.  By late 2002, U.S.-DPRK relations hit a low point as 
Pyongyang concluded that the U.S. “abrogated” the Agreed Framework.  Party and military calls 
to scrap the Agreed Framework won out as the state reversed course, ending its eight-year 
nuclear freeze of the Yongbyon nuclear complex and moving to withdraw from the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.   
The U.S.-DPRK relationship was only one of the three major issues at play during this 
period, and inter-Korean relations and marketization efforts proceeded on a different track.  
Inter-Korean relations generally improved as the liberal South Korean Presidents Kim Dae Jung 
(1998-2003) and Roh Moon-hyun (2003-2008) prioritized inter-Korean engagement where the 
previous conservative governments in Seoul had pursued tougher lines.  The North Korean 
cabinet likewise pushed an agenda of inter-Korean rapprochement.  Party and military actors 
tried to undermine inter-Korean projects by linking Seoul to Washington, now seen in 
Pyongyang as especially hostile.  The bureaucratic tactic had some limited success but central 
authorities seemed to recognize the stark differences between Seoul and Washington’s policies.   
North Korea’s marketization also progressed during this period.  The cabinet actively 




reforms.  The party objected to these “capitalist” impulses on ideological grounds, and military 
officials openly worried about foreign ideas seeping across the border as trade intensified.  
Defectors and spies could penetrate the state more easily, they argued in the press.  Though the 
state has implemented several market reforms, it has not yet shown a deep, irreversible 
commitment towards reforming its economy, mirroring the debating positions of institutional 
opponents.1   
Internal debate continued in the press on all three issue areas, and central authorities 
selected from the universe of policy options presented from below.  These discussions took place 
prior to policy decisions.  Though the internal social and economic situation along with South 
Korean and Chinese aid decisions seemed to drive central authorities’ decisions on 
marketization, Pyongyang again demonstrated a reactive orientation in its U.S. policy and inter-
Korean efforts.  North Korea’s institutions presented distinct policy lines, but the external 
environment pushed central authorities towards one institution’s policy advocacy over another’s.       
Towards Economic Reforms 
 Pyongyang debated and made preparatory moves toward marketization during the U.S. 
policy review, but it refrained from announcing any major changes.  As President Bush was 
sworn in to office in 2001, Kim Jong Il made a major trip to Southern China.  The trip was 
noteworthy as it provides rare insight into how Kim arbitrates between competing interests 
below him.  Kim took an unusually large and diverse delegation on this long trip to China’s 
financial centers and Special Economic Zones.  In Kim’s rare trips abroad, he usually takes only 
a few senior Foreign Ministry and party officials.  This time, however, he took multiple senior 
members of the party, military, and cabinet organizations.  He brought all the major players 
needed to establish a coherent, long-range economic policy for the state.  The state moved 
significantly towards marketization plans, but it did not implement these changes while relations 
with the U.S. remained in limbo.  Full realization of economic opening required improved 
relations with the United States to provide security amid opening.   
The delegation visited cities that had developed rapidly since 1985 under China’s 
relatively open economic arrangement for these areas.  The most important stop was China’s 
main financial center, Shanghai.  Kim Jong Il last visited Shanghai in 1983 when its level of 
development was roughly akin to Pyongyang’s.  Kim was reportedly shocked at the differences 
between Pyongyang and Shanghai when he returned in 2001 despite being briefed prior to this 
trip.2  North Korea’s press coolly noted that “Comrade Kim Jong Il expressed his opinions on 
visiting Shanghai, which has changed beyond the imagination of the world's people in a short 
period of time.”  Privately, he reportedly exploded in anger, harshly scolding the Party Secretary 
in charge of reunification, Kim Yong-sun, upon seeing how far Shanghai had eclipsed 
Pyongyang.  Memoirs of those close to Kim report that he is subject to fits of rage and his 
uncontrollable screaming can “shake the windows.”3  His screaming was so loud that foreigners 
could hear his words through a door.  The Dear Leader blamed the KWP Secretary for 
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Pyongyang’s insufficient development – when every major institutional actor had representatives 
in the room.  He seemed to blame the party’s economic model for the state’s lack of 
development; the state soon thereafter departed in some substantial ways from this economic 
model.    
 Despite this scolding, the North Korean media reported that the Premier of the Chinese 
State Council Zhu Rongji allegedly congratulated the Korean Workers Party on its “correct 
leadership” that had “reaped big achievements in all sectors.”  Kim Jong Il replied publicly, 
however, that Shanghai “carried the sublime ideal… demonstrating pride on the land of China.”  
He lauded China’s “cataclysmic change,” approving of Shanghai’s specific development path 
that incorporated substantial marketization and Special Economic Zones.4  China and North 
Korea have long had a tenuous relationship as North Korea has attempted to assert its sovereign 
place as an equal while concerned that China treats it as a younger brother.5  It would not be an 
easy decision for a North Korean leader – especially if he was primarily committed to a 
nationalist ideology – to follow China’s lead, but within a few months, Kim empowered the 
cabinet to take a different approach to economic development that shared some early steps as 
China’s path.   
The party minimized Kim’s statements.  The institution touched off a debate after Kim’s 
decision.  It did not simply accept the supreme leader’s pronouncement, and the cabinet still had 
to engage the party to pursue its economic agenda that Kim authorized.  Again, this resistance 
shows the relative autonomy of North Korean institutions in advancing the organization’s 
interests.  The fact that the party would cautiously dispute the wisdom of Kim’s pronouncement 
is more significant than the substance of their argument.   
The party argued that socialism improved the state’s material condition in face of distinct 
crises that China never faced.  China’s experience simply was not particularly relevant.  The 
party tapped into the anti-Chinese, Korean nationalist sentiment by presenting the party’s goals 
as a moral imperative that should be judged by historical, not short-term, standards.  The party’s 
achievements were more comprehensive than a narrow reading of the economy; viewing all three 
issue areas together, the party argued, it has created a dignified, Korean system in line with 
revolutionary principles:  “[Chinese] General Secretary Comrade Jiang Zemin expressed 
satisfaction with the fact that the DPRK people have overcome manifold difficulties and 
achieved significant developments and new achievements in many sectors, including economic 
construction, North-South reunification, and foreign relations under the leadership of the DPRK's 
Workers Party... our people regard living and carrying out the revolution under a superior 
socialist system by upholding the great leader and under the party's strong leadership, as the 
utmost dignity and pride.   They are also overflowing with the firm determination to advance 
toward the independent road, the socialist road, which they selected to the end.”6  The party 
noted how it is involved in all three strategic issue areas, pushing North Korea’s specific, 
“superior” variety of socialism.  They are claiming that their position exemplifies what it means 
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to be Korean and for which Koreans have struggled for centuries.  Koreans are not Chinese, and 
the party will defend the Korean way.   
 The cabinet’s economic journal shot back with its own spin on socialist ideology, 
nationalism, and the party’s proper role.  The cabinet criticized the party’s position as focused 
only on the short-term morality of individual actions without recognizing the downstream 
consequences of building a socialist utopia.  Through promoting “actual profits,” the DPRK 
could return to the socialist paradise and civilized life in line with its revolutionary principles:  
“We are accelerating the construction of a powerful state while highly displaying superiority of 
socialism in all fields of revolution and construction.  However, this is not merely intended to 
overcome impending economic difficulties but to turn our nation into a paradise of people where 
people would enjoy a better wealthy life.  For us to resolve the problems on life including the 
food problem and to make a breakthrough in building an economic power, we should thoroughly 
discard shortsighted work attitude and work style in overall economic works. It is particularly 
important to ensure actual profits.”  These two institutions offer competing ideas of moral action 
and taking pride in Korea’s specific path.  The party focuses on the road – the individual action – 
to determine its morality while the cabinet injects the consequences of actions into the decision-
making calculus.   
The cabinet publication instructs workers on how to produce agricultural products “in the 
Juche method” albeit according to foreign prices and “investment effectiveness.”  The cabinet 
tried to stretch the flexible Juche ideology to justify its policies, but the argument was tenuous.  
Economic data tended to favor the cabinet’s position; marketization proved more economically 
beneficial in contemporary North Korea than the party’s socialist push. However, the party’s 
advocacy enjoyed an ideological advantage; it simply represented the socialist principles more 
simply and clearly.  Though neither side conceded either the empirical or the ideational debate 
completely, this did reinforce generally an ideology versus pragmatism back-and-forth.   
As part of its refusal to cede the anti-Chinese, nationalist position to the party, the cabinet 
portrayed marketization efforts – even if it had parallels in China – as “Korean-style socialism.” 
It did not cite the Chinese experience as justification for its policies, rather this was used to 
discredit the moves internally.  Nevertheless, the cabinet remained on the defense on these 
questions, as their party and military critics drew comparative parallels to China and Eastern 
Europe.  The Eastern European example was used more often by marketization’s internal critics; 
the cabinet’s position risked unraveling the socialist system and collapsing the state.  For North 
Korean elites, this was used as something to be avoided.   
Kim’s authorizing the cabinet’s economic position based at least in part on his 
observations in Southern China indicates a degree of pragmatism in his decision-making.  He 
essentially worked as an unwitting comparativist, viewing the outcomes of China’s distinct 
policy path with some envy.  Ideological and nationalist arguments about the morality of the 
decision itself or the “Korean-ness” of the policy failed to dissuade a policy change.  Likewise, 
party contentions that the cabinet effectively cited a spurious correlation between marketization 
and development failed to persuade central authorities.  The tremendous differences that had 
grown between Shanghai and Pyongyang seemed to push the state to develop significant 
economic changes similar to some early moves by Deng’s China that Pyongyang would 




 The cabinet won this policy battle, but it did not stop the party from resisting the 
cabinet’s authority.  Within a month, an article in the government’s newspaper appeared, 
demanding that the cabinet follow the “party’s policy-level guidance… in this year’s socialist 
economic construction.”7  The cabinet ignored the demand and pursued its economic agenda as 
the state’s decided policy line.  Indeed, it increasingly seemed that real power of the economy lay 
with the cabinet.  Foreign business and government officials treated the cabinet as the key 
economic policy bureaucracy.  Premier Hong met with the Russian Railways Minister Nikolay 
Aksenenko to discuss a possible, highly lucrative project to connect South Korean and Japanese 
markets to Europe via North Korea and the Trans-Siberian railway.  He did not meet with party 
or military representatives.8  Likewise, several European Ambassadors to the DPRK have noted 
that their official business, most notably including economic cooperation efforts, flow almost 
exclusively through the cabinet bureaucracy.  The party is not interested in meeting with them to 
discuss projects that require some degree of opening.9  The cabinet had an increased role in 
economic affairs, but it still would take several months for Pyongyang to decide on its specific 
course of action.  By the end of 2001, central authorities reportedly decided to inject more 
market mechanisms into the North Korean economy and started to implement these changes on 
July 1, 2002.   
Issue Linkages: Inter-Korean and U.S. Policy   
Pyongyang’s inter-Korean policy remained ill defined during this period as the state 
considered whether to segment warming inter-Korean relations from cooling DPRK-U.S. 
relations.  Party officials objected to negotiating with South Korea as an affront to the state’s 
dignity.  The party could only support inter-Korean talks if the South met all of the North’s core 
demands before negotiations began.10  The party again showed that it did not measure success or 
failure based on pragmatic metrics but on the morality of the act itself; the party tried to 
monopolize the moral discourse, citing its role as the authoritative interpreters of Juche.  
Predictably, the cabinet refuted the party by citing the need for continued inter-Korean projects 
for economic advancement.     
 South Korean President Kim Dae Jung prioritized inter-Korean cooperation and planned 
a trip to Washington to convince the new administration to follow his lead.  The dynamic Kim 
was reportedly convinced he could get Washington on board, allowing inter-Korean policy to 
transform North Korean society, economics, and eventually, politics.  By most accounts, the 
March 2001 summit was a disaster.11  The South Korean media speculated widely that if 
Washington moved away from the Agreed Framework, it may kill Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine 
Policy.”  The South Korean president would have a difficult time convincing his divided political 
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landscape to continue to follow the Sunshine path.12  As it would turn out, Pyongyang’s reaction 
to the summit was a greater concern than South Korean internal politics.  Party commentaries 
claimed the summit demonstrated that Washington only had aggressive intent, so the KPA stood 
ready to fight another war.13  The state followed the party’s advocacy and postponed inter-
Korean ministerial meetings two weeks later.   
However, two weeks passed between the U.S.-ROK summit and Pyongyang’s 
postponement announcement.  In the interim, North Korea made several conciliatory gestures 
towards the South.  Pyongyang allowed separated families to exchange 600 letters – an important 
South Korean demand – only two days after the summit.  Furthermore, North Korea sent an 
unprecedented delegation to Seoul to express the state’s condolences at the funeral of Chung Ju-
yung, the founder of South Korea’s largest chaebol, Hyundai.  Only after two weeks of internal 
debate did North Korea take action by postponing – not canceling – scheduled inter-Korean 
ministerial meetings.  The weak response demonstrated that Pyongyang sought to register its 
displeasure but had not yet given up on engagement with Seoul or Washington.  Central 
authorities could select a middle path between different institutional positions.  Importantly, 
North Korea’s post-totalitarian institutionalism moderated state policy in both a general sense 
and in specific instances – a point taken up again in the concluding chapter.  The following 
month, the North Korean cabinet reached out to Washington.   
Cabinet Premier Hong addressed the Supreme People Assembly to present his economic 
vision and extend a foreign policy olive branch.  This is the most high-profile speech the cabinet 
Premier regularly delivers each year.  After giving the necessary accolades to the party and 
socialism, the Cabinet Premier described his dual commitment to market incentives and 
promoting “friendly” relations with the U.S.   “In keeping with the changed environment and 
conditions, the cabinet will uniquely pioneer the method of the management and operation of the 
socialist economy in our own way.   All the sectors and units of the people's economy should 
thoroughly embody the demand of the Taean work system, properly combine the state 
centralized uniform guidance with the creative ingenuity of lower units in economic 
management, and strictly apply the socialist principle of distribution so that everyone can work 
to his best ability and get paid according to the work done.”   
The Premier advocated modifying the very essence of the 1960s-era communist (Taean) 
work system with monetary incentives for individual workers; Taean specifically sought to root 
out this type of individualism.  He placed his institution’s advocacy within a specifically Korean 
context, protecting his argument against critics charging it betrayed the nation.  Future 
commentaries modified the “socialist economy in our own way” language to “our-style 
socialism” or “Korean-style socialism,” indicating again the continued importance of nationalist 
sentiment and how all institutional actors tried to tap that nationalism.  
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Hong also discussed the cabinet’s Juche foreign policy.  The cabinet interpreted this 
ideological phrase as promoting friendly relations with all countries and without mentioning 
confronting the U.S. militarily: “In the future, we will continue to implement our Juche-oriented 
foreign policy in a consistent manner, and develop friendly and cooperative relations with other 
nations so that the sovereignty of our country and the dignity of our nation shines even more.   
We will expand and develop great unity in a full-fledged manner with all countries of the world 
who are friendly to our country.”14  If Washington decided to pursue cooperative relations with 
the DPRK, the cabinet could push for reciprocal action.  The Premier’s major speech is 
noteworthy not because the regime claimed to be peace-loving, rather because it came amid 
constant party commentaries calling for confronting the imperialists and developing the state’s 
military capabilities instead of negotiating.   
 In May 2001 Kim Jong Il authoritatively announced that the jury was still out on the 
North’s strategic direction in relation to the U.S.  Institutions debated policy options for months, 
but Kim had not yet made a decision.  He pledged to a high-level EU delegation in Pyongyang 
led by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson in his position as President of the EU that North 
Korea would “wait and see” about the Bush Administration’s policy review.  The state was at a 
fork in the road; institutions defined the paths ahead in different directions, but Kim would 
ultimately decide which road to take based on his and institutional advisers’ interpretations of 
Washington’s new policy.  In the meantime, North Korea pledged a unilateral moratorium on 
launching long-range missiles until 2003 despite military objections.  Kim Dae Jung welcomed 
the announcement and said he hoped Washington would resume missile talks with Pyongyang.15  
The U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, announced Washington would resume 
negotiations with Pyongyang within a few weeks as the policy review was reaching its 
conclusion.16   
 An American scholar, Selig Harrison, traveled to Pyongyang the following month.  He 
warned that the perception a tougher line in Washington’s policy emboldened hardliners within 
the DPRK:  "What I sensed in this visit is that the hard-liners in North Korea have gotten a new 
lease on life as a result of the Bush administration.  They have put North-South progress on hold 
and I am afraid they will continue to gain strength unless the tone of the administration changes 
and the Bush administration reiterates its commitment to pursue normalization."17  Some may 
dismiss Harrison’s “sense” that hardliners were gaining as non-falsifiable interpretation of 
meetings of one engagement advocate.  However, the wider point is that Harrison’s interviews 
document differences of opinion among elites and their willingness to express differences to a 
foreigner.       
Indeed, in advance of a decision from Kim, North Korea pursued divergent policies 
simultaneously.  North Korea’s bureaucracies acted in accordance with standard operating 
procedures and contradicted one another but did not take any truly bold decisions.  The KPA 
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indicated its willingness to launch more short-range missiles – a regular occurrence – and sent its 
naval vessels south of the NLL again, prompting another clash with the South Korean navy on 
the anniversary of the Korean War’s outbreak.18  As the two Korean navies engaged each other 
in the West Sea again, the cabinet hosted a unification forum at Mt. Kumgang on North Korea’s 
east coast, celebrating the one-year anniversary of the June 15 declaration on North-South 
cooperation.  Official representatives from the two Koreas attended the forum, South Korean 
visitors continued to vacation at Mt. Kumgang, and inter-Korean trade set another new record 
high.19  However, Yongbyon remained verifiably frozen and the state refrained from test firing 
any long-range missile systems.  Central authorities waited for a critical variable to decide which 
road to take and which bureaucracies to empower.  Kim seemed to be still committed to “waiting 
and seeing” as he pledged to the EU delegation.  He would not have to wait much longer.  
Pyongyang Reacts to New U.S. Policy 
 The completed U.S. policy review concluded in late July that the U.S. should engage 
North Korea.  Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the Administration’s “strong support” 
for Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy and the U.S.’s willingness to meet the North Koreans 
anytime, anyplace without precondition.20  The announcement was good news for the cabinet, 
but the North Korean media did not sound off in response.  It only repeated standard calls for the 
U.S. to remove all troops from the Korean peninsula and reiterated the party’s “principled stand” 
against the U.S.21  After waiting for months for the result of this policy review and debating 
courses of action, one would expect a robust response in short order, but Pyongyang’s 
bureaucracies did not reply for weeks.   
Kim Jong Il was on a long trip when Powell announced the result of the policy review.  
Kim was en route to Moscow via the Trans-Siberian railroad.22  It is unclear if no one left in 
Pyongyang had authority to present a new view on the American proposal in the North Korean 
media or that doing so would have little utility with the main decision-maker away for the next 
month.  Only upon his return did the bureaucracies begin presenting their contradictory views on 
the policy review in the official press.  This seemed to suggest at the very least that Kim’s train 
contained the core audience of the institutional debate.  However, before Pyongyang reached 
conclusion on the U.S. policy review, new instructions coming out of Kim’s trip to Russia 
intervened to change the emphasis of debate.   
Upon Kim’s return from his summit meetings with the Russian president, all media 
outlets ran several editorials lambasting the U.S. pursuit of missile defense and the U.S. 
“exaggeration” of North Korea’s missile threat.  This was certainly not the first time Pyongyang 
objected to U.S. missile defense plans, but it was a notable increase.   Putin sought North Korean 
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assistance on missile defense for over a year.  North Korean missile launches strengthened 
Washington’s arguments in favor of deploying the high-tech defense despite Russian and others’ 
objections.  The North Korean Broadcast Station even read a translated Russian newspaper 
article on the air that rejected U.S. pressure on North Korea as an excuse to create a missile 
threat to justify missile defense.  North Korea also focused its speech at the UN General 
Assembly that month on denouncing missile defense and the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as creating a new nuclear arms race.23   
Kim’s Moscow trip helped the cabinet’s position.  Presumably, this highly unusual spike 
in missile defense discussions stemmed from Kim’s personal instructions after his summit 
meetings with Putin.  This incident demonstrates how Kim can get information from sources 
other than his own regime and act on it.  Such sources of information are notable and significant 
but not regular.  For the purposes of this study, the military’s resistance to Kim’s position is the 
most significant point.  Flight tests provide the military with technical information to develop 
their missile systems, but they also undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts.  In this case, the 
Russians likely opposed North Korean flight tests and convinced Kim to maintain his flight test 
moratorium.  The cabinet did not need to convince Kim Jong Il and did not publish articles in 
support of the position at this time, but it tracks with their general policy preferences.  Still, the 
party voiced opposition to Kim’s policy.   
The party called for a principled, independent foreign policy.  The party regularly 
discussed issues with clear foreign policy implications, but it discusses them in an anti-
imperialist context.  It is rare to see the phrase “foreign relations” in a party article.  The party’s 
call for an independent foreign policy in this case, therefore, likely did not communicate a need 
to create policy independent of the U.S. (the imperialists), rather independent of some other 
country.  The party likely was calling for Pyongyang to resist Russian influence to end missile 
launches to support Russia’s anti-missile defense agenda.  The party called on the government to 
join it in asserting a principled, independent foreign policy.24  The media response suggests that 
institutional actors can and do cautiously oppose Kim’s policy guidance.  Still, neither the party 
nor the military took observable action against Kim’s policy line other than voicing dissent 
cautiously.   
Before clearly deciding on a policy course in response to the U.S. policy review, Kim 
Jong Il decided to go to China.  Kim traveled much more than normal during this period.  He 
went to China the month after his Russia trip, suggesting the leader was considering significant 
policy choices and personally consulting with the major states around him.  One day before Kim 
left for China in early September 2001, North Korea agreed to resume inter-Korean talks.  China 
had long advocated North Korea’s gradual economic opening, and Kim may have made the 
move in anticipation of Beijing’s demand.   
However, Pyongyang waited too long to reply to the U.S. policy review.  International 
events interceded to block diplomatic progress.  On September 11, 2001 terrorists attacked the 
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United States.  North Korea joined the international chorus in condemning international 
terrorism.  Already a signatory to all the other major international conventions on terrorism, the 
Foreign Ministry announced in November that the state would sign the International Convention 
for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention against Taking 
Hostages.  Washington’s focus changed substantially and results of the policy review seemed to 
be erased as the White House recrafted its foreign policy, including policy that affected North 
Korea.  Kim again stalled his U.S. policy, looking for Washington to focus on Northeast Asia.   
Inter-Korean talks continued in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks.  In 
September and early October, the two Koreas held two successful meetings.  However, after the 
U.S. invaded Afghanistan on October 7, the U.S. and South Korea placed their militaries on the 
Korean peninsula and elsewhere on alert.  The security-conscious leadership in Pyongyang 
consistently voiced concern about military exercises and alerts.  To register its objection, North 
Korea insisted that all family reunions take place only at Mt. Kumgang, North Korea, citing 
security concerns from the raised alert status.25  The October set-back would seem minor.  By 
November, inter-Korean relations hit a real snag.  The Sixth Ministerial ended without 
agreement, marking the first time such a meeting failed to make demonstrable progress since the 
June 2000 Summit.26  The Sunshine policy’s honeymoon period ended.     
The party expanded their objections to inter-Korean economic projections.  They 
modified their normal exhortation of capitalism to include a condemnation of marketization.  
Previously, the party objected to “capitalism” but refrained from criticizing “market socialism” 
and cabinet calls for “actual profits.”27  Now, the party argued markets destabilize the political 
system, and the state must return to planning the economy. “Fully promoting the superiority of 
the socialist planned economy is one of the principled issues that emerge in the process of 
executing the party's ideas for constructing a powerful socialist state... The superiority of a 
socialist planned economy over a capitalist market economy lies in its ability to guarantee the 
maximum economic gains…. In a market economy whose production is dominated by 
spontaneous and anarchical aspects due to a private ownership of the production means, it is 
unthinkable to rationally distribute the resources across the entire society.  Pursuit of profits is a 
physiology of the capitalist market economy, and exclusive competition is the capital's 
fundamental method of survival.”  In this period of heightened insecurity for North Korea, the 
party sought to reassert state control over society more firmly.   Nevertheless, the prospects of 
inter-Korean meetings improved as South Korea removed its troops from alert status.28  
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Regime Change Short List Concern Closes Ranks 
U.S.-DPRK relations deteriorated after 9/11, and Pyongyang responded to the new 
environment.  In a December 1 speech in Asia, President Bush warned Iraq and North Korea that 
they would be “held accountable” if they developed Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the 
January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address grouped Iran, Iraq, and North Korean together as an 
“Axis of Evil.”  The Foreign Ministry rejected Bush’s “slanderous remarks,” and an unattributed 
North Korean radio address focused on the U.S. military alert on the peninsula and repeated 
comments previously made by KPA officials: “We simply cannot casually overlook the violent 
remarks coming out of Bush’s mouth.”  Pyongyang appeared to be united in opposition to the 
U.S. stand.  Subsequent articles worried that U.S. regime change efforts would first concentrate 
on Iraq and move next to North Korea or Iran.    
Two weeks after the State of the Union, President Bush traveled to Seoul to meet with 
Kim Dae Jung.  Bush told reporters that he remained open to negotiations with North Korea, but 
Kim Jong Il had failed to call him.  Bush followed up by noting, “Yet I will remind the world 
that America will not allow North Korea and other dangerous regimes to threaten freedom with 
weapons of mass destruction.”29  The American president reiterated in Seoul that the U.S. had no 
intention of attacking North Korea and voiced support for the South’s Sunshine Policy.  He also 
questioned the character of his North Korean counterpart and voiced concern about human 
rights, North Korea’s forward deployed conventional forces on the DMZ, and nuclear and 
missile issues.  While Clinton administration’s goals narrowed, Bush’s goals vis-à-vis 
Pyongyang at the outset of his administration were more comprehensive.  For a political 
establishment in Pyongyang concerned about U.S. intentions to force regime change, Bush’s 
more comprehensive efforts to affect all of these issues simultaneously seemed to require a 
change at the source of each of these problems: the North Korean regime itself.   
North Korean elites of all stripes took little stock in American assurance that it had no 
intention of invading.  KCNA cited Bush’s “slander[ing] its political system” to sharply reject 
the American offer to negotiate under these circumstances.30  Party commentaries increasingly 
commented on individual foreign policy issues as the Foreign Ministry remained silent.  Party 
commentaries cited U.S. officials’ remarks in the following weeks – including issues as diverse 
as NPT commitments, nuclear weapons developments, human rights and religious freedom 
stances, and continued missile defense cooperation with Japan – as further evidence that the U.S. 
planned to “suffocate” and then invade the North.31  The party spoke out against the Pentagon’s 
unveiling a new nuclear policy document that recommended developing a nuclear weapon to 
target North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.   
Despite the party’s objection, the Foreign Ministry kept its meetings two days later in 
New York with U.S. negotiators.  The New York talks did not immediately yield a commitment 
                                                           
29 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Bush on Way to Asia, After Repeating Demand on North Korea,” New York Times,     
February 17, 2002, p. A18.  
30 “N. Korea Repeats Attacks on US,” Korea Times, February 25, 2002. “North Korea Rejects Talks,” New York 
Times, February 25, 2002, p. A4.  
31 "Mean Hidden Intent That Criticizes Our Nuclear Issue,” Nodong Sinmun, February 4, 2002.  "Why Is the United 
States Beating on the Worn-Out Drum of Human Rights Again?" KCBS, February 10, 2002.  Kim Nam-hyok, 




for higher level negotiations, but Pyongyang agreed to continue monthly technical meetings 
related to building the Light Water Reactor promised under the Agreed Framework.32 However, 
four days later President Bush delivered another address during his five-day trip to Asia.  The 
Foreign Ministry seized on his idea that the North Korean political system must “change” as 
reiterating a U.S. regime change policy and noting that the state was “single heartedly united” 
against this policy.  Faced with a perceived threat to the regime’s very existence, the cabinet had 
little room to maneuver on U.S. policy and refocused its energies on inter-Korean and economic 
policy.33   
The North Korean bureaucracies coalesced in opposition to engaging Washington for the 
time being.  A party commentary indicated that “The DPRK can never pardon Bush for 
unhesitatingly slinging mud at the supreme headquarters of the DPRK and even calling for a 
‘change’ in its people-centered political system, most dignified and independent, where the 
leader, the party and the masses form a harmonious whole.  His outbursts once again betrayed his 
true colors… The DPRK will not sit any longer with the Bush group keen on inventing pretexts 
for invasion in a bid to change the political system in the DPRK.”34  Faced with a perceived 
threat to its existence, elites closed ranks.   
More significantly, the cabinet released a rare paper severely criticizing the U.S. and 
calling the U.S., Japan, and Israel its own “Axis of Evil.”  The cabinet paper concluded that “the 
strained situation this month” required a rebuke, but the time element also left open the 
possibility of near term reversal.35  Reversing the U.S. regime change policy – namely, 
recognizing the DPRK’s right to exist –became a new prerequisite to resumed dialogue.  The 
government emphasized that the DPRK was not boycotting talks, rather it blamed the U.S. for 
stifling genuine dialogue.  “Dialogue is intended to discuss problems candidly and frankly 
between the two parties with equal qualifications through a meeting and to seek ways for a 
solution to the problem.  However, in a situation that one side hurts the feelings of the other 
without hesitation and furthermore, one side does not recognize the other, how can dialogue be 
held?... We cannot concede our ideology and system being pressed by the United States nor can 
we renounce the revolutionary principle.”36 The cabinet concluded in a call to reject the regime 
change policy and return to negotiations on their terms, “Dreaming a silly dream is worse than 
not dreaming anything, and the faster one comes out of a dream, the better.”37  The cabinet took 
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a tougher line with Washington than previously but did not make particularly unrealistic 
demands at this point like the military and party.   
The U.S. responded.  Vice President Dick Cheney reiterated the Axis of Evil remarks, 
drawing predictable criticism by party organs.  The U.S. announced it had developed new 
tactical nuclear weapons for targeting seven countries, including North Korea and its 
underground military facilities.  The cabinet’s efforts to reengage Washington failed.  The 
Foreign Ministry responded by announcing its own “comprehensive review” of the Agreed 
Framework.  The institution said the review was warranted, since the new U.S. policy threatened 
the existence of the state.  Pyongyang should study option to respond.38  This effectively silenced 
moderates in the regime seeking a negotiated solution to outstanding differences.  Kim did not 
need to mediate between competing interests.  By 2002, the state was united in opposition to 
engaging the U.S. for the time being.  Institutions focused their debates instead on economics 
and inter-Korean policy.    
Linking and Delinking Issue Areas 
With its foreign policy agenda stifled, the cabinet put its energies into its economic 
agenda.  The government’s quarterly economic journal argued for the need to “achieve 
informatization in all sectors of the people's economy” most notably in planning itself.  The 
article called for (1) increased use of Information Technology and (2) rational information to 
guide decisions.  The journal’s emphasized a need for data that was “characteristically different” 
than the previous mode of purely ideological policy inputs.39  The role of economic technocrats 
was on the rise as the role of party ideologues eroded.   
Government and party organs debated whether markets were compatible with a socialist 
system.  The government held that markets are not anti-socialist.  It outlined a history of the term 
“market” and argued that they were essential to a socialist economy.  The government document 
distinguished between socialist markets and capitalist markets, desperately trying to avoid the 
pejorative label “capitalist.” The government journal argued, “properly resolving the issue of 
markets – a realm where products are circulated through the commodity-money relation – is an 
essential demand for more properly satisfying the residents' demands and for stepping up the 
socialist economic construction….  What has been elucidated anew in the Juche-oriented theory 
regarding the socialist domestic market for the circulation of production means is, above all, that 
the essential difference between the socialist domestic market and the capitalist market has been 
disclosed from a completely new perspective by fully clarifying the socialist market 
characteristics as an organized market with a unique theory concerning the characteristic of the 
commodity-money relation in the socialist society.”40  Through Korean uniqueness, the power of 
Juche allowed the state to incorporated markets into socialism.    
The party responded by repeating its claim that markets are capitalist – period.  They 
should be opposed by all good socialists.  The party’s piece repeated the phrase “capitalist 
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market economy” 27 times and concluded that “progressive people… should entertain absolutely 
no kind of fantasy about the capitalist market economy,” referring to their government 
counterparts advocating increased marketization.41  Party commentaries also warned against the 
abuse of Information Technology.  Markets, combined with IT, produces “casino capitalism” and 
dangerous financial speculation.  Further, trade brings increased international communications 
and increased risks of drug trafficking, mafias, globalization, and the “criminal gang [which] 
discuss actions to be taken via e-mail or ‘on-line conferences.’” Increased information flow 
meant a “world without borders and guards,” here infused with a negative connotation.42  While 
the cabinet noted the benefits of marketization and increased international trade, the party 
focused on the possible drawbacks.   
The debate extended into the education sector.  After Kim Jong Il ordered economic 
training at universities should reflect “developing realities” instead of ideology, the party 
resisted, publishing a commentary that interpreted this guidance to “foster students to be 
revolutionaries and patriots before being intellectuals under the guidance of party 
organizations… [while] at the same time… strengthened the training on practical techniques and 
skills.”43  The party downplayed the disparity between teaching ideologically-correct economics 
and empirically-grounded economic theories.  The party continued to assert that functionaries 
should be subordinate to the party’s ideological guidance and opposed efforts that enhanced the 
training of the next generation with a less ideological bent.    
By mid-April 2002, ten weeks prior to the July 1 reform measure, there were no 
observable signs that the economic debate was going anywhere.  However, with the North 
Korean uproar over the latest U.S.-South Korean military exercises quelled, North-South 
contacts resumed.  The party stressed that the resumption of North-South dialogue was in spite 
of, rather than because of, U.S. pressure.44 Red Cross representatives from the two Koreas agreed 
to restart family reunions and announced that the two sides agreed to "fully restore inter-Korean 
relations."45 The party newspaper ran a commentary noting Kim Jong Il supported inter-Korean 
reconciliation through dialogue.  However, the same article criticized the main conduit of South 
Korea’s efforts to negotiate, the Ministry of Unification, and concluded by refocusing 
reunification efforts through militaristic terms.46  The party had to recognize Kim Jong Il’s 
decision but also resisted its implementation.   
The KPA again managed to disrupt inter-Korean contacts by provoking another naval 
clash.  Inter-Korean naval clashes are fairly regular events.  By June, the KPA Navy crossed the 
disputed maritime border between the two Koreas ten times, mirroring a similar number the 
previous year.  However, this time the two Koreas exchange fired and the North sank a South 
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Korean patrol boat, killing five South Korean sailors.47  A Spokesman of the KPA’s Naval 
Command stated the South Korean Navy perpetrated a “grave act of military provocation.”  The 
KPA navy blamed South Korea squarely.48  Three days later, the North Korean media decidedly 
shifted blame for the incident from the South Korean military to the U.S.  The unattributed 
television broadcast surmised that U.S. military surveillance must have detected the pending 
clash and aggravated the situation to undermine North-South reconciliation efforts.  The KPA 
issued another statement, along with a party commentary, blaming both the U.S. and South 
Korea for the clash.49  The military and party again sought to link the U.S. to South Korea in 
internal debates.   
Seoul placed its military on high alert and called North Korea’s actions a violation of the 
armistice; the North claimed South Korean patrol boats operated in North Korean waters and the 
South Koreans fired first.  The incident roiled the South Korean political establishment, but the 
public largely did not take notice as the country was in the middle of hosting the World Cup.  
Meanwhile, Pyongyang warmly congratulated the South on its World Cup victories within days 
of the deadly clash, leading some to call the confluence of events perplexing while others 
suggested that different North Korean actors may have pursued different policy lines 
simultaneously.50   
 South Korea hardened its rules of naval engagement and increased military surveillance 
with the United States.  The U.S. cited the naval clash as reason to cancel the following week’s 
scheduled bilateral talks.  Three weeks later, Pyongyang sent Seoul a letter expressing rare regret 
for the naval incident.  South Korea accepted the North Korean apology while the KPA 
continued to reject the validity of the NLL and threatened more clashes in the Yellow (West) 
Sea.  The party newspaper wrote, “The North-South dialogue has been suspended and North-
South relations are also headed for a dangerous situation of confrontation and war.”  The day 
before the U.S. and North Korean military representatives met, the party ran another article 
calling the NLL an “illegal, unjust bogus line,” and that “we cannot prevent the danger of 
military clash in the West Sea.”51 
With these seemingly conflicting signals and no definitive inter-institutional resolution, 
Washington attempted to engage.  Secretary of State Colin Powell said he was “not ruling out” 
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the possibility of meeting with North Korea’s Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun at the ASEAN 
Regional Forum the following week after Pyongyang’s “very positive statements," referring to 
the apology but not the following provocative comments.  The 15-minute informal meeting 
between Powell and Paek set the stage for the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Jim Kelley, to lead a small delegation to Pyongyang in October.52   
 Amid this activity, North Korea pursued significant economic policy change.  On July 1, 
2002 with hardly a mention in the North Korean press, the state implemented its most far-
reaching economic reforms in the period under review.  The changes rationalized the exchange 
rate, dramatically increased prices on basic goods and salaries, and granted more autonomy to 
industrial and business managers.  It helped turn money into a rational instrument of exchange, 
wiped out the value of retirees’ or black marketers’ savings, and narrowed the gap between black 
market and official exchange rates.  The moves had a decentralizing effect intended to bolster 
economic growth.  The Premier was also at the forefront of advocating the economic changes, 
and the government’s advocacy demonstrated a willingness to risk certain political costs 
associated with lessened central control in exchange for greater economic efficiency.53     
 While the move was not immediately announced in the North Korean press, the party 
continued its warnings against capitalism.  Capitalism in Eastern Europe brought regime 
downfall and pursuing profit contradicted socialist morals.54  Markets, in their view, were 
roughly synonymous with capitalism.  Characteristically, the cabinet was silent after policy 
victory.  It did not relish in its win but orchestrated a series of follow-on actions that extended 
the reforms.   
 Seoul seized the momentum, proposing more inter-Korean talks and bilateral talks 
between U.S. and North Korea.  Inter-Korean talks could not fully address the Yellow (West) 
Sea naval clashes.  The disputed maritime border stems from the 1953 armistice signed by an 
American general (as the UN Command’s representative) and a North Korean general.  South 
Korea is not a signatory to the armistice.  Consequently, U.S. and North Korean generals should 
discuss means to resolve this dispute.  Pyongyang reversed its position and agreed to the South 
Korean proposal to meet with an American military representative.  However, inter-Korean talks 
on rail and road connections stalled despite South Korea’s unilateral pledge to increase food aid 
to the North.  The North’s statement indicated that “Both sides agreed to make a proposal to their 
military."  South Korean negotiators indicated the North Korean negotiators in the cabinet did 
not have the authority to agree to road and rail connections without the KPA’s approval.55  
                                                           
52 “NK FMs ARF Move Draws Attention,” Korea Times, July 27, 2002.  “US Welcomes NK's Apology over Naval 
Clash,” Korea Times, July 27, 2002.  Karen DeYoung, “Powell May Hold Talks With N. Korean Foreign Minister; 
Welcoming Pyongyang's 'Positive Statements' and Overtures Toward South, Secretary Hints at Possible Meeting in 
Brunei,” Washington Post,   July 27, 2002, p. A14.  Alex Spillius, “Ice thaws in N Korean Meeting with Powell,” 
Daily Telegraph, August 1, 2002, p. 13.  
53 Andrew Ward, “Ageing officials ousted in N Korean reshuffle,” Financial Times, September 4, 2003, p. 4. “South 
Korean Official Notes Possible Economic Reforms in North,” Yonhap, September 5, 2003, BBC Monitoring 
International Reports.   
54 Ko Yong-hui, "What Has Return to Capitalism Brought?" Nodong Sinmun, July 13, 2002, p. 6.  
55 “Koreas to Hold Ministerial Talks; North to Participate in Pusan Asian Games,” Yonhap, August 4, 2002. 
“Positive Moves from Pyongyang,” Japan Times, August 3, 2002.  James Brooke, “Inter-Korea Talks Offer Signs of 




Pyongyang shifted course on economic policy, took modest steps to improve inter-Korean 
relations, and awaited a visit by U.S. negotiators to Pyongyang to refine its U.S. policy.   
The End of the Agreed Framework and the Second Nuclear Crisis 
By the end of August 2002, the U.S. agreed to send an American envoy to Pyongyang as 
Washington announced new sanctions against North Korea.56  The North Korean Foreign 
Ministry responded in a low-key manner – by privately asking Japanese negotiators in 
Pyongyang for normalization talks to help convince Washington to return to the table.  
Meanwhile, the party publicly and strongly denounced the new sanctions as further evidence of 
the U.S. hostile policy.   
A key driver in Washington of a more robust pressure strategy against North Korea, John 
Bolton, delivered a speech in Seoul, reemphasizing President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech and 
highlighting North Korea’s missile proliferation connections with states in the Middle East.57  
Pyongyang’s bureaucracies again reacted according to the post-totalitarian institutionalism 
model.  The party newspaper warned against an American “preemptive strike” on North Korea, 
citing OPlan 5027, while the Foreign Ministry downplayed Bolton’s remarks as “bereft of reason 
[and] therefore, his recent outbursts do not deserve even a passing note.”58  Pyongyang 
acknowledged divisions within Washington’s foreign policy establishment on North Korea 
policy, and still waited to see if the American envoy would present the Bolton pressure path or 
the Powell engagement path.   
 Pyongyang delayed any decisions on U.S. policy until after Washington’s envoy traveled 
to Pyongyang in October, yet September was especially active for inter-Korean and DPRK-Japan 
relations, highlighting how these Washington’s allies pursued bilateral relations with North 
Korea on a separate track.  Inter-Korean family unions continued, and Pyongyang announced its 
willingness to consider family reunions in South Korea once a railroad connected the two Koreas 
across the DMZ.  The defense ministers from the two Koreas agreed to clear enough landmines 
in the DMZ to connect the railroad.  Cabinet Premier Hong attended the groundbreaking 
ceremony for the railroad, but, despite the military’s critical involvement in the negotiations, 
KPA and party representatives did not attend the ceremony.59  Athletes from the two Koreas 
competed under a single flag in the Asian Games – doubly significant as the Games were hosted 
in Pusan, South Korea.  Also in September, North Korea pledged to open a Special Economic 
Zone near the Chinese border to attract foreign investment.   
The same month, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang for the 
first ever Japan-DPRK Summit.  In the resulting Pyongyang Declaration, Kim Jong Il admitted 
his country abducted 13 Japanese citizens, apologized, and pledged to extend the missile 
                                                           
56 Peter Slevin, “U.S. To Sanction North Korean Manufacturer; Penalty for Missile Parts Sales Comes as State Dept. 
Official Prepares to Visit Region,” Washington Post, August 23, 2002, p. A20.  
57 “ROK Views Under Secretary Bolton's Calls for DPRK 'To Accept' IAEA Inspections, Dialogue With US,” 
Yonhap, August 29, 2002.  “Civic Groups Protest About John Bolton's Visit Here,” Yonhap, August 28, 2002.  Ken 
Belson, “North Korea, Help Sought on U.S. Talks,” New York Times, August 27, 2002, p. A9. Don Kirk, “Senior 
U.S. Official Underscores Bush's Criticism of North Korea,” New York Times, August 29, 2002, p. A13.   
58 “U.S. State Undersecretary's Anti-DPRK Remarks Under Fire,” KCNA, August 31, 2002.  





moratorium beyond 2003 in exchange for Koizumi’s pledge to normalize relations.60  
Pyongyang’s previous long-range missile launch in 1998 rattled Japan in particular, as the 
missile overflew the country.  On each of these areas, the cabinet enjoyed significant policy 
wins.  The summit with Japan was highly significant, but Pyongyang still put Washington at the 
center of their quest for security.  The main event was the following month.  In October, the U.S. 
envoy reached Pyongyang.  
Foreign Ministry representatives hosted their American counterparts in Pyongyang.  The 
party apparently did not approve as a “special article” in the party newspaper noted Kim Jong 
Il’s guidance that the KPA supports peace.  Uncharacteristically calling the army one that is 
“struggling for peace” and highlighting a particularly defensive role, the article evolved by the 
end to reject any “slavish peace” that accommodation with the imperialists may demand.”61 This 
passage again reflected a pattern in bureaucratic resistance.  Articles must start with Kim Jong 
Il’s position if a decision has already been made, but it can spin an interpretation of that decision 
to mean something very different.  Each institution’s statements and commentaries are generally 
consistent in their final conclusions if not their originating argument.  The party emphasized 
defense and nuclearization at the very time that American negotiators were in Pyongyang to get 
the state to move in exactly the opposite direction.   
The Foreign Ministry’s talks with their American counterparts did not go well.  The U.S. 
delegation left Pyongyang a day early without substantial comment.  The Foreign Ministry 
publicly called the talks unproductive.  The U.S. delegation confronted North Korea on its 
alleged uranium enrichment program.  Two weeks later, Washington announced the North 
Korean negotiators admitted to having a uranium enrichment program – an admission one 
member of the six-person delegation called perplexing.  The “admission” became the centerpiece 
of U.S. policy, noting North Korea had admitted to cheating on the Agreed Framework and 
justified rolling back U.S. commitments to the Clinton-era agreement.62   
The Foreign Ministry announced that talks broke down as “it has become clear, through 
the special envoy's explanation that the U.S. Bush administration is continuing to pursue – 
instead of dialogue – a hardline hostile policy.”63  The Foreign Ministry’s statement cited Leon 
Sigal – a rare reference to an American in the North Korean press – whose work has recognized 
the division between hardliners and negotiators within the North Korean system.  The Foreign 
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Ministry statement said that “The United States should treat the other party based on a clear 
understanding of it,” suggesting the U.S. should recognize that North Korea had its own 
bureaucratic divisions, and the decision to pressure the North would “embolden hardliners” as 
Sigal warned.   
The Foreign Ministry continued, “Currently, the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework is 
facing the serious turning point of being nullified or not… We say this once more: the lesson the 
United States should learn is that it will have nothing to gain from the hostile DPRK policy.  
Should the United States faithfully implement the pledge it made with us and head in the 
direction of improving DPRK-U.S. relations, it will be commensurate with the U.S. people's 
interests.”64  The ambiguous “with us” can be interpreted either as an agreement with the North 
Korean state or with the Foreign Ministry personnel advocating engagement.  The statement 
indicates a type of desperation that the Foreign Ministry was on the verge of losing its 
bureaucratic battle.  As the actual negotiators, the Foreign Ministry got the first word, but the 
party and military stated their opposition to negotiations much more directly and forcefully.65  
Following the fall-out, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China all called on the U.S. to restart 
negotiations.66   
Despite the most notable set-back in U.S.-DPRK relations in almost a decade, it did not 
disrupt inter-Korean projects.  The cabinet labeled inter-Korean cooperation “astonishing” and 
argued progress should be “expedited.”67  In November the two Koreas announced a substantial 
industrial zone just north of the DMZ in the historic city of Kaesong.  The Kaesong Industrial 
Project broke ground the following year and become the centerpiece of South Korea’s 
engagement strategy with North Korea.  Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan actively pushed for 
continued KEDO oil shipments to North Korea as outlined in the Agreed Framework as the 
United States pushed to stop the oil tanker in transit to the DPRK given the recent alleged 
uranium enrichment admission.68  The U.S. diverged from its Asian allies on North Korea policy, 
and Pyongyang reacted to each state in turn.   
The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced its view of the international situation, the 
recent developments in the inter-Korean and economic issue areas, and how depressed U.S.-
DPRK relations could get back on-track.  It also clarified its stand that the United States 
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interpreter did not correctly translate Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment message, indicating 
negotiators claimed North Korea was “entitled to have nuclear weapons” rather than “had 
nuclear weapons” – a one-syllable difference in the original Korean, complicated by regional 
dialects.  The Foreign Ministry statement represented its position for the following 15 months as 
U.S.-DPRK negotiations faltered.  It is therefore worth quote as length:    
“Entering the new century, new, epoch-making changes are taking place in the Korean 
peninsula situation and the rest of the Northeast Asian region….  Bold actions have been 
taken to eradicate the old leftovers of the past, including linking the North-South railways 
that were severed over half a century ago and liquidating the past with Japan.  In line with 
the currently changed situation and our concrete situation, we have devised a series of 
new measures in economic management and back-to-back actions to boost the economy, 
including establishing a special economic region.  All of these developments in the 
situation are practical contributions to peace in Asia and the rest of the world.   Therefore, 
almost all the countries of the world, except for the United States, have supported and 
welcomed the developments, which greatly encouraged us.  Under such circumstances, 
we recently received a U.S. presidential special envoy with the hope we might be able to 
fundamentally forsake hostile relations with the United States and solve pending issues 
on an equal footing.  To our regret, however, we confirmed through the special envoy's 
visit that the Bush administration's hostile attempt to crush us by force and reverse the 
positive development of the situation on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of the 
Northeast Asian region has climaxed.  Providing no concrete evidence, the U.S. special 
envoy asserted we were violating the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework by engaging in a 
program to enrich uranium with a view to manufacturing nuclear weapons.  He said there 
would be no dialogue between the DPRK and the United States, and in particular, the 
DPRK-Japanese or North-South relations will be jeopardized unless we suspend the 
program.  We could not help being stunned by the United States' much too unilateral and 
arrogant attitude…. We clearly told the U.S. presidential special envoy that we are 
entitled to have nuclear weapons and more powerful weapons than those to safeguard our 
sovereignty and right to survive…. we, with greatest magnanimity, clarified that we were 
ready to seek a negotiated settlement of this issue on the following three conditions: first, 
if the United States recognizes our sovereignty; second, if it assures us of nonaggression; 
and third, if the United States does not hinder our economic development.  Nowadays, 
the United States and its followers assert that negotiations should be held after we put 
down our arms.  This is a very abnormal logic.  Then, how can we counter any attack 
with empty hands?  Their assertion is virtually a demand that we yield.  Yielding means 
death.”   
Concluding again with an ambiguous “we,” the Foreign Ministry said, “There may be 
negotiations or the use of deterrent force to be consistent with this basis, but we want the former, 
as far as possible.”69  
Party commentaries were less concerned with possible gains from negotiations.  They 
railed against international aid, markets, and international accommodation.70  Likewise, the KPA, 
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citing Kim Il Sung and the Korean War experience fondly, announced that the U.S. position 
amounted to a “direct challenge to the great military-first politics, which is our life and dignity, 
and the cause of national sovereignty and reunification…. the United States blocks us, imposes 
sanctions on us, and gravely impinges on our right to exist, even forcing us to dismantle our 
armament.  Historical experiences confirm that military-first politics is the wisest choice, based 
on the history of national tragedy in which the nation's sovereignty had been relentlessly abused 
by foreign powers…. in the name of the entire nation, they must strike a decisive blow on the 
United States' arrogant and rude maneuvers, which gravely threaten our nation's sovereignty, and 
more courageously wage a struggle against the U.S. imperialist forces of aggression.”71  The 
state faced a choice, and the party strongly advocated one option over the other.    
 At the same time Japan-DPRK normalization talks waned on unrelated grounds,72 and 
Japan continued to raise the nuclear issue to Pyongyang’s dismay.  North Korea’s Foreign 
Ministry responded that the “relevant organs” within the DPRK were pushing for an end to the 
missile moratorium, forcing the state to “reconsider” the moratorium.  Foreign Ministry 
statements tend to be much less redundant that party commentaries, only rarely reiterating points 
to emphasize them, but its statement concluded by reiterating and expanding upon the political 
process sentiment: “our related organizations and people are strongly calling on the DPRK 
Government to discreetly consider various issues concerning security guarantees, including the 
nuclear and missile issues, under the condition where Japan's words and actions regarding the 
DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration's implementation do not match.  In particular, our related 
sectors are even voicing the view that, should DPRK-Japan normalization talks become 
prolonged without making progress, like they did this time, the measure of extending the missile 
launch moratorium should be reconsidered.”73  The Foreign Ministry again explicitly cited 
proponents voicing distinct views that affect policy outcomes.     
By the end of November, the KPA and “other organs” used the same construction, 
pushing for the reevaluation of the missile moratorium: “now that Japan is zealously joining in 
the U.S. policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK, there is no need for the DPRK to show such 
magnanimity as maintaining moratorium on missile test fire any longer…  The right-wing 
bellicose forces of Japan should not act rashly, clearly mindful that the Korean people's army and 
organs concerned of the DPRK are increasingly assertive for the reconsideration of the 
moratorium.”74  The KPA and cabinet came down on different sides of this issue, but they agreed 
that organs within the North Korean system advocated different policy responses regarding 
Japan.   
Faced with failure in negotiations with both the U.S. and Japan, the North Korean 
Foreign Ministry took concrete steps to salvage U.S.-DPRK relations.  Instead of calling the 
Agreed Framework dead, Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju said the agreement was “hanging 
by a thread” and provided a means to get it back on track.  In 10 hours of talks, Kang, a political 
heavyweight in Kim’s inner circle, told the former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Donald 
Gregg that the U.S. misinterpreted the Korean statement when the U.S. envoy visited Pyongyang 
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the previous month.  Kang said North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Kwan 
responded to his American counterpart’s claim that North Korea was secretly enriching uranium 
by noting that North Korea was “entitled to” possess nuclear weapons and even stronger 
weapons, a common euphemism in North Korea for ideological strength.  South Korea and 
China agreed with North Korea’s account of the close translation.  Once North Korea tried to 
clarify its position and linguists pointed out the possibility of translation error, the U.S. did not 
back off its position that North Korea admitted to enriching uranium in violation of the Agreed 
Framework.75  The Foreign Ministry’s last ditch effort to get negotiations back on track failed.       
Following the October 2002 “admission,” Washington told the North Koreans they must 
first completely and verifiably dismantle its uranium enrichment program before they could 
begin dialogue.76  Washington required that Pyongyang move first.  North Korea responded with 
a mixed message.  An unattributed broadcast reflecting the previous Foreign Ministry statement 
announced the DPRK wanted the two adversaries to “live peacefully with one another” and 
Pyongyang would consider giving up its nuclear program once the two sides concluded a non-
aggression pact.  The broadcast reasoned that absent a security guarantee from the U.S., North 
Korea needed its nuclear deterrent.77  However, the same day, the party newspaper indicated, 
“the U.S. escalated policy to stifle the DPRK by force of arms would only prompt the DPRK to 
step up its arms buildup to cope with the policy and further increase its army's combat capacity 
than ever before,” and openly discussed once again the possibility of war.78  Different opinion 
remained in Pyongyang’s official circles.  The Foreign Ministry could entertain giving up the 
North’s nuclear weapons, but the party and military opposed such a measure.   
The United States maintained that it had no aggressive intent towards North Korea as it 
encouraged KEDO to terminate fuel shipments, marking the end to the Agreed Framework.  The 
Foreign Ministry argued the U.S. violated the only provision of the Agreed Framework that it 
had begun to implement – oil deliveries – and urged Washington to uphold the agreement.  The 
KPA did not urge the resumption of the Agreed Framework.  Rather, following the model’s 
expectations, the KPA Navy issued a statement that a skirmish between the two Koreas’ navies 
must be a part of the U.S. pressure strategy and warned South Korea of the perils of associating 
with the U.S.79  The KPA still tried to link the U.S. with South Korea.  The cabinet’s mild 
advocacy failed as the Agreed Framework was scrapped.  
The Foreign Ministry announced two weeks later that the state would resume 
construction on the plutonium reactor at Yongbyon that had been verifiably frozen for the 
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previous eight years.  Yongbyon would supply all of the nuclear material for North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons test in 2006.80   
The United States moved towards a strategy of isolating North Korea further 
economically, running into most obvious contradiction with South Korea’s Sunshine Policy.81  
Barred constitutionally from reelecting Kim Dae Jung, South Korea elected a new liberal 
president, Roh Moo Hyun, who pledged to continue Kim Dae Jung’s Nordpolitik.82  China too 
continued to support economic engagement with North Korea, prodding the state to roughly 
follow its economic reform model.  Wedged between these two states, the American economic 
squeeze strategy faced serious difficulties.   
With little meeting of the minds between Washington on one hand and Beijing and Seoul 
on the other, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted that the U.S. alone could defeat North 
Korea militarily even during a war with Iraq.  Meanwhile, the U.S. continued to say it had no 
intention of invading North Korea.  North Korea dismantled the IAEA’s monitoring equipment 
and ordered its officials to leave the country.  It began repairs on Yongbyon and cancelled inter-
Korean meetings.   
Following Pyongyang’s actions at Yongbyon, Washington supported the IAEA’s effort to 
refer Pyongyang to the UN Security Council, urging a Chapter Seven UN resolution that 
recognized North Korea’s actions as a threat to international peace and security.  Chapter Seven 
resolutions can allow military actions to respond to such threats.  Unnamed senior officials 
announced the new U.S. strategy towards the North included seizing shipments under a new 
Proliferation Security Initiative and sanctioning the state.83  By the end of 2002, internal debate 
in Pyongyang again went silent.  The North Korean political establishment was at least publicly 
unified in its confrontational response to the United States.   
 By early 2003 the U.S. indicated its willingness to talk to the North Koreans while 
resolutely rejecting any quid pro quo, arguing the North Koreans must uphold their existing 
obligations under the defunct Agreed Framework.  The Foreign Ministry did not bite, as the state 
labeled the American offer to talk without negotiating “insincere.” Pyongyang withdrew from 
the Nonproliferation Treaty and threatened to resume long-range missile tests.  Washington 
upgraded its proposal to talk by adding a willingness to consider providing economic aid and 
security commitments.  The North Korean Foreign Ministry said it was ready to talk bilaterally if 
the U.S. provided a security guarantee and lifted economic sanctions, but this response would 
soon be overcome by events.84  Four days later, President Bush criticized North Korea again in 
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his 2003 State of the Union Address and pledged that the U.S. would not be blackmailed.  The 
Foreign Ministry denounced the Address and called for a non-aggression pact, while the party 
noted, “it is necessary to reinforce our own defense capabilities in every way possible.”85  The 
KPA announced it was ready to take preemptive military action in the next two to three days as 
the U.S. moved warships into the Sea of Japan and awaited the IAEA’s scheduled referral of 
North Korea to the UN Security Council.86   
 The bureaucracies reacted consistently and according to the model’s expectations, but 
this period did not require internally contentious decision-making.  By the time central 
authorities took bold actions on its U.S. policy, internal debate was temporarily resolved.  High 
tensions did not provide political space for alternatives to confrontational policies.  The Foreign 
Ministry response to U.S. offers to negotiate were pro-forma and lacked traction at home.  
Central authorities moved the state incrementally down the path advocated by the KPA and the 
party on U.S. policy.   
The U.S. and North Korea ratcheted up the pressure on the other in the ensuing three 
months.  The KPA threatened to withdraw from the 1953 Armistice agreement and fired short-
range missiles during the South Korean president’s inauguration, intercepted a U.S. spy plane 
with MIG fighter jets, and fired an anti-ship missile.  The United States pressed China and its 
regional allies to exert political and economic pressure on the North, resumed food aid to the 
North at reduced levels, and imposed new sanctions.  President Bush indicated that “all options 
were on the table” and, after sending two dozen bombers to Guam in range of North Korea and 
as the U.S. prepared for war in Iraq, argued that if efforts towards the North "don't work 
diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily."87 
 With U.S.-DPRK relations in a firm downward spiral and engagement advocates 
silenced, China sent its Vice Premier Qian Qichen to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il to 
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encourage him to restart negotiations with the Americans.  The contact was reportedly 
contentious and did not immediately prompt North Korea to return to the table.88  Pyongyang 
was dug in; if central authorities did not want to hear counsel on restarting negotiations from 
Beijing, they certainly did not want to hear it from their own subordinates.  China temporarily 
suspended North Korea’s oil shipments, officially citing a technical problem.  North Korea 
depends heavily on Chinese energy assistance to keep its energy-inefficient industrial base 
moving – at a fraction of its Cold War level.  It is North Korea’s economic lifeline.  Following 
the pipeline incident, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry announced it would accept the U.S. offer 
to meet in Beijing.  The announcement came shortly after the U.S. invaded Iraq and two days 
after North Korea’s NPT withdrawal date elapsed.  However, there was no indication that the 
state was interested in seriously negotiating with the Americans.   
North Korea’s lead Foreign Ministry negotiator told his American counterpart in Beijing 
that North Korea reprocessed its spent fuel rods and was ready to “physically demonstrate” or 
transfer them.  The vague threat seemed to indicate the North’s willingness to test a nuclear 
weapon and/or export nuclear material.  For its part, the Americans demanded North Korea 
completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear program before they could discuss 
other issues.  Both sides reiterated positions that had been established for months.  The talks 
ended a day early without progress, but both sides agreed to meet again.  The party and KPA 
continued to promote “physical deterrence,” referring to a nuclear test.89  Pyongyang’s threat was 
clear: if it did not determine that the U.S. was sincerely negotiating security guarantees, North 
Korea would test a nuclear weapon to provide for its security.   
 The United States encouraged China and its regional allies to pressure North Korea into 
submission with little success.  South Korean foreign policy officials said “coercive measures are 
not on the table,” China actively encouraged bilateral negotiations between Washington and 
Pyongyang, and Japan voiced concern over the prospect of sanctions although it responded to the 
American request for action by reaffirming existing laws barring military-related exports to 
North Korea and continued missile defense cooperation with the U.S.90  As the North Korean 
Foreign Ministry prepared for scheduled talks, KCNA indicated for the first time that the 1992 
North-South Basic Agreement that committed to peninsular denuclearization was “nullified,” 
citing U.S. hostility, although only the two Koreas were party to the agreement.    
While in Seoul to discuss the relocation of U.S. bases in South Korea, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz announced that North Korea "is teetering on the edge of economic 
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collapse.  That, I believe, is a major point of leverage."91  The comment again embolden those in 
Pyongyang who argued the U.S. only wanted to bring down the regime and could not be 
engaged.  With a united political establishment in Pyongyang on U.S. policy, the state pursued a 
consistent confrontational policy towards the U.S.  
Inter-Korean Relations: A Separate Track? 
Seoul and North Korean cabinet officials tried to keep inter-Korean engagement on a 
separate path from U.S.-DPRK relations.  Cabinet officials presided over the historic opening of 
rail connections across the DMZ and the groundbreaking ceremony for the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex.  Party and military officials did not attend.92 The KPA warned that the previous year’s 
naval clashes risked further South Korean aggression on land.  The military institution did not 
document how such a clash could result, since the DMZ was a firmly recognized, non-
ambiguous border unlike the disputed sea border.93  A month later, the two Koreas exchanged 
gun fire across the DMZ instead of seeing another naval clash in the Yellow (West) Sea.  No one 
was injured.94  
After inter-Korean talks started, the KPA again demonstrated their commitment to a 
consistent policy line, arguing the talks should be abandoned, even though central authorities had 
already authorized them.  The KPA noted that South Korea was conducting military exercises, 
portraying them as provocative and questioning the usefulness of inter-Korean dialogue.  The 
KPA noted, the military exercises “cannot but be seen as an act of impure challenge that deeply 
provokes the dialogue partner, casts a dark shadow over the results of the talks, and, moreover, 
throws cold water on brethren's vigorous footsteps toward national reconciliation, unity, peace, 
and reunification.”95   
Likewise, the party again tried to link the South Koreans to the Americans, arguing the 
U.S. was responsible for the divided peninsula and the South Korean military was subject to U.S. 
control.96  During the inter-Korean ministerial, the party newspaper ran an article describing 
what the cabinet’s goals should be at the talks.  The talks “must yield good agreements,” defined 
as one that improves the state’s physical security without mention of the cabinet’s primary focus 
in inter-Korean projects: economic goals.  By framing the goal of the talks as enhancing the 
state’s security, the party could erect a strawman and criticize the talks for failing to move 
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towards this end.97  Each bureaucracy demonstrated an ability to frame the debate to favor pre-
conceived policy options.  
 Cabinet Senior Councilor Kim Yong Song replied by citing Kim Jong Il.  Kim granted 
the cabinet the authority to go forward with the ministerial talks and the cabinet represented 
Kim’s reunification policy.  The cabinet moved forward as long as they had the lead.  As the 
main negotiators in inter-Korean talks, cabinet officials expressed the economic benefits such 
negotiations provided, implicitly refuting their institutional critics and refocusing the expressed 
goals of the talks.  Later in the summer, as one of his last statements as Cabinet Premier, Hong 
encouraged continued dialogue at the opening ceremonies of the National Rally for Peace and 
Reunification saying, “all anti-reunification forces must be opposed and dialogues, exchanges 
and cooperation encouraged.”98  The cabinet’s policy line remained static, and they advanced it 
whenever possible.  The policy was more than just one premier’s policy; it was an institutional 
position.  Hong started his tenure as Premier with similar comments, and his successor advanced 
the same agenda.     
 U.S.-DPRK confrontation continued, but it did not fundamentally threaten inter-Korean 
rapprochement.  The U.S. organized the first meeting of ten countries that agreed to join the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict ships suspected of carrying illicit or missile 
cargoes on the high seas.  Despite repeated requests, Seoul refused to join the PSI.  Referring to 
the PSI effort, party officials threatened war if the U.S. imposed a “blockade” against North 
Korea.  The U.S. circulated a new draft resolution on North Korea at the UN Security Council as 
the Administration sought congressional approval for a new bunker buster nuclear weapon that 
could target North Korea’s buried forward deployed forces.99  After John Bolton visited Seoul to 
pitch the PSI and UN Security Council referral again, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued 
a statement saying it would return to the Six Party Talks while ideologues in the North returned 
to inflammatory personal attacks against Bolton.  The repetitive pattern continued.   
 Six Party Talks resumed in August with much the same result: North Korea again 
threatened to test a nuclear weapon, citing U.S. demands that North Korea first shut down its 
nuclear facilities before discussing other issues.  The North Korean Foreign Ministry called the 
talks “not beneficial” as party commentaries unrelentingly criticized the United States.  The 
National Defense Commission’s highest ranking official called for reinforcing the state’s 
“nuclear deterrent” by testing a nuclear weapon.100  The North Koreans attended the Six Party 
Talks, possibly to appease their Chinese backers and Six Party hosts, but did not come prepared 
to softened their position first.   
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As the Six Party Talks flailed, the two Koreas participated as a single team in the 
international Summer Universiade collegiate athletic competition.  The North Korea rubber 
stamp parliament elected Pak Pong Ju the new cabinet Premier.  As Hong’s successor, Pak Pong 
Ju took up the same institutional position and developed a reputation as a key economic 
reformer.  Immediately after being named Premier, KCBS summarized Pak’s comments to the 
Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA): “The new premier said… North Korea's production power 
would be increased by improving economic management, and vowed to work towards the 
reunification of the two Koreas under the banner of the 15 June Joint Declaration.”101  Pak 
prioritized the same two issues as his predecessor, using the same construction to denote greater 
marketization in economic policy and more robust inter-Korean negotiations.   
The following month, U.S. Forces Korea announced an $11 billion military build-up on 
the peninsula as U.S. spy satellites reportedly detected that Yongbyon was shut down; North 
Korea announced it was uninterested in resuming talks until the U.S. offered a security 
guarantee.  The Foreign Ministry announced the following day that North Korea had shut down 
Yongbyon to remove 8000 fuel rods from the reactor – a move required for building a nuclear 
bomb.102  Inter-Korean ministerial talks continued as President Bush said the U.S. would offer a 
written security guarantee below the treaty level.  The party newspaper immediately rejected the 
offer as “laughable” and emphasized the state should pursue its “nuclear deterrent,” although the 
Foreign Ministry indicated “we are ready to consider Bush's remarks on the written 
assurances.”103  North Korea’s provocative move forced Washington to react and reopened 
Pyongyang’s bureaucratic debate on U.S. policy.   
 The Chinese again stepped in.  China’s third highest ranking politician, Wu Bangguo, 
traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Il and Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Ju.  Wu 
delivered Chinese grants and a message that the state wanted to see Six Party Talks resume.  
Before Wu left Pyongyang, North Korea announced its willingness to restart talks.104  Talks 
resumed with some prospect of movement given the Foreign Ministry’s apparent willingness to 
consider the written assurances pledge, but the talks ultimately broke down.  The Foreign 
Ministry may have had too little too late to overcome the party and military’s inertia.   
Three months later in mid-January 2004, an unofficial delegation of former senior U.S. 
government officials and academics returned from North Korea and said the North Koreans 
showed them the 8000 fuel rods were no longer in storage, noting the North Koreans claimed 
they had been reprocessed.105 Meanwhile, the U.S. started its planned move of U.S. troops away 
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from the DMZ to a base further south and moved six B-52 bombers to Guam, within striking 
range of North Korea.106 The Foreign Ministry did not observably advocate for renewed talks in 
the contemporary political climate.     
North Korea and the U.S. talked again in February to little avail as the U.S. continued to 
demand North Korea dismantle its nuclear program as a prerequisite to further talks, and North 
Korea continued to insist the reactors were for peaceful energy purposes.107  The talks ended 
with agreement to form lower level working groups, although Pyongyang took its time forming 
them.  The Foreign Ministry called the talks “disappointing” and merely an effort for the U.S. to 
stall for time as it tried to “suffocate” North Korea.108  North Korea remained outwardly united 
in opposition to further negotiations with the U.S.  
 Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s subsequent trip to Pyongyang in March 2004 
and meetings with Kim Jong Il did not change the dynamics.  When Kim Jong Il personally 
traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao in April, Kim reportedly sought 
more Chinese aid to return to negotiations.  No specific quid pro quo was ever revealed, although 
North Korea agreed to participate in the working group meetings after the trip.  Still, the North 
Korean media remained overwhelmingly negative about the prospect for the working group 
meetings.  The Foreign Ministry issued a single statement, defining the meeting’s agenda as one 
to advance a proposal of “reward for freeze” and empathetically ruling out any “talking about 
‘irreversible’ or something like that.”  In essence, the Foreign Ministry required a complete 
capitulation on the American side to continue “sit[ting] at the table.”109  Both financial rewards 
and a temporary or partial nuclear freeze were anathema to the Bush Administration’s as 
Clintonesque ideas.110  Pyongyang – and certainly the Foreign Ministry – knew this.  The move 
was likely tactical.  No one in the North Korean system was observably pushing for negotiations 
in this environment, but showing up gained Chinese support.     
Cabinet officials meanwhile concentrated their energies on inter-Korean projects and 
economic changes.  On Kim’s return to Pyongyang from China, a massive explosion rocked the 
Ryongchon train station.  Kim’s train traveled through the station only hours previously, leading 
to speculation that the explosion may have been a failed assassination attempt.111  The explosion 
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created a tense international environment as the North cracked down on Sino-North Korean trade 
and communications.  The KPA and party cited the explosion as a risk of increased opening.  
The state must reassert control.  In this tense environment, it is noteworthy that the Cabinet 
Premier still hosted a South Korean trade delegation only two weeks later.  The South Koreans 
reported a cordial atmosphere.112   
Moreover, the cabinet defended its role in economic affairs and advocacy of greater 
opening against other bureaucratic interests.  Cabinet Premier Pak addressed his detractors, 
contrasting the ideological approach with a realistic approach, and integrated a vague promise to 
pursue science and technology into the cabinet’s platform.113  The same month, Kim Jong Il 
purged his brother-in-law and possible successor, Chang Song Taek, and his supporters amid 
concerns that he may be developing his own power base and taking on too much of an economic 
role.114  The rest of the bureaucracy went silent on this politically-sensitive subject for the time 
being, potentially out of fear of being purged themselves.  On April 9 the DPRK Trade Minister 
Ri Kwang Keun was replaced with a younger economic technocrat, Rim Kyong Man, and the 
socialist Public Distribution System was suspended in exchange for an increased emphasis on 
markets.  U.S. policy did not seem to directly affect the state’s economic policy decisions.  
Pyongyang could accept some of the risks of lessened control that accompanied economic 
opening and inter-Korean economic projects even after a major explosion that some within the 
regime may have portrayed as an assassination attempt.   
 In May 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi returned to Pyongyang for a second 
summit with Kim Jong Il.115  Within two weeks, the two Koreas agreed to open road links and 
end loudspeaker broadcasts across the DMZ.  They established a hotline in case of future naval 
clashes, and South Korea promised rice aid to the North.116  The cabinet spearheaded only some 
of these inter-Korean efforts with even KPA representatives noting some improvement in North-
South military relations.117  Meanwhile, the U.S. announced it would cut one third of the 37,000 
U.S. forces stationed in Korea.  The party called this a victory and an American “retreat.”118  
 Washington offered Pyongyang a new incentive that Libya had recently accepted – 
immediate aid and eventual removal of sanctions as soon as Pyongyang pledged to verifiably 
dismantle its plutonium and uranium programs.  North Korea’s Foreign Ministry called the idea 
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“constructive” and said it would be studied in Pyongyang.119  That study period in Pyongyang 
included military officials opposing the proposal.  Speaking on the tenth anniversary of Kim Il 
Sung's death, Minister of People's Armed Forces Kim Il Chol voiced deep skepticism of the Six 
Party Talks and emphasized military preparations instead of dialogue.  The argument seemed to 
take some hold among central authorities, presumably up to Kim himself.  The Foreign Ministry 
reversed its initial characterization of the idea, announcing the U.S. offer was a “sham” and 
renewed calls for U.S. compensation.  With President Bush’s reelection in question and his 
Democratic opponent offering direct talks with the North Koreans, the rest of the year saw little 
advancement in nuclear deliberations.120  
Nuclear Declarations   
South Korea announced in September that it had enriched uranium and extracted 
plutonium under both the military dictatorship and democratic regimes.  IAEA inspectors 
indicated Seoul tried to hide the event for six years as it claimed the two small experiments were 
only on an academic research scale and did not constitute a weapons program.121  As the IAEA 
investigated, North Korea’s media highlighted what it saw as international hypocrisy and double 
standards applied to the two Koreas.  The Foreign Ministry had the first word, downplaying the 
revelation as an American fabrication, and urging continued inter-Korean contacts.122   
KCNA called the news an “open secret” and noted South Korea could never make a 
nuclear weapon without U.S. help.  The article blamed the U.S. and the IAEA for creating a 
“double standard” for the two Koreas but largely refrained from criticizing Seoul.  The North’s 
only criticism of Seoul came from the Tongil Sinbo website – one of the least authoritative 
means for the regime to communicate messages.  The website is officially independent of the 
regime, run out of Shenyang, China, and claims to be the voice of an overseas Korean expatriate 
group committed to reunification on the North’s terms.  It indicated the South Korean nuclear 
experiments provided further reason to be cautious of the United States and boycott the Six Party 
Talks.123   
The KPA and party had a good talking point.  Uncharacteristically, they did not capitalize 
on it.  For months, they had attempted to link North-South relations with declining U.S.-DPRK 
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relations.  Here was an excellent opportunity to not only bash the South but to link Seoul and 
Washington together by alleging nuclear cooperation between the two allies and IAEA 
hypocrisy.  The North Koreans are not beyond stretching the truth considerably, but the official 
reaction was particularly muted.  The party and military did not downplay the event actively like 
the Foreign Ministry, but it did refrain from speaking out.  Inter-Korean relations were 
improving, and a higher authority may have squelched their dissent.    
 Pyongyang moved towards its own more developed and well-publicized nuclear 
declaration.  In January 2005, prior to President Bush’s second inauguration, KCNA announced 
that North Korea was prepared to try talks again and “treat it [the U.S.] as a friend,” expressing 
hope that the second Bush Administration may change its policy towards the North.  The North 
often uses anonymous offers to test politically sensitive messages.  In this case, they used an 
official DPRK publication, more authoritative than an affiliated expatriate organization, but not a 
formal diplomatic offer.  They soon backed off this idea.   
Pyongyang probably increasingly viewed Bush’s second term as following a similar 
North Korea policy as the first term.  In Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice’s 
confirmation hearings in January 2005, she called North Korea one of the “outposts of tyranny.”   
Two weeks later, President Bush delivered the State of the Union Address.  In the paragraph 
following the only discussion of the Proliferation Security Initiative and naming North Korea as 
the only state outside of the broader Middle East as a country of concern, the president said, 
“And we've declared our own intention:  America will stand with the allies of freedom to support 
democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny 
in our world.”   
The North Koreans put these two statements together in official press reports.  
Washington considered Pyongyang a tyrannical regime, and it was committed to ending those 
regimes completely.  Two days after the State of the Union, a Foreign Ministry statement, citing 
Rice’s “outpost of tyranny” and Bush’s “ending tyranny” remarks, argued North Korea was still 
high on the American list for regime change even in the second term.  Consequently, it 
announced North Korea had "manufactured nuclear weapons" to deter military intervention.  The 
statement also suspended indefinitely North Korea’s participation in the Six Party Talks and 
reaffirmed its military-first politics. 
 Debate continued in Pyongyang but the North Korean readings of events changed the 
conversation to not if, but how, the state should announce its nuclearization intent.  An American 
scholar met with several North Korean officials in Pyongyang and reported that the incongruity 
in the North Korean approach reflected bureaucratic divisions within the regime: “In the 
February [2005] showdown, I was told by several of those involved, the dealers argued in favor 
of preserving ambiguity concerning the extent of North Korean nuclear capabilities as part of a 
continued effort to get economic quid pro quos in return for step-by-step denuclearization. The 
hard-liners countered that it would be naive to continue hoping for a beneficial deal with the 
Bush administration, which in their view is seeking regime change and wants to use the six-party 
talks in Beijing to drive Pyongyang into a corner. It is demeaning for North Korea to let the 
United States keep it on the defensive in the six-party talks, they contended, even though 
Washington has 7,400 operational nuclear weapons of its own. The only self-respecting course 




declare unambiguously that North Korea is already a ‘nuclear weapons state’ in order to make 
Washington think twice about any military adventure.”124   
This account is a helpful single window into regime dynamics but still tends to conflate 
the military and party representatives together as a singular hardliner.  Though the more general 
grouping has a certain utility, this idea can be refined to the two separate set of arguments the 
scholar notes were used to advance the nuclear declaration.  “Hardliners” objected to Six Party 
Talks on both militarily pragmatic grounds (that they fail to provide for the state’s security and 
limit more tangible defensive actions) and on ideological grounds (talking with the imperialists is 
an affront to the state’s dignity).  Despite these distinct arguments, these two hardline groups had 
the same goal.  Their argument seemed to win out as engagement skeptics in North Korea 
increasingly defined the state’s policy towards the U.S.  
Diplomatic Impasse; Mutual Pressure 
Pyongyang returned to its earlier demand of bilateral negotiations.  Washington refused, 
noting its long-standing view that the issue was multilateral in nature, not simply a responsibility 
of the United States.  China called on North Korea to return to the multilateral talks as U.S. plans 
to intensify its Illicit Activities Initiative to reduce Pyongyang’s access to the international 
financial system leaked to the press.125  After the Head of the China's Central Committee's 
International Department met with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang, North Korea announced it would 
participate in the six-party format in principle but did not change its substantive demands.  The 
pattern continued.  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called her Chinese counterpart in March 
to get China to pressure the North Koreans.  China refused and offered North Korea “substantial” 
new “loans” when Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Ju and Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju visited 
Beijing in April.  North Korea does not repay the Chinese and South Korean “loans” that are 
better understood as aid.  Beijing reportedly may have increased North Korea’s aid by up to 40 
percent, reflecting Beijing’s stated primary interest in peninsular stability.   
The following month, some media outlets in Pyongyang suggested the state may test a 
nuclear weapon – traditionally seen as a Chinese red line – while others called such allegations 
American propaganda.  The state indicated its willingness to return to the Six Party Talks while 
others rejected negotiations.  New York Times columnist David Sanger reported that the U.S. 
intelligence community was divided in its interpretation of North Korea’s actions, relying on 
satellite imagery of possible preparations for a nuclear test while seeing diplomatic overtures 
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towards resuming talks.126  Based on these empirical observations, North Korea seemed to be 
moving in two different directions simultaneously – a position puzzling for those analysts who 
viewed North Korea as a singular monolith.  Personalizing this disparity led some to call the 
state a two-faced, though monolithic, entity that fundamentally could not be trusted enough to be 
engaged.    
 Similar skepticism about negotiations came from the Chief of the KPA General Staff who 
said in another major anniversary address that negotiations are fruitless and only delay 
meaningful progress towards the North’s “nuclear deterrent.”  His advocacy seemed to have a 
receptive ear among central authorities.  By May, the Foreign Ministry announced the state had 
completed its reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor.  At the same time, 
though, the U.S. and North Korea met “secretly” two days later in New York.  The Foreign 
Ministry announced its desire to keep the backchannel open while rejecting U.S. “punitive 
measures.”  The divergent institutional stands again cannot be explained by monolithic theories 
of the North Korean state.  If policy was solely defined at the top, one should not be able to point 
to such divergences.   
 South Korea offered to sweeten the negotiated settlement pot for North Korea to 
denuclearize with its “important proposal.”  Pyongyang agreed to an inter-Korean ministerial 
meeting where South Korea added 200,000 tons of fertilizer to the North’s aid package but the 
North still refused to return to Six Party Talks.  In mid-June 2005, 40 South Korean officials and 
295 non-official citizens celebrated in Pyongyang the fifth anniversary of the inter-Korean 
summit.  100,000 North Koreans attended the opening ceremony at Kimilsung Stadium, and the 
Cabinet Premier’s speech "welcome[d] the South Korean delegation with my brotherly love."  
Meanwhile, the Pentagon suspended searches with the KPA for remains of soldiers killed in the 
Korean War and ordered Nighthawk stealth fighter planes to South Korea as the U.S. publicly 
considered pushing for another UN Security Council action against North Korea.127  Seoul and 
Washington’s approaches were not in step.  
The party again focused on poor relations with the U.S. instead of advances in inter-
Korean relations.  The Party Central Committee Secretary, Choe Thae-bok, said in a speech 
commemorating the anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s work at the Party’s Central Committee that 
North Korea, “is responding to the imperialists’ hardline policies with an ultra-hardline…. Our 
army and people are sharply watching the United States and its servile followers' foolish acts of 
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recklessness and hostile attempts, and are fully ready to smash any crushing offensive and 
military attack by the enemies in a single stroke… [W]e will mercilessly annihilate and sweep 
away the aggressors by fully putting in motion our political and military might.”128  By the end 
of the month, the party had more bureaucratic ammunition to cite.  President Bush issued 
Executive Order 13382 as part of WMD Commission recommendations.  The Order barred U.S. 
persons from doing business with eight foreign entities based in North Korea, Iran, and Syria 
suspected of transferring WMD- or ballistic missile-related technology.  The party called the 
move a new sanction.   
“The Atmosphere Has Improved” – For a Day 
In mid-June 2005 China sent a delegation representing President Hu to Pyongyang to 
again convince Pyongyang to return to Six Party Talks.  This time Kim Jong Il provided a more 
substantial guarantee.  He said peninsular denuclearization was his revered father’s “dying 
wish.”  The statement was especially significant as it was difficult for party or military leaders to 
resist this authoritative claim.  Within a week, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry said replacing the 
armistice with a "peace mechanism" would end the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK and 
eliminate North Korea's need for a nuclear deterrent.  South Korea revealed the details of its 
“important proposal,”129 and Washington named an accomplished diplomat, Chris Hill, as its 
new lead negotiator.130  Absent a new stumbling block, it seemed that all parties were getting on 
the same page and willing to move forward.  This turn of events reexposed bureaucratic 
differences in Pyongyang.  
The new American negotiator reportedly enjoyed more leeway than his predecessor as he 
announced the U.S. would pursue a ''words for words and actions for actions'' strategy towards 
disarmament.  Pyongyang previously called for “simultaneous” actions to bridge the lack of trust 
between parties.   In his opening statements at the July Six Party Talks session, Hill reportedly 
recognized North Korea’s sovereignty and repeated the U.S. line that it had no intention of 
attacking the North.  Hill presented U.S. evidence that North Korea enriched uranium, reportedly 
drawing on A.Q. Khan’s confession.  Despite North Korea’s reluctance to accept the U.S. 
information, the six parties worked on drafting a set of principles to guide the Talks.131  The 
Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that “the atmosphere has improved.” 
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Talks stalled over North Korean’s Light Water Reactor (LWR) demand.132  The 1994 
Agreed Framework pledged to build a LWR and the international consortium charged with the 
project had broken ground by the time the framework agreement fell apart in 2002.  Pyongyang 
claimed the state needed the reactor to harness the scientific and medical benefits of nuclear 
power, support its focus on science and technology to transform its economy, and produce badly 
needed energy.  However, the move would also be an important means for Pyongyang to save 
face and placate internal opponents to negotiations.  For Washington, the LWR was politically 
unpalatable as a centerpiece of the Clinton-era agreement.133   
China proposed a compromise where the six parties agreed in principle to North Korea’s 
right to develop nuclear energy while delaying the question on building a LWR until an 
“appropriate time.”  In exchange, North Korea agreed to return to the NPT.  All sides eventually 
agreed to this September 19 joint statement.134  Within three months of switching the U.S. 
negotiating team and granting it more flexibility, Pyongyang reacted.  The North Korean Foreign 
Ministry had news they could bring back to Pyongyang.  Six Party Talks now gave them 
something to cite as a benefit of the diplomatic track when presenting their case internally.  
However, this would not last long.  The first significant agreement in years was quickly 
undermined in both Washington and Pyongyang.   
LWR Demands and Banco Delta Asia 
 As the six parties met in Beijing, the U.S. Treasury Department designated a Macao 
bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), as an entity of "primary money laundering concern" under 
Section 311 of the Patriot Act due to its ties with North Korean entities allegedly involved in 
illicit activities and missile sales.  The move, formally published in the Federal Register the day 
after the conclusion of the September 19 agreement, had the effect of cutting North Korea off 
from the international financial system over an allegation of $27 million worth of laundered 
funds.135 
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Also on September 20, Pyongyang announced that the critical sticking point of the LWR 
had to be resolved before the state began to denuclearize.  Pyongyang interpreted the 
“appropriate time” for providing an LWR was now.  North Korea’s powerful Vice Foreign 
Minister repeated the LWR demand in his speech at the UN General Assembly five days later.  
The Foreign Ministry objected to U.S. claims of illicit activities, but the party newspaper first  
labeled the 311 action a “sanction” incompatible with continued negotiations.   
Chinese President Hu again visited Pyongyang, and Pyongyang returned to Talks in 
November.  Hu toured the Chinese-funded major glass factory and reportedly pledged more aid.  
Six Party Talks resumed without progress as the North Korean negotiators took up the party’s 
position.  North Korea’s chief negotiator told reporters that progress could not be made without 
the U.S. removal of the new sanctions; the LWR demand fell from prominence for the time 
being.  Pyongyang boycotted the Six Party Talks over the BDA issue for the next 14 months.    
Cross-border Cooperation: The Only Game in Town  
As the U.S. and North Korea reached an impasse over the BDA issue, South Korea 
agreed to more than double its aid that year to the North by pledging $2.6 billion.  The South 
Korean annual figure was worth approximately 100 times more than the one-time amount in 
dispute with the U.S.  South Korea opened its first liaison office in Pyongyang, agreed to finance 
a multi-year $10 billion joint textile project, and planned to double the size of the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex.  The two Koreas also agreed to field a joint Korean team for the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing.   
With South Korean and Chinese aid and good weather, Pyongyang enjoyed a bumper 
harvest in 2006.  Inter-Korean relations reached a new height, and North Korea’s food situation 
improved markedly for the year.  However, the improved food situation allowed central 
authorities to heed party demands to crackdown on market mechanisms to distribution food.  The 
state reinstituted the socialist Public Distribution System and expelled UN World Food Program 
(WFP) staff involved in humanitarian assistance.  While WFP food aid requires inspections to 
guarantee food reaches its intended recipients, South Korean and Chinese aid largely lacked 
these oversight provisions.  Pyongyang preferred its neighbors’ less intrusive food aid.  The 
expulsion reflects longstanding arguments by the military that intrusive food inspections 
undermined the state’s information security.  International aid workers channeled information to 
hostile governments, exposed North Korea’s citizens to more outside influences, and decreased 
central authorities’ control over distributing food as it saw fit, including prioritizing feeding the 
military, as opposed to aid agencies’ insistence on reaching vulnerable populations.   
Reintroducing the PDS also addressed growing inequities and corruption that 
accompanied the markets.  Markets provided farmers an incentive to produce over their quota 
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amounts, because they could sell their surplus.  However, unintended side effects from the 
partially marketized food distribution system emerged, creating arbitrage opportunities and 
depriving certain at-risk populations from accessing food, including the unemployed, disabled, 
and elderly.  Market incentives created an unsavory side effect of rewarding those who violated 
the law and put vulnerable populations that relied on the state in greater risk of starvation.  
Notably, it also smelled of capitalism to party officials long opposed to this type of incentive.  
With food secured (this year), the state rolled back market reforms and reintroduced the PDS.  
The state closed more markets, seized more food production, and tried to distribute it through 
state channels.  The move shows competing demands on North Korean decision-making.  
Central authorities do not seem to prefer market mechanisms and have not undertaken a top-
down reform economic reform project, but cabinet officials argue they should tolerate some 
market mechanisms to address critical problems that the state cannot efficiently resolve.136        
Despite three Premiers’ documented role in advocating marketization, Premier Pak had to 
announce the significant change in national economic policy.  With Kim Jong Il in rare 
attendance at the Supreme People’s Assembly, Premier Pak carefully spoke on the reintroduction 
of the PDS.  He proposed an administrative solution to food distribution and labeled it the party’s 
position: “By all means, we must reach this year’s grain production targets by thoroughly 
implementing the party’s policy of agricultural revolution by fully concentrating and mobilizing 
the entire country’s efforts into the agricultural front.”  
 Yet the speech was significant in that the Cabinet Premier held out other roles for 
continued marketization.  Following the party’s construction of first presenting the required 
position and then undermining it by the end of the speech or article, Pak said, “[W]e will present 
the renovation of plants and enterprises with modern communication facilities within the next 
few years as one of the significant economic strategies.”  This possibly meant the legalization of 
cell phones, already pouring in over the Chinese border, and the more widespread use of 
international phone lines.  Both were necessary to grease the wheels of international business but 
were opposed by the security camp fearful of information outflows.   
Pak continued, “While actively conducting external economic activities in line with the 
changed environment, we should raise the level of the secondary and tertiary goods that are great 
in demand to the world level so as to actively develop the overseas market, and effectively carry 
out economic cooperation with other countries in a way that helps to introduce advanced science 
and technology.”  He interjected the role of supplying foreign markets with exportable goods 
while also supporting the party’s position on advancing science and technology.  Pak presented 
the benefits of his institution’s advocated policy and included minimal party demands that did 
not fundamentally contradict his own platform like state-led science and technology 
development.  
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Still, the most interesting compromise in the speech came when Pak tried to balance 
ideological requirements with market principles: “All economic guidance functionaries… should 
organize and conduct the activities of production and management by strictly adhering to the 
principle of socialism and the principle of guaranteeing actual profits.”137  This framed the 
debate by cloaking the cabinet’s profit policy in socialist garb.  North Korea would roll back its 
market efforts in the politically sensitive and economically significant agricultural sector, but the 
move did not seep into other sectors as the regime continued to use market incentives in 
business-to-business transactions, decentralize administrative responsibilities to the regions, and 
deemphasize the plan in industrial policy.  It also continued to expand the Special Economic 
Zones and cross-border trade with South Korea and China.   
Bureaucratic Cracks on “Sanctions” and Missile Tests 
In early January 2006 Kim Jong Il made a secret ten-day trip to China as the chief 
American negotiator visited Beijing to meet with his North Korean counterpart.  Negotiations 
were at a stalemate as North Korea required the U.S. remove what it termed new “financial 
sanctions” before they would negotiate further.  The U.S. maintained the “defensive measures” 
were a law enforcement issue unrelated to negotiations.138  Party commentaries opposed 
negotiations in characteristic rhetorical flourishes, lambasting the U.S. imperialists.  The Foreign 
Ministry took a more pragmatic approach.  They agreed with the party and KPA that U.S. 
“financial sanctions” aimed to pressure North Korea, yet the Foreign Ministry claimed the 
pressure move was intended to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, not change the regime.  
Pyongyang too sought a fully denuclearized Korean peninsula where all parties could enjoy 
security.  Therefore, both sides should resume negotiations towards this common goal in the 
most productive manner – through the Six Party Talks.139   
The Foreign Ministry’s nuanced pitch failed to produce movement, and Pyongyang 
continued to refuse to talk, since the financial measures hampered its economic activity and 
threatened its pride.  Beijing dispatched its Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei to Pyongyang for a 
five-day visit in mid-February 2006.  Again, the Chinese sought to break the impasse as all three 
bureaucratic organs opposed the U.S. “sanctions.”140  In March, the U.S. and North Korea held 
bilateral meetings in New York.  The U.S. termed the meeting a “briefing” and sent Treasury 
Department technical experts while the North Korean delegation called it a “negotiation” and 
sent Foreign Ministry personnel.  Failure was predictable as the U.S. technical experts came 
prepared only to describe U.S. actions, while North Korea officials sought to roll them back.   
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With the New York failure, North Korea’s bureaucracies again united on U.S. policy.  
The KPA spokesman denounced the financial sanctions, noting they must be related to U.S.-
South Korean military exercises as a pretext to invasion.  The Foreign Ministry announced the 
U.S. does not have a “monopoly” on preemptive military strikes.  Negotiators from the six 
parties attended a conference in April in “unofficial” capacities.  South Korea and China tried 
unsuccessfully to convince the American delegation to meet informally with the North Koreans.  
During the conference, North Korea’s Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces highlighted the 
U.S. unwillingness to negotiate further demonstrated the American’s resolve to invade.  
Pyongyang continued to boycott Six Party Talks.   
The U.S. issued new Foreign Asset Control Regulation targeting DPRK-flagged vessels 
in May and urged KEDO to finally scrap the LWR project.  The U.S. State Department issued 
new, controversial allegations in its Trafficking in Persons report criticizing the low wages paid 
to North Korean workers at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.141  By June, the North Korean 
Foreign Ministry issued a statement inviting Chris Hill to Pyongyang for bilateral negotiations.  
The White House rejected the offer, citing American policy to only negotiate with the North 
Koreans in the six-party format.142   
As North Korea’s Foreign Ministry offered this invitation, the KPA readied a long-range 
missile launch.  Neither the invitation to Hill nor the long-range missile launch likely could have 
gone forward without central authorization, showing how Kim can utilize his distinct institutions 
to create a range of opportunities.  Long a backchannel for negotiations, North Korea’s second 
highest ranking official at its office at the UN in New York, Han Song Ryol, offered to discuss 
the pending flight test with the Americans but the White House refused.  Meanwhile, the KPA 
Air Force warned the U.S. to stop flying reconnaissance flights over its territory or risk getting 
shot down.  High-level administration officials rejected former Clinton administration officials’ 
calls to strike the missile on the launch pad as too provocative; instead, they moved sea-based 
missile defense assets into the region, potentially to take a shot at the rocket in flight if given the 
opportunity.   
Rejecting the Foreign Ministry’s invitation and New York channel overtures made it 
easier for Kim to authorize the KPA’s launch.  North Korea prepared its longest range rocket for 
its first flight test – the three-stage Taepo Dong 2, suspected of being able to reach the 
continental United States.  North Korea ended its self-imposed six-year moratorium on missile 
launches on the fourth of July (U.S. time).  The missile only flew for a few seconds before 
failing, according to declassified sea logs of the U.S. Aegis cruisers tracking the launch.  The 
U.S. pushed for a new round of six-party negotiations as the UN Security Council again 
condemned the North.  Washington and Tokyo began deploying sensors for missile defense.  
South Korea cut off food aid although they would resume it the following month when floods in 
the North risked mass starvation.  South Korea’s president also demanded wartime operational 
control from Washington as South Korea’s generals worried openly about the military utility of 
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the political move.  With divergent strategic interests and threat perceptions, the U.S.-South 
Korean military alliance loosened.143   
Though the Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the latest UN Security Council 
Resolution, the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kim Il Chol, went one step further, 
saying that North Korea must provide its own self-defense "in every way… without being 
hindered by anything."  The launch did not prompt a resumption of bilateral talks or U.S. lifting 
its “financial sanctions.”  A senior U.S. Treasury official called the line between North Korea 
licit and illicit finance “nearly invisible” and openly urged countries to cut off all business 
contacts with any North Korean citizen or entity in contradiction to the Administration’s 
previous argument that the BDA action was a targeted legal action rather than a general political 
“sanctions.”  The North Korean Foreign Ministry rebuffed this “expanding financial sanctions” 
and vaguely pledged to “seek after all the necessary countermeasures.”  The state, moderately 
divided before the launch, united as the Foreign Ministry did not see any opening to make 
advances with the Americans.  Pyongyang would quickly move to another, even more serious 
provocation.   
Hitting Rock Bottom: The Nuclear Test 
Marshal and Defense Minister Kim Il Chol used the anniversary of the Korean War 
“victory” to lay out the KPA’s strategic vision towards the U.S.  The position was not new.  The 
KPA is openly skeptical of negotiating with an enemy it considers untrustworthy and calls 
tension reduction measures as impediments to reunification.  Putting the nuclear program on hold 
for phantom gains only delays the North’s nuclear deterrent.  And reducing the military’s actual 
budget share for economic projects – especially those without military uses outside the heavy 
industry sector – reduces the KPA’s role in domestic and foreign policy:   
“Under the aggressive ambition of overturning our socialist system and dominating all of 
Korea, the United States is blatantly translating into practice its evil scheme for a second 
Korean war… the United States is increasing its large scale state-of-the-art military 
equipment and modern homicidal weapons in South Korea and in its surrounding areas 
and is waging one war exercise commotion after another, such as the ‘RIMPAC’ [Rim of 
Pacific] joint military exercise… the United States picked a fight over the missile launch 
our military carried out and… had the UN Security Council adopt a so-called 
‘resolution,’ which took serious note of the exercise of our self-defensive right.”144   
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The position was not merely one for public consumption.  Another high-level KPA 
official made the same argument in private conversations with his Russian counterparts.   Chief 
of the KPA General Staff Kim Yong-joon noted the importance of investing in a “powerful 
deterrence force” against the U.S., according to a Russian media leak.145  The missile launch was 
an abysmal military failure that the state misrepresented to its population as successful.  
However, officials knew their foreign counterparts were keenly aware of the failure.  In this 
context, Pyongyang decided to push forward with another major provocation.   
Only three months after the failed Taepo Dong 2 launch, the Foreign Ministry announced 
the state would test a nuclear weapon since it considered previous agreements abrogated and 
sanctions remained in place.146  North Korea pursued the test despite strong international 
objections, including Beijing’s temporarily suspending critical oil supplies to North Korea.  On 
October 9, 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb.  The bomb’s plutonium came from 
the Yongbyon nuclear reactor that it unfroze after the 2002 scrapping of the Agreed Framework.  
The test “marks an historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA and people that 
have wished to have powerful self-reliant defense capability.”147  The party newspaper ran an 
epic poem in grand jubilation over the successful test.148  
International outcry condemned the test, but few real punishments were forthcoming.  
Pentagon officials privately told reporters that the U.S. could not sustain another war effort in 
Korea due to commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq and questioned the effectiveness of a naval 
blockade attempt.  U.S. efforts in the UN Security Council moved further as China proved less 
reluctant to sanction Pyongyang in wake of crossing this assumed Chinese red line.  The UN 
resolution cited Article VII explicitly, noting North Korea’s actions threatened international 
peace and security.  The UN Article generally allows for militarized responses to such threats; a 
similar resolution allowed the creation of the UN Command in 1950 and internationalized the 
Korean War.  Still, South Korea and China refused to abandon their engagement strategies.  
South Korea indicated it would not stop its investment in Kaesong, and China said it would not 
stop trading with North Korea. They remained firmly opposed to any military action against 
North Korea.149    
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Two days after the test, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry called on the U.S. to return to 
negotiations.150  President Bush responded two days after that by signing the North Korea 
Nonproliferation Act of 2006 that allowed the U.S. to sanction entities that transfer missile- or 
WMD-related components to North Korea and the next day the UN Security Council sanctioned 
North Korea.  The Foreign Ministry called the Security Council action a “declaration of war” as 
North Korea’s highest constitutional official, Kim Yong Nam, warned of a second nuclear test.  
He also boasted that North Korea’s economy had improved despite previous UN sanctions, 
highlighting the important role of South Korean and Chinese aid and investments.  The cabinet 
officials seemed to argue that Washington could try as it may, but it lacked the power to pressure 
Pyongyang into submission.   
The series of events demonstrated again the conclusion of the Perry policy review 
completed years earlier.  The U.S. had few sticks to employ against North Korea, especially 
given diverging South Korean and Chinese interests, short of direct military action.  A second 
Korean War would be very costly in treasure and blood.  The policy review estimated such a 
scenario would kill hundreds of thousands and create over a million refugees – not including the 
possibility of nuclear escalation or Chinese involvement.  North Korea had an aged, but 
effective, military deterrent.  It would likely lose a peninsular war if fought to a military 
conclusion without Chinese aid, but the costs would be so high that it would dissuade 
Washington or Seoul from pursuing this policy.  Once North Korea went nuclear, the United 
States modified its strategy towards the North.     
Conclusion 
 This period shows the reactive nature of North Korea’s U.S. policy and its ability to 
segment the three policy issue areas under consideration.  Pyongyang viewed Washington’s 
policy as fundamentally hostile and committed to regime change.  As these ideas became 
increasingly impervious in Pyongyang, internal debate on U.S. policy went silent.  External 
events effectively silenced cabinet advocacy on U.S. policy.  Short-term gains in diplomacy had 
little prospect for success and did not have long-lasting impact during this time.  Though not 
responsible for North Korea’s sovereign choices, Washington has tremendous power over North 
Korea.  It can shape Pyongyang’s internal debates about missile and nuclear policy that critically 
shape its response and it has the capability to eradicate the regime if it is willing to accept the 
attending high costs of such a decision.    
Pyongyang responds to both symbols and substance.  When U.S. officials criticize Kim, 
for example, it provides ideologues in Pyongyang another talking point to demonstrate in internal 
debates that the regime must hold onto its missile and nuclear forces.  Those not carefully 
evaluating the North Korean system may scoff at such a claim that a brutal regime would 
seriously react to international name-calling, but verbal attacks threaten the prestige and pride of 
the regime’s top leader and institutional leaders have to come to his defense, making advancing 
negotiations in such an atmosphere difficult internally.  Understanding the North’s internal 
mechanisms can help inform the cost-benefit calculation of such a decision.   
                                                           





Likewise, efforts to enact sanctions, regardless of economic impact, prompt much the 
same reaction from North Korea.  Ironically, many proponents of sanctions against North Korea 
have cited Pyongyang’s loud reaction against them as evidence of their effectiveness, 
miscategorizing Pyongyang’s complaints about a poisoned atmosphere for bilateral negotiations 
with genuine economic pressured being applied.  Most prominently during this period, some 
argued that freezing roughly $25 million of North Korean accounts that resulted in cutting the 
country’s entities off from the international financial system prompted it to make certain 
strategic decisions out of a economic pressure.  North Korea lost 80-90 percent of its industrial 
capacity in the 1990s and its severe economic contraction prevented it from feeding its own 
population, yet it still maintained the core elements of its system as this study has continually 
noted.  Additional economic sanctions have a truly marginal impact economically and 
understanding the regime’s internal functions helps understand how these moves simply 
antagonize the regime more than making any strategic advance.   
This understanding of the North’s internal dynamics leads to an uncomfortable 
conclusion that moderate carrot and stick approaches to the North are difficult to sustain.  One 
institution will inevitably present the stick, no matter how small or ineffective, as an affront to 
the leader and regime’s dignity, requiring an even larger inducement than otherwise would be 
required to shape regime responses.  More focused and sustained strategies that try to embolden 
the cabinet’s agenda internally or eradicate the regime outright are likely to be the only means to 
address concerns about North Korea’s long-term actions, the latter strategy with particular high 
opportunity costs.     
 Despite repeated efforts by party and military officials to link inter-Korean relations and 
marketization efforts to souring U.S.-DPRK relations, cabinet officials successfully managed to 
keep this policy on a separate track.  This development disputes the idea that the regime is 
strategically committed to creating a wedge between Seoul and Washington, rather institutions 
use linkage strategies tactically to bolster their predetermined advocacy.  It was the cabinet – not 
the party or military – during this period that tried to distance Washington and Seoul to prevent 
the soured U.S.-DPRK relations from undermining its efforts on inter-Korean economic projects.  
This did not prevent the military and party from objecting to decided inter-Korean policy.  The 
military demonstrated bureaucratic resistance and its semi-autonomous capabilities by provoking 
a naval skirmish in the Yellow (West) Sea.  Both the party and military used the event to argue 
for a policy change on inter-Korean projects.   
 Economic policy was also subject to inter-institutional debate.  The regime tended to 
tolerate additional forms of market mechanisms to address its inability to provide for its citizens’ 
basic needs.  However, when economic conditions improved enough that such coping 
mechanisms were not deemed absolutely necessary, the regime reintroduced administrative 
control over the economy.  Pyongyang seemed to try to fashion its economic policy in response 
to the economic situation rather than linking these decisions to the external environment.  
Seoul’s hope that engagement would drive North Korean economic policy decisions was not 
directly met as other variables proved more important.  Perhaps counterintuitively, the extent that 
Seoul’s efforts actually improved North Korean food security, one could argue that this 
contributed to Pyongyang’s 2005 decision to crackdown on markets and reimpose greater regime 




 U.S. policy, inter-Korean relations, and economic policy are inherently linked at some 
level in North Korea’s decision-making.  One institution has always used conditions in one of 
these issue areas as a debating point for its policy agenda in other issue areas.  Nonetheless, the 
state has demonstrated an ability to segment policy areas when it deems it appropriate.  This 
segmentation allows more nuanced policy decisions but also contributes to impressions that 
North Korea is simply “muddling through” – that the state lacks an overarching agenda to bring 
it out of the current depressed situation.  Top leadership has not shown a consistent commitment 
to economic reform and international opening that could transform the state into a more 
sustainable polity, nor has it consistently retrenched in policies of the late 1950s and 1960s 
where a planned economy supported socialist ideals and a strong defense sector hoped to prepare 
for the right time to launch a reunification drive by force.  A reunified Korea on the North’s 
terms provides a logically consistent alternative to transforming North Korea as reformers 
advocate.  The state is not of one mind on these fundamental questions.  Different ideas about the 
future of the state come through in the bureaucratic jostling on specific agenda items.   
After the nuclear test, these issues remained unresolved, and Pyongyang’s response to 
Seoul and Washington flipped.  Seoul started to back off the unconditional engagement policy 
and turned substantially towards a harder line with the election of a conservative president in 
December 2007.  As Seoul moved towards a tougher line, Washington started to increasingly 
accommodate the North.  Divergence between Washington and Seoul’s policies remained but on 




Chapter 7: Policy Reversals, 2006-2008 
Introduction 
 Fall 2006 proved another watershed in North Korea’s U.S. policy and inter-Korean 
policy, though economic policy remained on a different track.  The external environment 
changed in Fall 2006, prompting the regime’s bureaucracies to cite different data in their 
institutional debates.  The changes raised the cabinet’s role on U.S. policy at the expense of the 
party and military while having the reverse effect on inter-Korean projects.  Economic policy 
remained static.  North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Democrats in the 
United States won substantial gains in November congressional elections.  Washington 
increasingly changed its policy towards North Korea, and Pyongyang’s institutions reacted.   
The October nuclear test, however, had the opposite effect in Seoul.  Seoul’s embattled 
president became an increasingly lame duck largely on grounds unrelated to North Korea policy.  
However, the nuclear test affected South Korean public opinion on its government’s North 
Korean policy.  Increasingly, conservative demands for greater short-term reciprocity in inter-
Korean relations took hold over liberal argument that unconditional engagement could gradually 
change the North Korean economy, society, and politics.  A year later, South Korea elected a 
new president based primarily on economic grounds but committed to a tougher North Korea 
policy.  Pyongyang eventually responded to the new inter-Korean policy with greater hostility, 
favoring party and military positions.   
Return to Six Party Talks 
A month after the nuclear test, Congressional Democrats took over both houses of the 
U.S. Congress in November 2006 and demanded changes in policy towards North Korea.  Key 
members of the Administration pushing the pressure strategy resigned,1 and the new Congress 
required that the Administration appoint a single coordinator of North Korea policy.  The White 
House tapped lead negotiator Chris Hill. The U.S. offered aid in response for North Korea’s 
nuclear dismantlement and, critically, offered to discuss North Korea’s outstanding concern 
about the frozen assets at Banco Delta Asia.2  Washington cautiously pursued a more flexible 
approach, and the U.S. and North Korea met bilaterally in Berlin in late January 2007.   
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The North Korean Foreign Ministry announced the two states reached an agreement.3  In 
a short and direct statement, the Foreign Ministry simply noted that “The talks took place from 
Jan. 16 to 18 in a positive and sincere atmosphere and a certain agreement was reached there.”4  
They did not elaborate.  The Foreign Ministry had been pushing for bilateral talks with the U.S. 
for years, and they were finally bearing fruit.  Nevertheless, the party newspaper ran a 
commentary the same day, vaguely indicating that “the United States is viciously pursuing the 
policy hostile to Korea,” although lacking recent evidence.  The follow-up commentary in the 
party newspaper the next day focused on the four-month old news that the U.S. moved a 
squadron of Stealth fighters to South Korea and was “hastening preparations for a war of 
northward aggression behind the curtains of six-party talks.”5  The party was grasping at straws 
to oppose renewed momentum in the U.S.-DPRK diplomatic track.  Central authorities would 
rule against them.    
The following day, North Korean state policy became clear.  A senior party 
representative reversed course and uncharacteristically supported the cabinet’s foreign policy 
advocacy: “Kim Ki-nam, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, in 
a statement on January 20 fully supported and approved the joint statement released by the 
political parties, government and organizations of the DPRK, recognizing that the statement is 
the most just and patriotic appeal indicating the path of a sacred struggle to achieve earlier the 
national reunification, the supreme task facing the nation at present.”6  The party tends to utilize 
rhetorical flourishes, yet this statement was subdued and direct.  The party supported the long-
held position of the government, representing a bureaucratic defeat.  The subdued statement 
suggests Kim Ki-nam was unenthusiastic about the move but was directed to issue it.  The party 
had to publicly back off its opposition to negotiations.  Kim Jong Il likely personally weighed in 
on this watershed change in the North’s policy.  Stated institutional positions from each of the 
bureaucracies supporting negotiations with the Americans signaled that the state was ready to 
deal.   
Six Party Talks resumed on February 8.  In the two weeks between Kim Ki-nam’s 
statement and the resumption of talks, the party managed to express restrained doubt in the 
outcome of the negotiating session.  A party commentary note, “Whenever the opportunity 
presents itself, the United States says that it will resolve the Korean peninsula issue through 
‘dialogue.’  As reality shows, however, the United States is acting diametrically contrary to its 
words.”7  The party’s criticism was more reserved than previously statements and did not affect 
diplomatic progress.   
After five days of negotiations, the Six Party Talks adjourned.  North Korea pledged in 
the joint document to seal and dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility and provide a list of 
                                                           
3 “N. Korea Reports Progress In Talks With U.S. Envoy,” Washington Post,  January 20, 2007, p. A17.  “U.S. 
Envoy Upbeat About New Korea Talks,” New York Times, January 22, 2007, p. A10.   
4 "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Results of DPRK-U.S. Talks," KCNA, January 19, 2007.   
5 Ri Sok-chol, "Timely Appeal for Reunification and Patriotism," Nodong Sinmun, January 19, 2007.  "Revelation of 
the Attempt Aimed at Carrying Out Preemptive Nuclear Strike for Northward Aggression," Nodong Sinmun, 
January 20, 2007, p. 5.  
6 "Secretary of WPK C.C. Supports Joint Statement of DPRK Political Parties, Government And Organizations,” 
KCNA, January 21, 2007.   




nuclear facilities.  Japan and North Korea also promised to restart normalization talks and "the 
Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK” 
starting with heavy fuel oil shipments.8  The DPRK media did not carry the joint document's 
text.  Instead, the Foreign Ministry announced the deliverables it had secured, prompting external 
observers to conclude there must have been some internal debate in Pyongyang on the joint 
document itself.9   
By the following month, U.S.-DPRK talks were underway, and Cabinet Premier Pak 
Pong Ju emerged from a five-month public hiatus around the nuclear test to host South Korea’s 
Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung for four days in Pyongyang.  In these first post-test inter-
Korean talks, Pak requested the resumption of rice and fertilizer aid, economic projects, and a 
peace treaty to end the Korean War saying, “Now is the time for the two Koreas to step on a 
springboard planted on firmer ground.”10  North Korea’s cabinet sought to maintain Seoul’s 
conciliatory northern policy.  KCNA paraphrased Chief Councilor of the Cabinet Kwon Ho 
Ung’s keynote address: “Recalling that the North-South relations witnessed repeated suspension 
and resumption, he held that this abnormal situation should not be allowed to repeat itself any 
longer.  To this end, it is necessary to refrain from sacrificing the interests of the nation for the 
sake of the relations with the outsiders under any circumstances.”11  The South Korean 
administration agreed that inter-Korean engagement should be permanent and sustainable as this 
sentiment became the first thought expressed almost verbatim in the joint press statement at the 
meeting’s conclusion.12  Government-to-government inter-Korean relations continued to 
improve even as the South Korean public grew more wary of dealing with the North after the 
nuclear test.   
Meanwhile, the IAEA sent a delegation to North Korea for the first time since 1992 to 
discuss implementing the February 13 Six Party agreement.  Slightly lower level working groups 
of the six parties met in Beijing to discuss energy and economic assistance.  Washington also 
dispatched a Treasury Department official to Macao to finalize the removal of the U.S. financial 
measures against North Korea.  Before the month was over, the Six Party Talks resumed again.  
The political stage was set for more progress, but, citing a technical problem in transferring 
funds, the North Korean money still could not be unfrozen.  The talks ended four days later 
without progress as the North Korean delegation refused to negotiate until the BDA funds were 
actually unfrozen.13   
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KPA officials took the delay in six-party negotiations to reiterate opposition to 
accommodation.  Another general repeated the KPA’s position that it stood ready to defeat the 
Americans.  The KPA’s end game is clear: defeating the Americans by getting them to leave 
Korea paves the way for reunifying the nation. “Should the U.S. imperialists infringe even a bit 
upon the sovereignty of the DPRK and its right to existence, the KPA will wipe them out at a 
single stroke and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification, the cherished desire of 
the nation, without fail.”14  The call seemed particularly hollow in a general atmosphere of 
negotiating progress, much like previous cabinet and Foreign Ministry statements holding out the 
prospect for continued negotiations as other bureaucratic actors’ policy preferences won out.   
Cabinet Economic Reformer Replaced… with Economic Reformer 
Meanwhile, Kim Jong Il replaced the Cabinet Premier.  Cabinet Premier Pak Pong Ju had 
a difficult balancing act, continually advocating new economic reforms couched in socialist 
language.  With military and party opposition to the cabinet’s accommodating foreign policy 
with the Americans and its economic opening platform, Kim Jong Il removed Pak from power.  
However, unlike previous economic reformers who were executed, Pak was moved to manage a 
chemical factory.15  The regime did not distance itself far from Pak, replacing him with his 
former subordinate, Transportation Minister Kim Yong Il.   
A week after Kim Yong Il replaced Pak, the new Premier held a major meeting on the 
state budget.  His first public comments in his new position articulated the same institutional 
goals as Pak in the government’s newspaper: “The meeting noted the need for all of the 
economic guidance functionaries to strictly guarantee actual profits in industrial management 
and to attain their units' state budgetary payment plans without fail every month and every 
quarter… [while] resolutely maintain[ing] the principle of socialism.”16  Kim Yong Il was the 
third consecutive cabinet premier since the 1998 constitutional revision that upgraded the 
institution’s formal powers, and all three premiers articulated the same vision in contradiction to 
their party and military colleagues.   
 Premier Kim’s first major speech took place a few months later on the anniversary of the 
state’s founding.  It largely reinforced state ideology, but on the economy, the premier carefully 
balanced demands for heavy industry with consumer goods, light industry, and agriculture: “We 
will firmly adhere to the socialist economic construction line of the military-first era and while 
developing the national defense industry first, we will vigorously ignite the flames of the 
agricultural revolution and the light industry revolution, thus the food problem and the issue of 
the people's consumer goods should be smoothly resolved.”17  The new premier is not as 
outspoken and effective as his predecessor, but he still presents the same institutional policy line.   
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Party leaders also continued to argue that the state should favor heavy industrialization 
and communal agricultural production and distribution.  They cite the need for administrative, 
not market, solutions to economic problems.  By working harder and applying science and 
technology, the state can remedy underproduction.18  It is unclear whether Pak’s dismissal actual 
placated military and party hardliners who suffered major policy losses on both domestic and 
foreign policy, since the replacement meant another individual advocating the same positions, 
albeit with some reduced personal clout and effectiveness.   
Chris Hill in Pyongyang 
In late June 2007, Chris Hill traveled to Pyongyang for bilateral meetings with his North 
Korean counterparts – marking the highest-ranking official to visit Pyongyang since Hill’s 
predecessor led a delegation in 2002 when North Korea allegedly admitted to having a uranium 
enrichment program.19  The Foreign Ministry labeled the discussions “comprehensive and 
productive,” detailing that “both sides shared the view that they would start implementing the 
agreement on the premise that the issue of the remittance of the funds is finally settled and had 
an in-depth exchange of views on the actions to be taken by each side in the next phase.”20  
On June 25, the anniversary of the start of the Korean War, the North Korean Foreign Ministry 
confirmed the $27 million of Banco Delta Asia accounts had been returned and the state would 
begin dismantling its nuclear complex at Yongbyon.21  The following day, IAEA Deputy 
Director Olli Heinonen led a delegation to North Korea's nuclear facilities.  The Foreign Ministry 
announced it would start shutting down Yongbyon as soon as the first delivery, or ten percent of 
the pledged heavy fuel oil shipments, arrived rather than waiting for the entirety of the pledged 
oil.22  Within a week, South Korea made the first delivery.  Pyongyang began to follow through 
on its pledge by shutting down and sealing Yongbyon as party and military personnel had little 
new evidence to cite to stall the dismantlement move.   
Lacking new evidence, the military attempted to cite historical reasons to scuttle this 
agreement.  In a long article detailing a selected history of U.S.-DPRK confrontation from the 
1950s to the present and noting the fundamental untrustworthiness of the Americans on nuclear 
policy, the KPA attacked the agreement.  “The KPA cannot but clarify its stance on the persistent 
maneuver of the anti-Republic fanatics of the United States… nobody can dare to deny that 
confrontation between the DPRK and the United States becomes a life and death confrontation of 
who beats whom.  As the other side to the engagement, we have the undeniable and legitimate 
right to prepare all the self-defensive means necessary to defend one's right to existence from the 
threat and blackmail of the United States.”  The KPA statement threatened that if the regular 
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U.S.-South Korean military exercises continued, “the implementation of the 13 February 
agreement or the six-party talks will evaporate” and called on the U.S. to negotiate a permanent 
peace regime to end the U.S. presence in Korea.23   
The Army’s objection was a desperate effort and did not produce results, mirroring 
cabinet efforts in the previous time period to forestall a confrontational policy.  U.S.-DPRK 
relations had improved, and the cabinet had the policy lead.  The Foreign Ministry announced 
the suspension of activities at Yongbyon, and the IAEA inspectors confirmed the reactor was 
shut down.24  Again, the details of senior leadership’s decision-making remains obscured from 
view, but two days later, Six Party Talks resumed.  The North Korean negotiating team called for 
a LWR in exchange for dismantling Yongbyon and providing a full declaration of its nuclear 
inventory to the IAEA.  The Foreign Ministry called for more talks as the round yielded no new 
agreement.25  Meanwhile, the two Koreas held another summit.  Kim Jong Il and an unpopular 
South Korean President Roh Moon Hyun met in Pyongyang.  With only three months left in 
office, Roh promised Pyongyang that Seoul would expand multi-year, multi-billion dollar 
economic projects.26  Even at the time, however, it was questionable whether any future South 
Korean administration would honor this late term presidential pledge.  
U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks proved more effective.  In early September the U.S. and North 
Korea reached agreement –in Geneva, the site of the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  
North Korea pledged to declare and disable all of its nuclear facilities by the end of the year in 
exchange for the U.S. removing North Korea from the terrorism list and ending Trading with the 
Enemy Act sanctions.27  The Foreign Ministry expressed it was “grateful” for “sincere” 
international aid, naming the U.S. as one of the donors of food in response to recent flooding in 
its mass media.28  Party commentaries warned about U.S. and IAEA inspections of Iraq prior to 
the U.S. invasion and pointed to regular military exercises as further evidence of Washington’s 
untrustworthiness,29 but the party’s efforts were futile as the U.S. and North Korea were firmly 
on the engagement path.  In October a U.S. technical team traveled to North Korea to verify the 
disabling and announced North Korea had made a “good start.”  Chris Hill again visited North 
Korea in December and said dismantlement was “going well.”   
Presidential Turnover in South Korea 
In December 2007, South Korea elected its first conservative president in a decade, Lee 
Myung-bak.  The Korean Workers Party had long published articles severely criticizing the 
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conservative Grand National Party (GNP), but Cabinet Premier Pak’s institutional successor, 
Kim Yong Il, carried on inter-Korean dialogue despite the South electing a president from the 
GNP.  Pyongyang preferred the liberal candidate, but the cabinet prior to the election pledged to 
work with the conservative administration too.  North Korean Premier met with his South 
Korean counterpart, Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, in November 2007 and argued the North’s 
ideology supported negotiations with the South:   
“The experience and lesson over the past seven years following 15 June show that North-
South relations can successfully develop when we are faithful to the idea of By Our 
Nation.  Though our fellow countrymen are divided into the North and South, we have 
the power to safeguard the national dignity and interests and infinite potential that can 
achieve the nation's shared prosperity and development.”30   
The report continued to document concrete efforts to expand inter-Korean cooperation, 
stating the Cabinet Premier “emphasized the importance of sincerely implementing the economic 
and cooperative issues pointed out in the declaration and said that the North-South cooperation 
projects are not simple economic dealings but are lofty projects that contribute to the nation's 
reconciliation, reunification, and prosperity.”31  The talks sought to head off conflicts in the 
Yellow (West) Sea that the KPA had routinely used to aggravate inter-Korean contacts and 
accommodation with the Americans.  The two premiers discussed turning the disputed area in 
the West Sea around the Northern Limit Line into a ''peace and cooperation zone.”  They also 
made concrete progress towards expanding rail and road links across the DMZ and expanding 
joint economic projects worth an additional $11-15 billion.32  By the end of the year, the two 
Koreas opened regular freight train service across the DMZ.33  The cabinet continued to work for 
continued progress in inter-Korean relations.   
President Lee took office in February 2008 and upheld his pledge to substantially modify 
his two predecessors’ engagement policy.  Candidate Lee presented a harder line than his two 
predecessors but President Lee moved further to the right than his campaign pledges.  He 
attempted to abolish South Korea’s Unification Ministry, the institutional lead on Seoul’s 
previous Nordpolitik, but settled for marginalizing it politically.  Lee insisted his policy 
advocated engaging North Korea but increasingly conditioned economic aid on North Korea’s 
denuclearization.  The new administration declared its policy “pragmatic” by rejecting previous 
administrations’ more unconditional engagement as ideologically driven and focused on short-
term results.  
Pyongyang’s reaction for the first several months was notably restrained.  When the 
North Koreans sought to register displeasure with a U.S.-South Korean alliance move, they put 
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the blame squarely on Washington.  Though Pyongyang still had a strong interest in maintaining 
momentum with the Americans, their still seemed to be a fairly uniform requirement for the 
North Korean bureaucracies not to speak out too harshly against the new government in the 
South.  In the Security Consultative Meetings where Washington and Seoul discussed alliance 
wartime operational control, the party newspaper blamed the Americans for providing military 
support to South Korea but Seoul is not blamed for accepting it.34  Normally, the party would 
label the South “puppets” of the Americans and culpable for this decision.  After a U.S., Japan, 
South Korea summit that the party newspaper called "triangular pressure cooperation," the article 
blamed Japan and the “United States, the master of Japan,” but not South Korea.35 
Pyongyang grew impatient with discussions in Washington on the future of its diplomatic 
engagement.  The party used a U.S.-South Korean military exercise to argue negotiations should 
end.   “It has already been publicly recognized that the war exercise the U.S. warmongers are 
about to conduct is a war exercise of northward aggression. Conducting a war exercise against a 
party to dialogue now, when the DPRK and the United States are in the process of dialogue, 
proves that the position of [the United States] is that it does not want to settle the issue through 
dialogue.”36  The party let loose some of its previous restraint against the U.S., but even more 
importantly, it noted these joint U.S.-South Korean exercises were the “full responsibility” of the 
United States.37  The next day, however, another unattributed radio broadcast blamed the U.S. 
and South Korea together without any indication of one being an innocent or even junior 
partner.38   
The party showed an early willingness to open criticism of the new Lee government.  
First unattributed, then party, and finally all bureaucracies increased their criticism of South 
Korea.  The official press starts cautiously blaming the new South Korean administration in late 
February, growing substantially more pointed by April when the gloves came off.  The North’s 
Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland blamed “the hard-
line U.S. conservative forces and their followers -- the belligerent South Korean forces” for 
“expanding the current South Korea-US Combined Marine Forces Command.”  Though it does 
not mention the South Korean president and leaves blame on a segment of the South Korean 
military, this demonstrated Pyongyang’s willingness to make low-level jabs at the South.39  
By mid-March, Pyongyang demonstrated a greater willingness to criticize the new 
government in Seoul.  A party commentary led the way after the unattributed talks. “The pro-US 
conservative forces in South Korea are now clinging more impatiently to a racket of 
confrontation against their fellow country with the backing of outside forces.”40  The party 
followed-up another direct criticism of Seoul, criticizing it for missile defense cooperation with 
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only a passing mention of the United States.41  Previously, Pyongyang focused on Washington’s 
role in this type of military cooperation.        
Though earlier party commentaries blamed the U.S. solely for military exercises, by late 
March, a cabinet article joined in, placing blame squarely on the shoulders of both Washington 
and Seoul: “the culprits that increase the threat of a new war, a nuclear war, by damaging peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula today, are the United States and the following pro-US 
conservative forces of South Korea.”42  This shift, coming from the cabinet, suggests a real 
downturn in inter-Korean relations.  Each of the bureaucratic players started to voice opposition 
to Seoul.  Lacking opposition to increased confrontation with the South, the model expects that 
the state will take a more aggressive stand towards its southern neighbor.  This would not be a 
tactical move but register a strategic turn that would require a significantly changed situation to 
reverse.   
Relations deteriorated quickly.  Only two days later, the technically independent Tongil 
Sinbo webpage took issue with the South Korean Unification Minister’s comments that Seoul 
would condition Kaesong development assistance on nuclear progress.  The article concluded, 
“The conservative ruling forces in South Korea -- who seek nothing but confrontation in homage 
to outside forces bent on harming their fellow countrymen and pay no attention to the 
reconciliation, unity, and reunification of the nation -- will be made to pay for their sins without 
fail.”43  The same day, the head of North Korea’s general-level military talks with the South 
criticized the “violent remarks on a preemptive strike against us made by the chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean forces.”  The military representative noted “Our army 
will counter even a slight move for a preemptive strike attempted by the South side with a more 
rapid and more powerful advanced preemptive strike.” He demanded an apology, threatened to 
suspend all North-South dialogue, and prevent all South Korean officials from traveling to the 
North.44   
On April 1, the North launched its most scathing attack on the South, severely criticizing 
the new South Korean president by name in a party commentary.  The article was run repeatedly 
as well on North Korean television and radio; it ushered in a period of unrestrained criticism of 
their southern neighbor.45  Within days, party commentaries linked the Lee government with the 
Japanese imperialist period;46 an unofficial North Korean webpage satirized Lee in poetry47 and 
openly criticized him in prose48; and each institution severely denounced the South Korean 
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government.49  Several months after Lee’s inauguration, Pyongyang’s prodding to convince 
Seoul to maintain the position of Lee’s two predecessors took a decidedly different turn.  The 
North Korean bureaucracy was united in its opposition to the new government in Seoul.   
After the April turn against the Lee government, North Korea’s three bureaucracies 
largely solidified their confrontational position towards the South.  South Korea received most of 
the North’s blame for US-South Korean alliance cooperation now where Washington previously 
took this heat.  Not only the party and military, but also the cabinet joined in criticizing South 
Korea for a variety of offenses, ranging from accepting U.S. beef imports to education changes 
to military exercises to Seoul’s summits with Washington and Tokyo.50   
Though the Lee government reiterated that it was pursuing an engagement policy and 
even offered the North economic aid, compared to the previous two governments, Seoul offered 
Pyongyang very little.   In the coming months, Seoul offered Pyongyang corn aid, instead of the 
preferred rice, and discussed providing $7 million worth of humanitarian assistance when Lee’s 
predecessor just a few months earlier discussed economic projects worth upwards of $11 billion.  
Pyongyang refused South Korean offers, exerting greater pressure on the South Korean 
government to revert to the liberal engagement policies of Lee’s two predecessors.  In effect, 
Pyongyang gambled the $7 million in the hopes of hitting the $11 billion.  This is not a bad 
gamble by casino standards but a different issue when considering the regime turned down food 
aid when its citizens still suffered chronic food shortfalls.   
North Korea demonstrated an ability to adapt to a changed environment in inter-Korean 
relations.  It can change suddenly as seen in previous episodes or gradually as in this one.  First 
unattributed and then party commentaries increasingly called on Seoul to shape an engagement 
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policy on the North’s terms.  Each bureaucracy joined in the anti-Seoul chorus after the April 1 
denunciation.  Inter-Korean relations continued to deteriorate throughout 2008.  In an apparent 
accident, a North Korean soldier shot and killed a South Korean tourist who entered a restricted 
area a North Korean tourist area in July, reenergizing South Korean public opposition to 
unconditional engagement with the North when Pyongyang refused to allow an investigation.  
Though making some minor concessions to the North, Seoul maintained its firm position, and 
Pyongyang continued to stonewall, calling on the conservative government to return to the 
liberal engagement policy.51  After Kim Jong Il reportedly started to recover from a mid-August 
stroke, the North gradually ratcheted up pressure on the South by threatening to cut off and then 
taking sequential actions to sever all official inter-Korean contact.  Even the Sunshine policy’s 
flagship project, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, came under attack from Pyongyang.   
Just as the cabinet had previously concentrated its energies on inter-Korean issues when 
tensions with the U.S. were at a high point, the organization shifted to the exact opposite.  The 
cabinet defended its progress with the Americans despite periodic setbacks from the rest of the 
year.  Resolving inter-Korean tensions seemed to be a bridge too far, presumably due to a high 
level decision and few signals of a substantial change in Lee’s principled stand.   
Refocusing on the United States 
Everything was not coming up roses in U.S.-DPRK relations in 2008, but fragile progress 
moved forward.  In January, the Foreign Ministry noted that North Korea’s actions in 
disablement started in November and urged the U.S. to uphold its part of the most recent 
agreement, including removing North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and 
completing fuel deliveries.  “Now that other participating nations delay the fulfillment of their 
commitments, the DPRK is compelled to adjust the tempo of the disablement of some nuclear 
facilities on the principle of ‘action for action.’ The DPRK still hopes that the October 3 
agreement can be smoothly implemented should all the participating nations make concerted 
sincere efforts on the principle of simultaneous action.”52 The cabinet newspaper rejected calls 
for the North to give up its nuclear weapons before the U.S. takes action.53  
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The party took a more aggressive stand in accordance with its wider policy agenda.  
Citing a White House announcement that the U.S. planned to reduce its nuclear arsenal to one 
quarter of the Cold War levels, party commentary noted, “The United States' announcement of 
its plan to reduce nuclear weapons-related facilities is nothing but a petty trick to deceive the 
world's public opinion.”54  The party spun news to portray the U.S. in the worst possible light.  
Another party commentary lashed out at the news that a U.S. division would soon serve on a 
rotational assignment to South Korea.  For the party, this “clearly laid bare the aggressive and 
criminal plan of the United States that is trying to indefinitely occupy South Korea as a 
bridgehead for nuclear war and thereby realize the wild ambition for northward aggression and 
the strategy for the domination of the world at any cost.”55  It spoke out against F-16s stationed 
in South Korea, and U.S. efforts to engage South Korea in the Proliferation Security Initiative 
that it labeled a blockade.56  
The Foreign Ministry, stressing repeatedly its “sincerity,” said the U.S. should uphold its 
commitments in the Six Party Talks.57  It hosted a U.S. Track II delegation of senior current and 
former government officials in February; military officials turned down the delegation’s meeting 
requests.58  Senior Congressional Staffer Keith Luse asked and answered in a trip report: “Is the 
North Korean military resisting MFA efforts to substantively engage with the U.S. and the other 
five countries?  Chairman Kim’s best efforts to orchestrate a balance among competing interests 
within the North, may be a ‘stretch too far’ for North Korean military hardliners.  Declaring and 
discarding the jewel of their arsenal will be difficult for those viewing it as the ultimate 
deterrent.”59  Former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Siegfried Hecker, made a 
similar conclusion.  He reported that cooperation between the North Korean nuclear specialists 
and Americans monitoring the disablement was “excellent,”  but the Foreign Ministry hosts 
explained in Hecker’s words that the “DPRK military and industrial officials were extremely 
unhappy with the access the Americans were granted and with the fact that they were given 
samples of the aluminum tubes in question” that provided evidence of enriched uranium in North 
Korea.60  The Foreign Ministry again demonstrated a willingness to deal with the Americans in 
official and non-official realms but the military and party resisted.   
  Indeed, the party actively undermined the Foreign Ministry’s statement that the 
Americans should uphold their commitments sincerely, concluding that the United States could 
not sincerely engage Pyongyang.  Washington would always find some pretext to scuttle paper 
agreements.  “The national sovereignty is a prerequisite for peace and prosperity, and the nation's 
dignity and happiness depend on sovereignty.  That is why our party eloquently made an appeal 
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again in the joint editorial to firmly maintain the position of the national independence….  The 
United States is continuously raising the level of pressure against our Republic, persistently 
finding fault with us by fabricating the ‘nuclear issue’ and ‘human rights issue,’ and so on…. 
Peace, which is a prerequisite for development and prosperity, should be seized by struggles.  
Self-defensive national defense capabilities are the guarantee of defending peace…. Our party's 
position on peace and prosperity is firm.”61  The party questioned American sincerity based on 
ideological convictions of the aggressive nature of the imperialists, but it did not call for a 
scrapping of Six Party Talks outright.  The party registered its objection and pledged to struggle 
on.   
Talks stalled in April when the Bush Administration briefed Congress on its evidence of 
North Korean nuclear assistance to Syria.  The briefing came eight months after Israeli air strikes 
destroyed the facility, raising ire that the Administration was trying to sidetrack the legislative 
branch to maintain diplomatic momentum.  Some Members of Congress argued against 
continued negotiations with the North Koreans.62  In this context, the Foreign Ministry remained 
fairly quiet.  It made a single pro-forma objection to a U.S. democracy report, and an 
unattributed radio broadcast mildly rebuked President Bush for supporting missile defense in 
Europe.63  Party commentaries noted that “hardline elements” in Washington sought to 
undermine diplomatic progress and disguise their true hostile intent with “cunning” diplomatic 
overtures.64  
However, largely conservative opposition in Congress to a conservative White House’s 
foreign policy did not derail the Administration’s new focus.  In mid-June the Foreign Ministry 
announced that U.S.-DPRK negotiations in Pyongyang “proved successful,” as Pyongyang 
moved to supply a nuclear declaration and Washington started efforts to remove North Korea 
from the terrorism list.65  The military and party made some effort to turn the tide in U.S.-DPRK 
negotiations.  Party commentaries rejected the U.S. Defense Secretary’s comments that nuclear 
weapons could help deter states like Russia and Iran.  Though the speech did not mention Korea, 
the party portrayed increased American nuclearization as North Korea took steps away from 
this.66  They continued to note the U.S. was the “root cause of war” on the peninsula.67 Still, they 
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refrained from the most outlandish calls to reject the diplomatic track altogether and rely on 
military means as they had done in previous periods.  The military weighed in against American 
and South Korean criticisms of North Korea’s human rights record; the KPA linked the U.S. and 
South Korea and argued the allies wanted to see North Korea collapse and integrated into South 
Korean society.  Yet, the article focused mainly on Seoul’s speaking out on North Korean human 
rights, not Washington’s, reflecting a 180-degree turn in its inclination to blame South Korean 
over the U.S. from the prior South Korean administration.68   
By mid-July U.S.-DPRK diplomatic option was on-track.  North Korea destroyed the 
Yongbyon reactor’s cooling tower, a largely symbolic move that signaled the state’s decision to 
dismantle the nuclear site.  The U.S. began the process of delisting and delivered its first 
shipment of the 500,000 tons of pledged food aid.  The World Food Program’s Asia Director 
commented that his organization delivering most of the American food aid enjoyed “the best 
monitoring conditions the WFP has ever had in North Korea.”69        
However, when Washington did not remove North Korea from the terrorism list when 
Pyongyang expected, U.S.-DPRK relations dipped.  Washington noted the nuclear declaration 
required verification, citing its lack of several key nuclear installations, before removing North 
Korea from the terrorism list.  The Foreign Ministry called on the United States to uphold the 
letter of the published agreement that did not provide for the document’s verification prior to 
delisting.  The party took a different view, running articles saying Washington’s actions 
demonstrated the true intent of the imperialists.70  With great fanfare, Pyongyang had already 
demolished Yongbyon’s cooling tower.  Though it could be rebuilt with relative ease, the highly 
publicized demolition would embarrass the country if Washington did not follow through on 
delisting the North.   
Party and military criticisms of the United States spiked.  The party objected to the 
comments of the U.S. Forces Korea commander comparing North Korea and Iraq, resurfaced the 
criticism of new U.S. nuclear weapons, objected to U.S. naval assets moving into Korea for 
military exercises, and stressed the strength of socialist ideology to defeat imperialists – all 
within two days.71  They linked U.S. policy to economic policy, arguing opening was dangerous 
and impractical with terrorism list sanctions remaining in place.72   
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As the model predicts, the cabinet continued to take a more moderate view.  It openly 
urged American delisting, condemning the delay as tactical and not a strategic move away from 
removing the North from the terrorism list or engagement.  The cabinet held that the U.S. was 
trying to extract more concessions at the negotiating table, not threaten the state’s basic 
existence.  Nevertheless, the cabinet warned that the delisting delay jeopardized recent 
diplomatic gains:  “The question is why the United States is continuously committing such acts 
of military provocation that irritate us – its dialogue partner – at a crucial time when diplomatic 
efforts are underway to resolve the pending issues between the DPRK and the United States and 
thereby to put an end to hostile relations which have persisted between our Republic and the 
United States for many decades…. Since the situation has entered an important crossroads where 
the DPRK-US relations of deep-rooted hostility should be brought to an end, and peace and 
stability on the Korean peninsula should be achieved through the denuclearization of the Korean 
peninsula, now is the time for the United States and other relevant countries to act with 
discretion.”73  The cabinet did not explicitly leave an ultimatum, but it warned that not delisting 
would have significant, long-term, strategic consequences.   
With the delisting delay ongoing, even the government’s newspaper began running more 
critical pieces of the U.S.74  The party newspaper critiqued “U.S. imperialism” and American 
nuclear policy,75 and the Foreign Ministry took issue with renewed U.S.-South Korean military 
exercises.76  By September, the Foreign Ministry announced that the state would begin efforts to 
restart Yongbyon “as a countermeasure against the action taken by the United States to 
indefinitely put on hold the effectuation of the measure on removing our country from the state 
sponsors of terrorism list.  This was a natural, logical result in accordance with the principle of 
action for action.”  As “a natural, logical result” no bureaucracy voiced support or condemnation 
of the decision.  The regime published the story in the mass media as well, but buried it near the 
end of both the television and radio broadcasts.77  Pyongyang was playing hard ball to secure 
delisting but also indicated its willingness to verifiably dismantle Yongbyon in exchange.   
North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Pak Kil-yon repeated the same sentiment the 
following week in the country’s address to the UN General Assembly and other Foreign Ministry 
statements bolstered the point.78  Meanwhile, party commentaries called for a strategic shift: 
provide security through nuclear weapons, not negotiations, and secure the state’s sovereignty 
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and dignity.79  The internal controversy over the terrorism list was resolved in mid-October when 
the United States removed North Korea from the list.   
With a new president slated for the White House, the U.S. and North Korea continued 
their tenuous engagement in the Six Party venue.  Though Pyongyang said they would treat 
Japan as if it was not present at Six Party Talks due to a bilateral dispute, the negotiating 
structure remained in place through the end of the year.  Washington remained highly skeptical 
of the North’s supposedly complete nuclear declaration, raising real concerns that the agreement 
had narrowed to one where North Korea was only giving up the aging Yongbyon reactor, not its 
full nuclear program.  Concerns about the North’s uranium enrichment program had long sat in 
the background in nuclear negotiations due to differences over whether Pyongyang admitted to 
having such a program in 2002 and the more substantial question of verifying dismantlement of 
this more easily hidden program.  U.S.-DPRK relations were anything but friendly but 
Pyongyang seemed to be angling for more concessions from the incoming Obama 
Administration by backing off its verbal commitments to verification.80  Nevertheless, by the end 
of the Bush Administration, U.S.-DPRK relations had made a dramatic comeback.  Whether 
those improved relations would allow a negotiated solution to the long list of outstanding issues 
between the countries, however, remained to be seen.   
Continuity Amid Change: The North Korean Economy 
 North Korea’s third strategic issue area, the economy, saw a great deal of changes over 
the decade under analysis in this study.  Yet during these last two years when North Korea’s 
relations with the United States and South Korea flipped, Pyongyang maintained much of the 
same in the economic realm.  The party’s advocacy for retreat from the 2002 economic reforms 
continued to carry the day, and souring relations with South Korea and China after the nuclear 
test – the main backers of the North’s economic changes – did not aid the cabinet’s argument.  
The party had the lead on economic matters, and tried to reinforce this institutional reality 
through regular pronouncements to that effect.  
The party argued that the rest of the government should follow it in this ideological 
position, rejecting alternative institutional views.  “If a country wants to develop and be strong, it 
should be politically stable and its society should be united…. Unity is a root of socialism, and 
the power of ideology eventually comes out of the power of unity that firmly solidifies all the 
people as one under the column of the Party and the leader.”81  Party unity means squelching 
unwanted dissent within the state.  More directly, the party demanded that cabinet functionaries 
follow party guidance in all cases: “All functionaries should display all the more higher the 
revolutionary trait of unconditionally implementing the party policy to the end.... The party line 
and policy are filled with fighting tasks and methods and strategy and tactics for embodying the 
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Juche idea and the military-first idea in all areas of revolution and construction.”82  The party’s 
guidance was comprehensive.  The rest of the system should get on-board for not only U.S. 
policy but economic construction and all other areas.   
The party enjoyed authority granted in the 2008 New Year’s Joint Editorial and 
continually cited it throughout the year.  The important planning document reiterated that the 
cabinet must adhere to party economic guidance: “Leading functionaries of economic 
establishments at all levels, including the cabinet, should strictly adhere to the socialist principle 
and the collectivist principle in conducting economic management, regarding the party's 
economic ideas, theories, and policies as unbreakable guidelines for the construction of an 
economically powerful state.”83  The emphasis on unity over divergent policy options indicated 
the cabinet should not attempt to chip away the party’s economic position, prioritizing defense 
and “guaranteeing the planned and balanced development of the national economy.”84   
The party repeated this authority and emphasis on planning over markets several times 
throughout the year.  The party’s commitment to socialist economics was in line with the Juche 
ideology and must be adhered to.85  Cabinet functionaries should implement the party’s 
economic planning guidance: “The socialist economy is a planned economy, which can be 
rapidly developed only when its superiority is adhered to and unreservedly displayed.  For this 
reason, this year's joint editorial importantly stressed the issue of strengthening the planned 
discipline in all sectors and all units of people's economy.  In order to brilliantly realize the grand 
goal of building an economically powerful state presented by the party, all functionaries and 
working people must cherish the superiority of socialist planned economy as their firm faith and 
put great strength into displaying it highly.”86   
Furthermore, communal ownership and abandoning markets allows the state “to fully 
secure the true freedom and rights for the people masses and provide them with prosperous and 
happy lives,”87 while “economic reform maneuvers of the Lee Myung-bak gang for ‘opening up 
the North’ are an attempt to degenerate our system and to ‘absorb’ our Republic into their 
‘liberal democratic system’ and thus will unfailingly bring nothing but North-South 
confrontation and war.”88  The party comprehensively rejected all cabinet efforts to reform the 
North’s economy as contrary to Kim’s NYJE guidance, socialist orthodoxy, party direction, and 
even upholding the country’s basic national interests.   
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As the post-totalitarian institutionalism model suggests, however, the cabinet would 
likely try to resist.  Indeed, the cabinet continued to cautiously present the benefits of 
marketization, even expounding upon conceptions such as a price index on the same day that 
inter-Korean relations took a substantial and sustained downturn.89  The cabinet also positively 
appraised that “The DPRK government is consistently pursuing the policy of encouraging joint 
venture with various countries over the world.” This means expanding the number of foreign 
companies willing to investment in the state, “transcending differences in ideology, ideal and 
social system.”90  The cabinet held that North Korea should expand international economic 
cooperation at least with the most friendly states that may establish joint ventures with the 
regime and develop the tools for rational macroeconomic policy, including basic economic data. 
The party refuted these cabinet arguments with a special article in Nodong Sinmun noting 
the party’s role in guiding a “collectivist” economic policy and imploring cabinet functionaries 
once again to simply carry out the party’s orders.  In short, the party told the cabinet to stop 
debating; they had already lost.  Efforts to “convert the socialist planned economy to a market 
economy” were “imperialist maneuvers” that should be avoided at all cost.91  The party also 
noted its institutional role in upholding the planned economy in the government newspaper.  The 
party often uses this vehicle when it seeks to speak directly to a government audience: “It is the 
proud fruit of the planned socialist economy that our economy – which has broken through harsh 
trials under the wise leadership of the party – is achieving active orbit, vigorously displaying its 
might.”92  Though marketization was far from dead, it suffered continued setbacks as the 
timeframe under analysis closed.  The cabinet continued to mildly assert the benefits of markets 
and greater openness but poor relations with Seoul and Beijing created an unfavorable external 
environment for this stance.  The cabinet had little contemporary evidence to cite and the 
economic situation, while still dire, not as bad as previous years, allowing the party’s economic 
advocacy to remain on top.   
Conclusion 
 Since its October 2006 nuclear test, North Korea has demonstrated an ability to gradually 
reverse course on its policy positions.  Though each of its three main political institutions kept 
their same basic platforms, the state moved significantly.  Ten years of active inter-Korean 
relations collapsed in a matter of months, and six years of highly hostile dealings with the 
Americans moderated significantly.  Pyongyang’s economic policy remained constant amid this 
change as economic issues largely receded from the headlines within the state.  North Korea’s 
three bureaucracies reacted in predictable form but external events largely drove its policy.  As a 
small, reactionary state, Pyongyang again showed how external actors can largely shape its 
internal debates that ultimately affect national political outcomes.   
 With new congressional leadership in Washington and a growing sense that the 2001-
2006 policy did not prevent Pyongyang’s nuclear test, Washington’s shift to engage the North 
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started to bear fruit.  Though it remains unclear if the negotiators will convince North Korea to 
give up all of its nuclear programs and weapons, diplomatic efforts to date have achieved the 
initial dismantling of Yongbyon.  The nuclear reactor that provided all of the plutonium for 
Pyongyang’s nuclear test and unknown number of nuclear weapons93 was verifiably shut down 
and being taken apart.  This is a dramatic shift from the North’s decision in 2002 to unfreeze and 
restart that same reactor that had been shut down for eight years at that time.     
 Pyongyang’s ability to change its strategic position in inter-Korean cooperation is 
likewise notable.  While ten years of engagement by the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
Administrations yielded the establishment and expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, Mt 
Kumgang Tourist Site, family reunions, and other economic projects and government-to-
government efforts, Pyongyang managed to freeze or significantly limit activity in each of these 
inter-Korean areas of cooperation and at the time of writing made the risk of inter-Korean 
conflict higher than anytime since the Kim Young Sam administration in the 1990s.  The state’s 
bureaucracies came together in opposition to the new Lee Myung-bak Administration, mirroring 
an earlier period when these institutions united to oppose American policies.   
 Amid this change, economic policy remained somewhat separated from this international 
politics.  Each bureaucracy kept its position on the economy, but the party and military won out 
over the cabinet.  Pyongyang did not announce any new efforts to reintroduce significant 
marketization as the government sector in areas like food distribution grew at the expense of 
markets.  Though the regime did not reverse all changes that came with the markets over the 
years, including bottom-up changes that produced a slowly revising social structure, it did show 
how the North’s economic policy can be explained by the post-totalitarian institutionalism 
model.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
North Korea’s Post-totalitarian Institutionalism 
North Korea more closely resembles the post-totalitarian institutionalism model than 
previously presented theories of non-democratic rule.  The single, most important person in 
North Korean politics is unquestionably Kim Jong Il.  His role should not be minimized, but Kim 
is not the state.  To more fully understand North Korean politics and explain variant policy 
outcomes, one must evaluate the second-order institutions that Kim seeks to command.  
Authority remains centralized, but power is more diffuse than the relatively monolithic 
typologies of totalitarian, corporatist, and personalist rule predict. 
North Korea’s bureaucracies have sufficient autonomy, corporate identity, and 
conflicting objectives that their advocacy and actions help explain variant North Korean policy 
outcomes.  The cabinet, party, and military interact by applying three distinct but individually 
coherent, institutional policy platforms to specific policy debates.  These general policy outlooks 
are stable across leaders of each institution, further indicating these groups do not fundamentally 
waver with the personal position of the institution’s leader.  Though the institutions are formally 
stovepiped, they express conflicting ideas and spin facts and events in the official press.  
Institutional actors resist decided policy and take actions in contradiction to the state’s overall 
policy to shape the agenda according to these preconceived platforms.  They operate under the 
ultimate authority of the supreme decision-maker, but their operations have a meaningful and 
systematic impact on national policy.   
Institutions have power in North Korea.  They impact policy decision-making by framing 
the agenda and effectively defining the universe of policy alternatives.  Policy innovation comes 
from below, and central authorities generally select between these presented alternatives.  
Institutions frame decisions by contextualizing specific contemporary events in a particular 
historical or ideological context or present recent empirical data to bolster their advocacy.  
Though leaders make decisions and can reject advice, this advice in the aggregate is important.  
In a post-totalitarian institutional state like North Korea, inner circle advisers have an incentive 
to avoid getting out of line with mainstream thinking lest they jeopardize their personal and 
professional survival.  Impersonal institutions have more room to innovate – a characteristic not 
generally associated with bureaucracies in a democratic context.  Put differently, inner circle 
groupthink and innovation-discouraging incentives make this body more static and variance by 
institution better explains divergent national policy decisions than hidden inner circle 
deliberations.   
Institutions also influence implementation, modifying central decisions when they can.  
Central authorities make every effort to control bureaucratic action, but a single individual has 
limitations on his ability to do so.  This is not to suggest Kim Jong Il’s rule is in doubt or fragile.  
It is to suggest that his power is not as thorough as the totalitarian and personalistic ideal types 
otherwise suggest.  Kim and other leaders of states that fit the post-totalitarian institutionalism 
model must contend with institutional opposition and freelancing.  Kim relies on peer institutions 




Kim must manage these bureaucracies through the divide-and-conquer arrangement that 
he molded.  North Korea no longer has a single, monolithic party that guides strategic decision-
making under the power of a single man nor is the command economy or ideological correctness 
sacrosanct today as under Kim Il Sung.  North Korea has moved away from but not totally 
abandoned these core elements of totalitarianism.  Institutional interaction has replaced party 
monolithism, markets have etched cracks in the command economy, and ideological arguments 
compete with rational ones in policy debates.  The party competes with the military and cabinet 
in advocating national policy.  The party’s efforts to reassert their dominant, comprehensive 
institutional position after the 1998 constitutional revision have failed.  Post-totalitarian 
institutionalism is not simply an interim state but a regime type more robust and sustainable than 
many other typologies of non-democratic rule with relatively short lives.   
An Evolved Polity 
While totalitarianism comes closer to explaining an earlier period in North Korean 
politics under Kim Il Sung, the younger Kim’s government is still highly centralized but not as 
much as its predecessor.  Due to the exogenous shocks to the system in the 1990s, North Korea’s 
political system changed.  Kim Jong Il did not have the personal gravitas to dominate a united 
polity.  The younger Kim accepted the inefficiencies of a divided government to aid his effort to 
maintain control over the state.  Pitting one institution against another allowed Kim to restrain 
one large modern bureaucracy with another.  Placing greater emphasis on rational results even 
when in competition with ideological imperatives allowed the state to stave off collapse amid 
serious challenges to regime survival.  Kim did not choose to move away from his father’s 
totalitarian state and likely would have preferred the stronger, totalitarian state, but the natural 
progression of totalitarian states and particular accelerating dynamics in the 1990s forced his 
hand.   
It is important to recognize that post-totalitarian institutionalism is an outgrowth of a 
totalitarian state.  In this sense, it is a subset of the generic post-totalitarian umbrella type.  Kim 
maintained much of the old system and changed only what he thought he must in order to 
address the changing internal and external situation and avert collapse.  Kim implemented 
changes to the political and economic structure over time based on particular needs that in the 
aggregate created a political system different than his father’s.   
Consequently, the post-totalitarian institutional state retains some key legacy elements of 
totalitarianism.  In North Korea’s case, the state still uses arbitrary terror and regular purges to 
instill fear and anxiety in elites and masses alike.  Despite extensive elite privilege, the system 
holds long range goals beyond simply enriching the leadership, including broad national goals 
like reunification, macro-economic improvements, and anti-imperialism.  Pyongyang 
monopolizes the media and does not allow civil society or dissent to develop.  North Korea’s 
state institutions carefully provide distinct views in the controlled press, but that press should not 
be misunderstood as free.   
North Korea also lacks a comprehensive opposition within the country.  The population 
does not have a clear alternative to the status quo and no semi-organized means to pursue it due 
to continual purges and extensive repression.  There are not significant non-governmental groups 




Poland.  Forces of moderation and reform are firmly within the authority of, and indeed 
sanctioned and employed by, the state.  Of course, this does not suggest that an opposition could 
not develop, especially given continued material hardship, ideological decline, and regime 
ineptitude, but it does not describe the current reality.  Removing this role of a domestic 
opposition, the regime has greater opportunity to gradually modify its roles.  Facing increased 
impotence in these core areas, Pyongyang could alter its mode of operations to recapture its 
ability to provide basic services to the population and maintain a mantle of legitimacy as 
protector against imperialist forces and/or as champion of a reunified Korea.   
North Korea’s specific post-totalitarianism also involved addressing ideological change.  
Ideology and tradition are still critical inputs into policy decisions in all issue areas under 
consideration.  Juche, military-first politics, and the Kims’ personality cults are important parts 
of regime stability.  Kim does not want to be measured only on the rational outputs of his 
governance, because this raises the specter that another individual could do the job more 
effectively.  Kim references his bloodline to bolster his legitimacy and the regime continues to 
expend great energy to uphold its integrated ideological justifications of its rule.  At the same 
time, ideological erosion is common to totalitarian regimes.  As the promised utopia is not 
realized, regime calls for extreme sacrifice for a better future ring hollow.  Propaganda pays 
diminishing returns.   
The state increasingly must focus on rational results to augment this decline in 
ideological furor while not discounting the importance of ideology.  At a basic level, it must 
provide for the subsistence of its citizens.  The declining material condition of the state where it 
cannot prevent chronic food and heating shortages makes ever delayed promises of a better 
future more difficult to accept.  The state uses repression as a check on ideological decline to 
keep its grip on power, but it has not shifted to a simple, personalistic rule where repression is 
the cornerstone of regime maintenance.  Such a shift away from ideology would represent an 
important change in North Korea’s post-totalitarian institutionalism, greatly weakening its tools 
to maintain social control and political stability.  North Korea’s broad and deep institutional 
arrangements also continue to distinguish it from the less stable personalistic state.   
North Korea has developed meaningful groups that influence policy decision-making and 
implementation.  Though these groups operate within the state, this group identity and shared 
purpose breaks down the individual atomization that the totalitarian regime type encourages.  
Elites can engage in group politics in this restricted way.  More directly, the state is not as 
monolithic as totalitarianism suggests.  These groups advocate distinct policy purposes, conflict 
with and undermine one another at times, and even resist central decisions.  This disunity and 
structural conflict is the most significant difference between the post-totalitarian institutional 
model and totalitarianism and corporatism that predict relative intra-governmental harmony.   
Decision-making 
 Over this ten-year period, there are discernable periods of time where one institution’s 
preferences prevailed over another’s.  With very rare exception, no single institution could claim 
victory on all three issue areas at once nor did any institution sustain these victories indefinitely.  
North Korea’s evolution is not simply the rise of the military and/or the cabinet at the expense of 




Table 8.1: Decision-making Outcomes, 1998-2009 
Date Issue Area Policy Issue Lead Institution 
Sept 1998 U.S. 
Policy/Inter-
Korean 
Taepo Dong 1 Launch Credit No Resolution 
Oct 1998-May 1999 U.S. Policy Kumchang-ri Suspected Nuclear 
Facility 
Cabinet 
Nov 1998 U.S. Policy OPlan 5027 No Resolution 
Jan 1999 Economy Second Chollima March Party 
Jan 1999 All Party claims institutional 
supremacy 
Military/Cabinet 
June 1999 Inter-Korean Northern Limit Line Naval Clash Military 
July 1999 Inter-Korean Ministerial Negotiations Cabinet 
July 1999 U.S. Policy Renewed Contacts Cabinet 
September 1999 U.S. 
Policy/Inter-
Korean  
Taepo Dong 2 Launch 
preparations 
Cabinet 
June 2000 Inter-Korean First North-South Summit Cabinet 
June 2000 U.S. Policy Missile Moratorium Cabinet 
October 2000 U.S. Policy High-level visits to Pyongyang 
and Washington 
Cabinet 
January 2001 Economy Kim’s Tour of Southern China Cabinet 
March 2001  Inter-Korean  Letter exchanges and North 
Korean delegation to Seoul 
Cabinet 
May 2001 U.S. Policy / 
Inter-Korean 
Missile Moratorium  Cabinet 
May 2001 U.S. Policy Kim’s “wait and see” comment Neutral 
June 2001 Inter-Korean Naval Clash Military 




August 2001 U.S. Policy Missile launches Cabinet 
Nov 2001 Inter-Korean Ministerial Meetings Stall Military 
Dec 2001 – Feb 2002 U.S. Policy High-level U.S. comments urging 
comprehensive change in North 
Korea 
Party/Military 
June 2002 Inter-Korean / 
U.S. Policy 
Naval Clash Military 
June 2002 Inter-Korean  World Cup congratulations Cabinet 
July 2002 Economy Wage and price reforms Cabinet 






(Table 8.1 continued) 
Sept 2002 Inter-Korean Road/rail links, family reunions, 
unified sports team 
Cabinet 
Oct 2002 U.S. Policy US visit to Pyongyang Party/Military 
Nov 2002 Economy  Economics education Cabinet 
Nov 2002 Inter-Korean Kaesong Groundbreaking Cabinet 
March 2003 Inter-Korean Economic projects continue amid 
challenges over rail explosion 
Cabinet 
May 2005 U.S. Policy Announces reprocessed fuel rods Party/Military 
June 2005 Inter-Korean Celebrate anniversary of inter-
Korean summit 
Cabinet 
June 2005 U.S. Policy Dying wish comment  Cabinet 
Sept 2005 U.S. Policy Agreement on Guiding Principles Cabinet 
Sept 2005 U.S. Policy LWR demand and reaction to 
BDA 
Party/Military 
Nov 2005 Economy Reintroduction of the PDS Party/Military 
July 2006 U.S. Policy TD-2 flight test Military/Party 
Oct 2006 U.S. Policy Nuclear test Military/Party 
Jan 2007 U.S. Policy Berlin agreement Cabinet 
Feb 2007 U.S. Policy Six Party agreement on 
denuclearization 
Cabinet 
Feb 2007 Inter-Korean Contacts resume Cabinet 
Apr 2007 Economy Cabinet Premier Pak replaced 
with less influential technocrat 
Party/Military 
June 2007 U.S. Policy US official in Pyongyang; BDA 
resolved; begin denuclearization  
Cabinet 
Sept 2007 U.S. Policy Lifting some sanctions for 
disablement deal  
Cabinet 
Nov 2007 Inter-Korean Commit to economic projects 
with South 
Cabinet 
Feb 2008 Inter-Korean North’s negative reaction to new 
ROK president begins 
Military/Party 
July 2008 U.S. Policy NK destroys cooling tower; U.S. 
starts food aid deliveries 
Cabinet 
July 2008 U.S. Policy Delay in terrorist list removal Party/Military 
Oct 2008 U.S. Policy Terrorist list removal Cabinet 
Jan 2009 U.S. Policy NK tries to recast the terms of 








rationalization of the system.  Table 8.1 documents the institutions that wrestled agenda control 
on all three issue areas.  Though all debates do not have a clear winner and loser, are of equal 
importance, or have the same lasting effect, this summary table demonstrates that no single 
institution has won out over the others in a sustained fashion.   
North Korea’s polity has grown relatively more rational than in the past, but this does not 
suggest that the cabinet is the new preeminent institution in North Korean politics or that one 
should expect it to take on this role.  Quite the contrary, the most recent evidence points to a 
reversal of many of the cabinet’s early gains in economic and inter-Korean policy.  North 
Korea’s current system is stable because institutions check one another and blend rational policy 
justifications with ideological ones.  Policy decisions oscillate between favoring the party, 
military, and cabinet’s agendas.  Each institution has won and lost bureaucratic battles, but the 
war has no end in sight.  Institutional conflict, not cooperation, contributes to the regime’s 
stability.  
The table also shows that simplifying these three institutions to “hardliners” and 
“pragmatists” by collapsing the party and military into one “hardliner” category has only limited 
usefulness.  This conclusion overlooks the decades of well-entrenched bitter divides between the 
party and military.  The “Party/Military” label, for example, should not be read as a joint policy 
win.  These institutions argued separately – with distinct justifications – for a similar outcome.  
The military institution, for example, is actually quite pragmatic but also hard-line.  It does not 
reject accommodation strategies with enemies because they are imperialists but because in their 
estimation doing so undermines state security.  Furthermore, defining elites as “pragmatists” and 
“hard-liners” without reference to institution creates artificial, amorphous groups that are not 
coherent political actors within the state.  These “groups” are not discernible clusters of regime 
elites influencing decisions or modifying policy implementation in any organized fashion.  The 
nature of the table’s effort to summarize outcomes hides the more complex picture of inter-
bureaucratic struggle.  However, it is important to note that there are no permanent coalitions 
between institutions and no observed evidence of explicit and sustained collusion.  Indeed, 
Figure 8.1 shows much the same story with an emphasis on the timeline.  In short, Table 8.1 and 
Figure 8.1 do not clearly show a systematic pattern in North Korean politics.  No single 
institution is on top of the others.    
If this table and figure do not show a discernable pattern influencing North Korean 
decisionmaking, the natural question remains: what does?  Figures 8.3-8.5 help bring out some 
of the core conclusions of this study not found in the table.  The picture is much clearer if one 
breaks down agenda control by issue area.  These figures show the most general of sketches of 
agenda control over the decade under consideration in this study.  I smooth out the trend lines to 
bring to the fore strategic and long-lasting shifts in North Korean institutional agenda control.  
The empirical reality is much messier than this trend, of course, and documented in detail in 
chapters five through seven, but the big picture should not be lost in the weeds and is fairly 





 Figure 8.1: Institutional Lead by Issue Area, 1998-2009 
 
Figure 8.2: Institutional Lead on Economic Policy, 1998-2009 
Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy ushered in a new period in inter-Korean relations that 
lasted throughout his and his successor’s administrations.  Delays and difficulties abounded in 
inter-Korean relations, but the cabinet’s agenda won out internally in North Korea as the primary 
strategic orientation towards the South.  However, with a new administration in Seoul in early 
2008 and its tougher line towards the North, the cabinet lost its control over inter-Korean 
relations as the party and military’s advocacy gained increased resonance in Pyongyang.  
Control over economic policy likewise had two major inflection points during this time.  
Kim empowered the cabinet to take over economic policy after his tour of Southern China’s 
financial centers and special economic zones in 2001.  For four years, the cabinet implemented 
various economic reforms, emphasizing greater reliance on markets and localized management  
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Figure 8.3: Institutional Lead on Inter-Korean Policy, 1998-2009 
 
to distribute goods and provide workers incentives to produce.  However, when the party’s 
observations that this created social irregularities, including creating a new wealthy class of 
businessmen that the regime may have a harder time controlling and left vulnerable populations 
so destitute that the stark contrast further eroded the regime’s claim to protect socialism, 
Pyongyang eventually shifted.  Once food security could be reasonably assured for the year, Kim 
gave the power over strategic economic questions back to the party which reversed several of the 
cabinet’s liberalizing endeavors.   
The regime’s approach to U.S. policy has been more complicated.  Figure 8.3 shows 
considerably more variance than the two-inflection point figures on inter-Korean and economic 
policy.  However, the trend here can be simplified further as well.  Cabinet organizations, 
particularly the Foreign Ministry, led on U.S. policy until shortly after terrorists struck the 
United States on September 11, 2001.  The Foreign Ministry engaged both the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations primarily on the North’s long-range missile programs.  When repeated 
comments by senior Administration officials in late 2001 and early 2002 convinced Pyongyang 
of the party and military’s arguments that Washington could not be trusted and sought to 
eradicate the North Korean regime, the cabinet lost its lead over U.S. policy.  Party and military 
outlets emphasized armaments over paper agreements as U.S.-DPRK confrontation intensified 
over the coming years.  The cabinet ultimately failed to wrestle back agenda control over U.S. 
policy until after the North’s nuclear test in 2006.   
The cabinet briefly regained agenda control in late summer 2005 when Washington appointed a 
new lead negotiator with seemingly greater authority to deal, but this quickly fell apart after the 
six parties agreed to the guiding principles of future negotiations.  The party and military pointed 
to Washington’s new financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia that cut the North off from the 
international financial system and were labeled internally as part of Washington’s “suffocation” 







strategy that revealed the “imperialists’” efforts to promote regime change through other means.  
The argument carried the day in Pyongyang as the cabinet lost its newly-acquired leeway.     
Figure 8.4: Institutional Lead on U.S. Policy, 1998-2009 
 
Strategic change in the North’s policy towards the United States occurred after North 
Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test.  With a tested nuclear deterrent in hand, the cabinet 
reengaged the Americans from what the state considered a position of strength.  Though the 
party and military temporarily took back agenda control in late summer 2008 over what 
Pyongyang saw as the U.S. backtracking on its commitment to remove North Korea from the 
terrorism list, the cabinet again took center stage once Washington completed this action in 
October 2008.   
Importance of the Internal Mechanism 
 One may argue that understanding this internal mechanism is not necessary to understand 
North Korean responses.  An observer could theorize that treating North Korea as a reactive 
black box explains its responding to a perceived hard-line policy from Washington or Seoul with 
its own hard-line.  Economic policy is more difficult to explain without reference to the internal 
situation, but one may dismiss it as relatively unimportant as unrelated to questions of high 
politics.  Though there is some value to this basic shorthand for explaining North Korean actions, 
this section argues that the explanation and prediction of North Korean actions is not nearly as 
specific or productive without a full understanding of the internal mechanism of policy 
formulation, execution, and sustainability.   
 The primary difficulty with the contention that North Korean policy choices can be 
explained without reference to the internal mechanism is that it makes more difficult mediating 
between competing theories of North Korean actions.   On U.S. policy, for example, is the state 
proactively pursuing security through nuclear, missile, and other asymmetric capabilities without 
reference to foreign actions or is it willing to denuclearize in exchange for progress towards 
other goals?  There is a logical claim to both theories with tremendous impact on foreign policy 







choices of several states in East Asia and the United States.  If Pyongyang is pursuing 
nuclearization without reference to foreign actions, then denuclearization negotiations are a 
waste of time and resources and unnecessarily limit more coercive options against the state.  
Likewise, if foreign powers can convince North Korea to give up its nuclear drive without force, 
then the relevant actors can potentially avoid a high-cost military conflict to achieve these goals.  
One purpose of this study is to argue that the empirical evidence should mediate between these 
theories rather than preconception.  As is often the case, empirical reality is much more complex 
than neat theories allow, but policy-relevant conclusions are not beyond the pale.  
 This study shows that Pyongyang, beyond tactical posturing, has demonstrated a strategic 
commitment at times to abandon negotiations with the Americans outright and pursue its nuclear 
and missile capabilities but also has shown an ability to slow or halt this drive under other 
conditions.  Seizing on data selectively rather than systematically can bolster either theory but is 
not an intellectually honest evaluation of either argument.  The more useful question, therefore, 
is what explains these variant strategies?  Put differently, under what conditions does the regime 
consider halting or reversing its nuclear drive?  If this can be identified, policymakers can 
proceed to the normative question as to whether those conditions are worth meeting.   
The evidence presented here indicates North Korea is a highly reactive state, specifically 
in its U.S. policy.  The cabinet, party, and military consistently advocate their agenda on U.S. 
policy and define the specifics of what each of those agendas consist of, but the simple decision 
as whether to empower the cabinet, party, or military over the other comes down to the basic 
calculation of atmosphere.  Regardless of the shape of the table in negotiations with room for 
two, three, four, or six parties, Washington has more control over this variable than any other 
single driver.  Pyongyang is concerned with Washington, and Washington’s actions can get 
Pyongyang to move.   
This is not to suggest that the United States is responsible for North Korea’s actions but 
simply to note that it has more power over the state in terms of inducements than it usually 
recognizes and less power of coercion than it often assumes.  North Korea is not strategically 
proactive in its U.S. policy.  It will take the lead to get Washington’s attention, try to define the 
agenda, or take a hard-line against the United States when conditions are not in its favor but it 
usually does not pass on an opportunity to enhance its security and economic situation when it 
deems the time is ripe. 
Pyongyang responds to both symbols and substance.  Symbols have greater role for North 
Korea’s ideologues, in particular – a point lost if one treats the country as a black box. It is 
generally accepted that ideology is eroding in North Korea but has some residual role.  This 
model helps one explain concretely the effect of ideology on policy decisions and the regime’s 
functions.  Ideology remains an important component of regime legitimacy and one set of 
arguments for or against certain policy options.  It helps explain North Korean actions that seem 
to defy logic at first glance without serving as a simple excuse for failure to understand the 
North’s decision.  Put differently, the ideology variable is not akin to arguing that Westerners 
cannot understand the Confucian or Korean mind – a contention I find neither accurate nor 
helpful.  Ideology is not a “spigot variable” to be turned on and off when the model fails – either 
by overpredicting or underpredicting a certain behavior – but concretely points towards pressure 




More broadly, another important question addressed by this study is what are the 
regime’s core goals?  It is a relatively simple enterprise to identify managing its relationship with 
the United States and South Korea and revitalizing its economy are core goals, but there are very 
different paths that Pyongyang can take to address each of these three issues with tremendous 
impact on the future of the state and region.  The regime has demonstrated its ability to try a 
diversity of approaches that are inexplicable and puzzling without reference to the internal 
mechanism.  Given the country’s dismal economic situation, the cabinet articulates economic 
revitalization as critical to the regime’s existence; it places the economic question on par with 
other existential security threats, which military opponents criticize.  The regime must balance 
between competing goals – ideological and rational.  Analyses that begin with a clear 
presumption about the regime’s goals and conclude that it will never attempt a certain course of 
action without qualification of circumstances overstate their case.   
Understanding how these three strategic issue areas interact helps explain why the regime 
does not react consistently to foreign policy options from Washington or Seoul without reference 
to the other issue areas.  Importantly, Kim’s divide-and-rule governance would make 
empowering a single institution on all three issue areas itself puzzling.  Though providing 
consistency in advancing one of the policy platforms, this move would weaken Kim’s 
institutional check on the empowered institution.  Kim would be skirting the system of rule he 
has molded if he granted the military, for example, its comprehensive agenda and would have 
eroded the most significant barriers from the military ruling the system – de facto or otherwise.  
Indeed, as Figure 8.1 shows, no one institution has been able to sustain its agenda on all three 
issue areas for any significant period of time since 1998.   
During this period of post-totalitarian institutionalism, Pyongyang has demonstrated an 
ability to manage this interaction by linking and de-linking issue areas.  All three institutions 
utilized all contemporary information at their disposal to present arguments to advance their 
internally-consistent, comprehensive agendas.  And while each institution’s comprehensive 
agenda had a certain logic, the state empowering one institution on one issue and another 
institution on another simultaneously blocked each of these comprehensive platforms from being 
advanced.  Put differently, this study shows that it is incorrect to say that North Korea does not 
have a strategy for the way forward or an explicit cause for being.  It has three, and the state as a 
whole has simply only empowered certain aspects of each strategy at any given time, giving the 
impression that the state lacks a central purpose or is doing anything more than “muddling 
through.”   
 This point has important implications for those crafting foreign policy towards North 
Korea.  Part of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy, for example, theorized that unconditional 
engagement towards the North that included significant economic aid and development 
assistance would provide incentives for Pyongyang to reform its economy and open up to the 
outside world.  Faced with serious economic problems, the regime would come to realize the 
necessity of diplomatic rapprochement with Seoul and Washington if sanctions were to be 
removed and North Korea integrated into the international order.  The policy also hoped to 
gradually shift the social structure by encouraging a new class of businessmen in North Korea 
who developed their wealth from non-state employment and may press for greater business 




The policy was a sophisticated and proactive approach towards the North that slowly 
made inroads into changing the North’s social structure, but it ultimately proved inconclusive in 
governing the North’s economic choices.  The North’s strategic economic choices have not 
correlated with its inter-Korean policy.  For a time, Pyongyang empowered the cabinet to pursue 
economic reform policies but South Korean aid largely did not encourage the state to advance or 
retreat from these strategic choices.  This study demonstrates that the North Korean leadership 
empowered one institution over another on economic policy based on two considerations: 
internal politics and realization of ground realities within North Korean society.   
Kim dramatically empowered the cabinet on economic policy after he saw for himself the 
tremendous differences in level of development in Southern China and North Korea.  His 
scathing attacks on the party’s policy produced the most sweeping economic changes in North 
Korea to date.  He backed off these policies with much less (observed) fanfare.  Party arguments 
about corruption, sufficient food availability, a rising class of rich businessmen that could skirt 
regime control, and general modification of the social structure that Seoul had hoped for 
prompted the central leadership to switch course.  Though the renewed administrative control 
over the economy has remained paramount, the cabinet’s more vocal recognition of corruption 
and social ills that accompany this reversal may presage yet another shift back towards 
marketization and economic reform in the near term.   
This analysis also points to the importance of Washington and Seoul finding common 
ground in its approach towards the North.  Though it is popular to note that Pyongyang tries to 
create a “wedge” between these two allies in their approach towards the North, it has not 
required much help in this regard over the period in this study.  Electoral politics in the United 
States and South Korea have stimulated significantly different approaches to North Korea.  For 
example, by the time the Bush Administration completed its policy review of North Korea policy 
and shortly thereafter shifted to a harder line towards North Korea after 9/11, a liberal president 
occupied the Blue House in Seoul intensely committed to inter-Korean engagement.  The 
critically important U.S.-South Korean alliance failed to produce a unified view of policy 
towards North Korea.  President Bush reversed course after the October 2006 nuclear test and 
November 2006 elections that gave Democrats control of both houses of Congress.  As the U.S. 
reached out to North Korea diplomatically, South Korean public opinion turned against 
engagement and its lame duck president could do little to stem the tide.  By the end of 2007, 
South Korea elected a conservative president committed to a tougher line as the United States 
continued to engage.   
Pyongyang exploited these differences tactically, but they did not have to work very hard 
to do so.  Indeed, this study shows how certain bureaucratic actors tried to do precisely the 
opposite.  Party opponents to inter-Korean engagement tried to link Washington and Seoul’s 
policies to make its case against a separate, generally conciliatory policy towards the South.  
Pyongyang’s strategic interests do not always call for separating Washington and Seoul.  Instead 
its strategic objectives are most straightforward.  If one ally is offering it concessions and 
pursuing a conciliatory policy, then it tries to get the other to do the same.  Arguments that the 
North needs an enemy and oscillates between identifying the Americans and South Koreans for 
this purpose are interesting and theoretically persuasive as distinct possibilities, but the empirical 




North Korea, Comparative Politics, and Downstream Consequences 
Like every state, North Korea is unique at a certain level of specificity.  However, 
asserting that it is non-comparable is unproductive and unpersuasive.  Understanding the state 
requires reference points, and building comparative theory has wider applications beyond this 
one state.  North Korea presumed oddity does not discount the ability to derive more general 
lessons about a group of post-totalitarian states.  As noted at the outset of this study, there is a 
variety of post-totalitarian states that makes sub-classifying these states fruitful.  Post-Maoist 
China looks very different than contemporary Romania, for example.  Refining the varieties of 
post-totalitarianism helps us understand the state’s functions and, consequently, contextualize 
and predict its policy responses.  In short, North Korea and states like it should be brought into 
the comparative politics tradition more thoroughly.   
Classifying a state as a part of a particular typology should have some utility.  This is not 
simply a labeling exercise.  In North Korea’s case, post-totalitarian institutionalism’s variant of 
the post-totalitarian set has specific, non-obvious downstream consequences.  These are 
important to answer the question why this characterization matters.  They are not necessarily 
intuitive without the model, making the effort to classify and characterize post-totalitarian states 
more helpful to both academics and foreign policy practitioners.   
Post-totalitarian institutional states like North Korea are more moderate than their 
totalitarian predecessors.  Observers rarely label North Korean actions as measured or moderate, 
but the appropriate comparison must be made.  Pyongyang’s actions are certainly further out of 
step with international norms than other post-totalitarian states like Russia, China, or even Cuba.  
One may argue that North Korea is one of, if not the, most extreme state in the world.  It is a 
small, impoverish state, surrounded by three of the largest economies in the world.  It officially 
clings to communist mantras when the world movement has long since faded.  It maintains the 
highest conscription rate in the world and holds to self sufficiency as it fails – chronically – to 
feed its own population.  However, recognizing the differences between North Korea today and 
North Korea two decades ago requires comparing these two states in time.  Comparing North 
Korea today to other contemporary states has other uses, but understanding the moderation thesis 
requires a comparison to itself.  Simply put, one must look at how the state has evolved to see if 
it has moderated or grown more extreme.   
North Korea’s post-totalitarian institutionalism under Kim Jong Il is more moderate than 
the totalitarian North Korea under Kim Il Sung.  Post-totalitarian institutional states bring the 
expert and compartmented knowledge of its modern bureaucracy into national-level decisions.  
The modern bureaucracy is more than a transmission belt, implementing ideologically-defined 
policy; bureaucrats contribute specified knowledge to national decisions.  A greater diversity of 
policy inputs affects policy decisions and implementation than under the previous regime where 
a single party applied a general ideology to make decisions.  Under post-totalitarian 
institutionalism, technocrats and ideologues moderate one another in the sense that more 
components of the perceived national interest are integrated into policymaking.  Policymaking 
becomes more representative of the state’s composition, and the state’s composition reflects a 
broader set of interests.  This does not make the state in any way democratic or democratizing 




Moderation does not necessarily mean aligning policy decisions with internationally 
proscribed norms.  However, it does institutionalize a counterweight to a singular policy metric, 
and, in practice, the post-totalitarian institutional state also moderates according to international 
norms.  Communist orthodoxy is out of step with contemporary global norms, and pragmatic 
national interests are closer to international norms, ceteris paribus.  This does not mean that a 
sovereign state may not decide to develop nuclear weapons or maintain a large military to 
provide for its security, restrict foreign influences or capital, or take actions with international 
repercussions to satisfy domestic political needs.  Indeed, one may argue that many democracies 
do many of these things to a certain degree.  This does mean, however, that the post-totalitarian 
institutional state is more rational.  It places less emphasis on a radical ideology to guide policy.  
It makes economic decisions, for example, more in accordance with contemporary international 
norms than under Kim Il Sung.  Though North Korea could not join the International Monetary 
Fund tomorrow, it has at least voiced a tenuous interest and could conceivably meet its 
requirements for admittance with some effort.  Its policy towards its southern neighbor is not 
exclusively dominated by a leadership committed to reunifying the state by force at the earliest 
opportunity.  Reaching strategic accommodation with the hegemon is a distinct possibility.  In 
effect, post-totalitarian institutional states are more moderate than their predecessors, because the 
current international norm favors pragmatic self-interest over ideologically-guided policy.   
The model also suggests that this category of states is stable.  North Korea is not 
muddling through or seeking a new modus operandi.  Post-totalitarian institutionalism is 
sustainable.  Though no one within the state chose this type of systemic function, it is still a 
stable political outcome.  Party efforts in North Korea to reassert the old system have repeatedly 
failed.  The cabinet and military have not been able to dominate either.  These peer institutions 
advocate at cross-purposes under the authority of central leadership, and one does not have to 
eventually win in a permanent way.  Indeed, an extensive set of checks prevent one institution 
from trying to usurp power over the others, and a security-conscious central leadership has a 
strong interest in maintaining a balance that it can control.  Regime leadership has not forsaken 
terror or the permanent purge to maintain control.  Though the state plays a precarious balancing 
act where tipping too far to one side in these inter-institutional debates could unravel the system, 
maintaining a long-term balance is indeed possible.   
Furthermore, this concept of balance means the model provides analysts specific areas to 
watch that may portend a strategic shift in policy.  This study has consistently demonstrated that 
a close reading of these debates can effectively show where the state is likely to move.  When 
one institution goes silent for a prolonged period of time in face of strong advocacy from another 
rival institution or when an institution mildly supports its rival institution’s position, then the 
state shortly thereafter generally takes action in accord with the strongly presented advocacy.  
When the three rival institutions agree on policy in media debates, the central authorities usually 
follow by deciding to implement that unanimous bureaucratic position.   
North Korea’s Future 
The search for balance among the three institutions also gives analysts special ability to 
forecast longer term changes as well.  If the balance is permanently broken, then the system is 
undergoing significant change.  If one institution is able to thwart another not on specific policy 




ability to function, then one should expect significant change.  Put differently, post-totalitarian 
institutionalism requires a plural set of institutions.  Breaking this institutional balance breaks the 
system.  The specific circumstances would help determine whether such a change meant moving 
away from post-totalitarian institutionalism towards a more liberal polity or retrenchment.  
Currently, it is hard to see how North Korea could break from this political system without a 
substantial shock.   
The most predictable shock is the death or permanent incapacitation of Kim Jong Il.  
Kim’s health came into sharp relief in early Fall 2008 after he suffered a stroke.  Though this 
study will not shed additional light on this specific incident, it does raise the more important 
issue to recognize: Kim is mortal, and he is not the system.  The system will eventually have to 
address leadership change at the top.  The top decision-maker is important, but a new leadership 
will not immediately revolutionize the system.  It will have to deal with the same institutions that 
have demonstrated their staying power.  Decisions may shift within the margins defined by these 
institutions, but the regime is unlikely to fall apart quickly or suddenly shift course with another 
person or group of people at the top.  Though the succession issue is certainly important, there is 
an overabundance of attention on this variable compared to the minimal attention paid to the 
larger systemic question for which Kim is but one important part.   
There are several plausible options for leadership at the top after Kim’s death.  Kim’s 
brother-in-law Chang Song Taek, one of Kim’s three sons, or someone else could simply replace 
Kim as the top leader.  Alternatively, a collective leadership could emerge to replace the Dear 
Leader composed of representatives from each of these three powerful institutions.  Though there 
has been contradictory evidence that Kim may have tapped one or another of his sons as his 
successor, it remains questionable whether even a formal and unambiguous designation would 
have much weight after Kim Jong Il’s incapacitation or death.  Kim’s much more powerful father 
took two decades and several purges to lay the groundwork for Kim’s own succession, so it is by 
no means certain that elites would accept Kim Jong Il’s dying wish.      
Despite the several unknowns in such a transition period, North Korea will evolve from 
its current political state as a highly institutionalized, modern state.  Whomever or whatever 
follows Kim will follow from Kim’s polity’s post-totalitarian institutional starting point.  It is not 
likely to quickly collapse like a personalist state after the death of the supreme strongman nor is 
it likely to evolve towards what analysts abroad consider that the state “needs” based on decades 
of ideological indoctrination or the Kims’ cult of personality.  It will evolve from its current 
starting point – potentially radically – but not without reference to the present functions and 
institutions that have real power in North Korean politics.  In short, North Korea’s strong 
institutions constrain the plausible possibilities for the near term in a post-Kim Jong Il North 
Korea and make comprehensive change in the successor regime less likely.  Even in the most 
radical political change in North Korea that occurred after the Japanese defeat in World War II, 
Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary polity had to deal with existing trained administrators and 
institutional structure to modify it.  Despite the many unknowns, one can say with a high degree 
of confidence that North Korea’s current institutions will be a relevant feature in any transition 
scenario.   
Focusing on what is known rather than the unknown helps narrow the range of more 




easily taking control is unlikely.  The long and lethal history between the Korean Peoples Army 
and State Security Department suggests that one will attempt to prevent the other from taking 
control.  These organizations could conceivably fight one another in a type of civil war for 
control but they could also deter one another as well.  What can be written with greater 
confidence is that individual ambition and fear of what may come if a rival takes power will 
likely trump the collective interest in stability.  Though most North Korea analysts predict a 
peaceful transition of some form, there is certainly a possibility that individual groups, especially 
if faced with a rival coming to power, could risk everything to secure their own position on top.  
Like a basic prisoner’s dilemma, the focus should be on the action of individual players – in this 
case, institutions with power – rather than the collective interest of elites.  In this sense, a 
transition could be bloody and destabilizing in the short-term, but Kim’s senior inner circle with 
tentacles into every major institution provide additional means to keep a lid on this type of 
leadership crisis.  In short, one should not rule out the possibility of a bloody transition and 
understand the histories and interests of the players that may be involved in such a scenario 
should it develop.  
Nevertheless, Kim Jong Il has not announced a successor like his father did.  Kim Il Sung 
purged those opposed to the appointment, and the Kims’ personality cult preparations made the 
father-to-son transition easier.  In a certain respect, one of Kim Jong Il’s sons may enjoy some of 
the authority of this weakening personality cult, but that does not preclude a non-Kim from 
attempting the job or even maintaining long-term control over North Korea.   The model reminds 
us that analysts should not speculate on what the North’s leadership needs to be successful or 
other normative arguments about how the regime should change to address the question how it 
likely will change.  Focusing on the evolution concept means focusing on how the system is now 
and how it may change to form the next regime.  That next regime need not be stable or survive 
but it must be an outgrowth of North Korea’s current reality.   
Discussion of possible successors is the topic du jour with more speculation than data.  
Indeed, one point of this study is to demonstrate that the question is not as important as most 
assume, since Kim is not the system.  Nevertheless, the question has merit and requires an 
evaluation of the data publicly available.  Kim’s eldest son, Kim Chong Nam, resides in China 
and is reportedly out of favor with his father.  He does not hold onto any of the reigns of power 
that would make him likely to emerge as the sole leader without help from someone within the 
state.  Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, Chang Song Taek, could possibly align with his nephew, but 
he too may simply become the new supreme leader himself.  Alternatively, Kim Chong Nam’s 
two younger brothers – both in their 20s – could take up the post with Kim Jong Un enjoying the 
greatest prospects of the three.  However, this parlor game of guessing who will be the next 
supreme leader is truly irrelevant if one cannot say anything about how those successors may 
rule differently than Kim Jong Il or each other.  It is unclear if swapping Kim Jong Un with Kim 
Jong Nam would make much difference as they seem to espouse many of the same positions as 
the current supreme leader and would be constrained by the same institutional system currently 
in place.    
The individual best positioned to be a real power broker if not the de facto ruler himself 
is Chang Song Taek with extensive experience and contacts necessary to control some of North 




of a personal following in the mid-2000s but brought him back into his inner circle after a few 
years of “reeducation.”  Chang has significant responsibilities over the party and government but 
lacks control over the military and does not have a blood relationship with Kim Il Sung.  If he 
came to replace Kim Jong Il, Chang would need to find a way to establish his legitimacy in 
North Korea’s long history of myth making.  Both Kims significantly embellished and rewrote 
their resumes before and after coming to power, so this may not be as difficult of a task as some 
commentators have implied.  Kim Il Sung’s legitimacy stems from his claims revolutionary 
heroism, so Chang would need to link his family to the revolution more than Kim Il Sung to tap 
into this source of internal legitimacy.  Alternatively, he could establish his legitimacy over time 
by actually improving the rational functions of the North Korean system.  If Chang decided to 
turn the state in another direction from his predecessor, he would need to do so through the 
North’s current institutions.  He could modify the institutional structure over time, but Chang or 
any one of the Kims initially would essentially manage Kim Jong Il’s bureaucracy as Kim Jong 
Il initially sought to manage Kim Il Sung’s system.   
North Korea’s political future is still a great unknown, inevitably shaped by future events.  
However, it will change from a knowable present.  Understanding how the state functions 
currently helps guide policy decisions from neighboring states that could influence not only 
short-term policy choices but long-term ones as well.  Kim Jong Il’s system has reacted with a 
certain level of predictability.  As a reactionary state with a particular security focus on the 
United States, Washington has more power over the country than it often assesses, albeit of a 
different nature than often assumed.  Sanctions and military moves can have some effect with 
opportunity costs, but the lessons of this study are that Washington and Seoul in particular have 
an important role to play in influencing North Korea’s internal debate.  Empowering the 
cabinet’s agenda more effectively achieves American and South Korean policy goals than 
attempting to strong arm the country that is deeply dug in against military moves and its isolated 
economy is relatively immune from sanction efforts.   
North Korea is a reactive system that is knowable and moldable.  It is not a strange 
enigma that should be treated without reference to comparative theory or historical interactions.  
It is an extreme polity that produces a great deal of suffering for its own people and insecurity for 
an important region, but it also can be known and tamed.  Understanding the bureaucratic 
positions of the main political institutions helps us peer inside North Korea’s red box, explain 
why this state responds to events the way it does, and proactively craft policies in Seoul and 
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